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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For information on the marabtin or "client tribes, " see Category 619.]

175 795 648 bat from al-Qasr joined the Sanusi army. The importance of their contribution to the Sanusi effort is vague, even though most of my informants claimed that their fathers "fought the British." Some of the al-Qasr activity was on a part-time basis. [124] One informant, whose father was the paramount leader of the 'Aishaibat tribe in 1916, told me that his father "used to take his rifle and ride out every morning to join the troops of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif (the grandson of al-Sanusi al-kabiir), and there he would kill many British soldiers. Then he would come home again at night." There was at least one group of al-Qasr Bedouins who joined the Sanusi in Libya before the start of the war. After the end of the fighting, this group returned to Egypt and asked to be pardoned by the British. They appealed to the Governor of Marsa Matruh that there should be no reprisals taken against them since the Turks had actually forced them to fight for the Sanusi. The British Governor, who was fluent in the Bedouin dialect and considered a great man by the Bedouins, replied to them in the form of a famous Bedouin proverb: "The ropes can be stretched far enough for forgiveness."

175 177 554 631 648 Traditionally, the Bedouins of the Marsa Matruh area were held in check by an officially created political structure which dated from the time of Muhammad 'Ali. This structure depended upon two political roles for the control of the Awlad 'Ali, the 'umda and the shaikh, neither of which had previously existed in the Bedouin authority system.

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648 Historically, the modern aspect of role differentiation and political specialization began with the appointment of Mitkhatri 'Adam at Sidi Barrani, west of Marsa Matruh. This was under Muhammad 'Ali Pasha. The new role was that of _'umda_, the same term used for the village leader in the Valley of the Nile. The first Bedouin _'umda_ died in 1909. At this time, under the British, another political role was instituted. This new role, that of _shaikh_, was a kind of vice-_'umda_ position. The son of the first _shaikh_ is now about 80 years old [115] and still lives in Marsa Matruh. (He was my chief informant for Bedouin history.) During this early period, there were few government officials in the desert, and, according to my informant, "there was need for only a few _'umdas_ and _shaikhs_. But later there was a need for more and more. The job of these men in those times was to work for the Egyptians in their dealings with the Bedouins of the desert." The number of incumbents in the offices of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ increased as the political needs of the British grew.

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648 According to the Bedouins, the British administration did not arrive in the desert until about 1914. Up until that time, matters were in the hands of the Egyptians who governed the desert province for the colonial government. When the British arrived in Marsa Matruh, the opening of World War I was at hand. The Bedouins say, quite proudly, that the British knew of their sympathy for, and cooperation with, the Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica.

175 Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica. "When the British
648 reached Matruh, they jailed all of the 'umdas and shaikhs
•554
631 (two 'umdas and five shaikhs, at that time). Then they chose new leaders, from the families of the old leaders, to work with them." But, "these men did not fight with the British, they only acted as their guides in dealing with the Bedouins of the desert. When the old leaders were released from jail, they returned to their positions of political office. While they were in jail, their replacements had only helped the
[178] British with supplies." Apparently, the British saw the need of maintaining the continuity of the Bedouin authority structure.

175 Data on the condition of the Bedouins of the Western
648 Desert between the two world wars are absent. The Bedouins say that they lived with no trouble, or any help, from the Egyptians. The Bedouins have no fond memories of their experiences during World War II. They first heard of the war in 1940 when the Italians marched into Western Desert from Libya. The Germans occupied al-Qasr from May to October of 1942, when the famous General Rommel had his headquarters at Marsa Matruh. The British had told the Bedouins, in 1940, that they should flee the Italians, and that unless they did
175 they would be held responsible for their actions. Most of the
648 people of al-Qasr agreed to go to refugee camps at Amriyya
722 near Alexandria for the duration of the war.
166
[556] Some of the Bedouins refused to leave for Amriyya.

233 with the movement toward a cash economy, this has changed.
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[465] The shepherd receives 8 to 10 piasters for each head of sheep
which he tends. The Bedouins who have taken up farming can
spare none of their family for sheep-herding chores. If he
[497] can afford it, during the dry season, a Bedouin may ship his
sheep to the Nile Valley by train at 12 piasters per head.
But the government will not accept sheep for shipment unless
they are accompanied by a shepherd. The role of shepherd
has become a very specialized one in the al-Qasr area. Few
• [554] of the al-Qasr Bedouins are shepherds, and the role is
reserved for the poorer men without land.

241 Plowing in the garden area is done by hand. Usually,
407 the plow is pulled by a donkey but occasionally, if one can
492 afford it, a camel or a horse will be used. A man and his
[462] sons handle all of the agricultural chores with the exception
178 of the winnowing process which the women do. Traditionally,
241 barley was threshed by camels plodding on it. The Bedouins say
492 that this is the best way because the soft feet of the camel
do not crush the kernel. Now, however, very few men can afford
[407] a camel. Threshing is done with a heavy wooden sled pulled by
241 a donkey or a horse. Tractors, when available, are used for
407 agricultural plowing in the southern barley zone. This zone,
434 during the year 1963, also became important for raising water-
433 melons (batiikh), and this product figures to be an excellent
cash crop for al-Qasr. Melons and barley can bring high profits

*613 formal leadership. Ideologically, group solidarity at this
level is explained solely in terms of patrilineality; in
fact, local contiguity and explicit contractual ties are
*613 just as important. When we add to this the principle of
582 cognation in the form of the Bedouin preferred form of
marriage, parallel-cousin marriage, the resulting structure
is what Emrys Peters (1965) has called "the corporate group
[183] *par excellence*." But, as we shall see later, father's
brother's daughter-marriage is more of a cultural ideal than
it is a social reality in al-Qasr.

*613 The interplay of kinship, residence and contract ties
•554 defines a corporate structure of authority and also informs
571 an external system of authority relations including all who
claim descent from 'Ali 'Aqar, son of the mythological Sa'ada.
The feeling of "corporateness," and the concomitant structural
demands upon the individual changes as the scope of political
action widens. This degree of corporate feeling is related
to the structural differentiation between what has been interpreted as "domestic relations based on kinship and descent"
and "the field of political relations" (Fortes 1953:26). In
121 *613 this study, I maintain that both the internal and the external
554 systems of relations are "political" since power and legitimate
571 authority are exercized in both. Therefore, rather than use
the terms "domestic" and "political," I shall refer to the
internal system of political relations and the external system

121 of political relations. The structural differentiation be-
*613 tween them relates to certain specifics of role differentia-
●554 tion and articulation, and corporate goals. Different roles
571 function differently in different spheres of politics. This is clear when we consider that the two structural aspects of corporate group politics serve the double purpose of insuring local autonomy while promoting integration into the larger lineage segments. This I will cover more thoroughly in the next chapter. Most of the discussion here deals with social structure and, in particular, the internal elements of the corporate group.

*613 In the total societal context, the tertiary segment
619 is pivotal for the conceptualization of two models: the Bedouin's model of his tribal system, and the observer's model of a segmentary lineage system. Both of these constructs are shown in Figure 7.[1] Both genealogical models can be completed by the addition of Figures 2, 3, and 8, extending the systems both horizontally and vertically.

Theoretically, all of the levels of the Awlad 'Ali tribal system constitute a political community, i.e., the various segments shown in Figure 3 regulate and maintain relations with each other through complementary opposition (Fallers 1963). But in fact, political action of any functional significance rarely occurs beyond the secondary lineage level. In terms of the structural principles, agnation, real or

[1] [See p. 77--Analyst]

*613 619 fictive, has practical political consequences only at the tertiary and secondary levels of segmentation. Most political activity in al-Qasr is the result of either cooperation or conflict between corporate groups the size of Bait 'Umar or 'Ailit Ma'fas. 'Ailit Ma'fas is made up of five structurally replicated political groups such as Bait 'Umar. Toward outsiders, [609] these five groups act as one; they represent a corporate entity before the rest of the tribe. As a member of 'Ailit Ma'fas, an individual has jural status in the whole tribe. *613 619 •554 He also has the means and the moral obligation to articulate his interests and to settle his arguments with other members of the tribe. When an individual is involved in an activity which relates to matters of power and authority, he is playing a political role in the political process. The units which make up the internal and external political systems of the 'Aishaibat tribe of al-Qasr are roles. Roles then are the 121 *613 619 554 analytical focus of this study. Of course, I realize that the concrete entities present in al-Qasr are human beings. I only use roles as methodological constructs in order to abstract from, and to understand, Bedouin behavior. By conceptualizing sets of roles as structures, we will be able to understand the internal and external political structures as well as the traditional and modern political structures of Bedouin society. In al-Qasr, these political roles and structures emerge from the more generalized kinship structure

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 79]

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and are related to the organizational principles mentioned above.

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The Awlad 'Ali represent a cultural entity whose membership is defined in patrilineal terms. Cutlurally, and genealogically, they are related to the Cyrenaican Bedouin but distinct from the Egyptians of the Nile Valley. The political system of the Awlad 'Ali can be extended to include Cyrenaicans "as Bedouins" but it can only interact with the Egyptians "as foreigners." This means that the Awlad 'Ali possess common roles, structures, and cultural institutions which can articulate with those of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. In the case of the Egyptians, however, social interaction calls forth new cultural categories and new structural elements in Bedouin society. This is the basis of political change in al-Qasr. Role differentiation and ideological replacement are taking place vis a vis the nation-state: the traditional political structure of the Bedouins is adapting to the Egyptian political environment. In the language of the "politics of modernization," this process is referred to as "politicization" or "political socialization." We shall deal with this process in later chapters.

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The principles which relate the Bedouins of al-Qasr to other Bedouins of the Western Desert and Libya are the organizational principles of kinship, residence, and contract; but the principle which relates them to the Egyptian state is

Familial Authority and Rights and Duties in Kin Relations

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The analysis of authority structure, whether it has reference to a group as small as the family or as large as the nation, assumes as its unit of study the social position or the role. The role is the organized complex of rights and duties by which individuals, or categories of individuals, participate in an interactive process. Roles are linked together into a set, or a structure, by the rights which incumbents claim and the duties they fulfill (Linton 1936:113; Parsons and Shils 1951:23; Gluckman 1963:185). The heuristic value of role analysis is well established. Role theory has been referred to as "the highest level of generalization about social phenomena that has yet become in any sense operational (Southall 1959:17).

Since all social roles possess rights and duties just because they are defined with respect to other roles, we may assume that each and every social role has an authoritative aspect to it. The authoritative aspect of roles refers to the way in which authority positions relate in order to give form to an authority structure. We want to know how the authority positions at all levels of the authority structure function, but for the time being we are concerned with familial authority relations. Until we understand the operation of authority at the familial level, which is the source of legitimate political authority in a kin-based

121 571 554 moral community, we cannot proceed to a discussion of the internal and external systems of political relations.

577 181 [867] As a result of the socialization process, and through relations with other members of the family, an individual comes to recognize that his conduct is measurable by certain standards of, what is considered by the group to be, good and bad, right and wrong. In al-Qasr, such standards are intrinsically correct, or "decent" as the Bedouins say; obedience to the authority representing these standards is interpreted as a "duty."
[596] The authoritative aspect of the role of household head (shaib al-bait), and the moral obligations which it represents, emerge from and reinforce values and structural arrangements central to Bedouin social order, namely, respect for authority and devotion to social groups, the two basic elements of morality defined by Durkheim (Parsons 1937:382-385).

577 571 181 182 The value placed upon social order, and the structural mechanisms for insuring its realization and extension--kinship, residence and contract--inform an authority structure which ranges between filial piety at the family level and a set of legal norms at the level of the external political system. The fact that the Bedouins of al-Qasr are interested in integrating a larger population into their authority structure means that a common value is operative in the range of it; also that one sphere of authority will tend to merge into another.
[593] [671] Hence the father-son authority relation has importance for the strength of Bedouin customary law in the desert. The

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538 brother to special place in the social structure states that
[539] "Two-thirds of the boy belongs to the khal, and he is like the father: the remaining one-third is divided equally between the father and the khal." The Bedouins are always quick to point out to the stranger, such as I was, that this means there is only one-sixth of the boy which belongs to the father. A clearer case of the ideology of kinship versus [539] descent could not be had. Another proverb has it that "the good which you see in a boy comes from khal khalu ("the maternal uncle of his maternal uncle"). Any kinship relation may be the basis for a new network of social relations by making use of the classificatory principle. The Bedouins [539] exaggerate the status and role of the mother's brother by saying that "when a boy does good or bad, one wants to know the name of his khal not the name of his father." This statement, which favors cognatic links over patrilineal ties, is not true but such an attempt at emphasis indicates that this relationship is something of value in the Bedouin society.

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578 In the case of any conflict "between his tribes," the Bedouins say, "the boy must support the tribe of his khal." This, of course, does not mean that the individual should take up arms against his patrilineal corporate group, but that he should seek to mediate the conflict. The political
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593 value of conflict avoidance and conflict control is also
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578 conspicuous in the dual role which the mature female plays

562 in Bedouin society, that is, the role of wife-daughter. The
593 •554 principles of patrilineality and cognation do not work against
182 each other when the girl marries outside her corporate group,
578 nor does her new dual role present a case of role conflict.
562 On the contrary, the wife-daughter role functions to bind to-
593 554 gether two groups which are structurally differentiated by
182 578 the rule of patrilineality. During time of peace, the wife-
*613 daughter acts as a bond-maker by carrying gifts back and
[431] forth between the two groups, often bringing some of her
[628] [574] younger patrilineal relatives back to her husband's house or
tent for short visits. During a time of conflict or war, the
562 593 Bedouins point out, she is the only person who can cross the
554 battle lines unharmed. She is a match-maker as well as a
[726] [584] peace-maker. Often she influences the selection of mates by
individuals in both her husband's group and her father's
562 group. The Bedouins say that "after the bint 'amm, a man
593 should marry his bint khal ("mother's brother's daughter")
554 because she is like his bint 'amm." Usually, over a period
582 of a few generations, a given direction in marriage is sustained (see Figure 10), and it is one function of this wife-daughter role to accomplish this important political action.

562 The role of wife-daughter, then, may be seen as one
593 important aspect of what Fortes (1953:33) calls, "complemen-
554 tary filiation," the essential mechanism which provides the
*613 182 link between the corporate groups of al-Qasr society and the kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent.

*613 582 'Ailit Lazumi, the other lineage, along with 'Ailit Ma'fas, considered to be the most powerful in al-Qasr. In the fourth [423] case, Abd al-Latif's marriage into 'Ailit Dawlat, this individual owns an olive orchard in Dawlat territory, adjacent to that of Ma'fas, which he purchased from a member of his wife's lineage before their marriage. In every case, with *613 582 421 one exception, marriage ties are intimately related to property relations, cognation with local contiguity. The two groups become politically entwined, and property relations become a basis for authority relations.

*613 All things considered, complementary filiation is as important in Bedouin society as it is in other societies: "The bilateral family is the focal element in the web of kinship" (Fortes 1953:33). As one Bedouin wedding song puts [533] it: "The bride is the flower of the stem," the stem here symbolizing her tertiary group.

583 554 556 The amount of brideprice which a man is expected to pay will depend upon his status as an "outsider" or an "insider," and his position on the prestige scale which is figured largely in terms of wealth. A man adds to his prestige and reputation when he pays beyond the "going price" to obtain a bride for his son. On the other hand, if a man is an "outsider," he is expected to pay well beyond the normal brideprice for the privilege of marrying into the family, and he receives no additional prestige unless he goes even higher than what is

583 •554 556 expected. The price is set by the corporate group but can vary, and usually does, from one tertiary segment to another. The wealthier tertiary segments tend to have higher bride-prices. This is explained by the fact that they occupy a "higher status" on the prestige scale, and also, by the fact that they wish to carefully control and maintain this status.

[435] For instance, "between cousins" of 'Ailit Ma'fas the mahr is fixed at 60 Egyptian pounds, but "a man can pay more out of generosity if he wishes." Hence, a member of the Ma'fas lineage can increase his prestige within and without his family by paying beyond that which is expected of him. In this case, "generosity" is the variable related to a man's place on the scale of prestige. On the other hand, in another "poorer" lineage, 'Ailit Zagharat, the mahr is 30 L.E. to members of the in-group but "the stranger will pay 60 to 80 L.E., according to the father's wealth." The largest and most famous mahr payment in the area was made by the wealthiest man in al-Qasr who paid seven camels (each worth about 150 L.E.) for his son's wife. The highest fixed mahr in al-Qasr was that of Bait Bu Tarram of 'Ailit Lazumi. It was 100 L.E. for members of 'Ailit Lazumi and, accordingly, much more for strangers. This mahr is in contrast to the average for the area which is about 30 L.E. within the secondary group. 583 554 556 435

586 521 784 Divorce is a forbidden topic of conversation in al-Qasr. Any talk about one's wife, mother, or sister is considered injudicious.

*613 concepts of what is desirable and undesirable. "Every structural
571 arrangement," Raymond Firth has said, "has its moral
attributes of obligation" (1961:212). This is most essential
in an uncentralized system, such as that of al-Qasr, where
no institutions exist outside of the corporate group for the
introduction of new principles of organization and association.

181 Among the Bedouins, the conceptualization of an authority
578 structure in the role of *'aqila* relates to the high value which
577 they place upon a peaceful and orderly world. Children in al-Qasr
*[613] are taught that one of their serious duties in life is
[571] to mediate conflicts, especially, when they are potentially
•[554] situations which may lead to protracted conflict. And, in a
segmentary society where a member's status links him to many
different groups in differing degrees of importance, all
quarrels are potential group wars. The Bedouin child knows
that his elders, and God, want him to follow "the path of the
good" (*tariiq al-khair*). Mainly, this involves helping others
to follow "the path of the good" by "bringing them back together"
when they are in conflict. When two individuals
quarrel and refuse to return to "the path of the good," this
*[613] brings *'aib* ("shame") to each of the persons. When two individuals
quarrel, setting off a group conflict, this brings
'ar ("shame") to the respective corporate groups of the individuals
[626] (Abou-Zeid 1966). Against individuals who persist
[784] in the ways which cause *'aib* to himself, or *'ar* to his group,

CHAPTER IV

THE STRUCTURE OF AUTHORITY

The 'Aqila as a Political Role

*613 •554 [596] The role of 'aqila is the single specialized role in Bedouin political organization. Although it is possible to differentiate another authority role, that of the shaib (elder), this role is primarily a kinship role and in this sense is not an institutionalized political complex of rights and obligations. The 'aqila represents a unique political status in al-Qasr having one incumbent at a time: "The present incumbent is merely a link in a chain of indefinite extent, the temporary custodian of all the properties, powers and privileges which constitute the office" (Smith 1966;117).

*613 554 571 The role of 'aqila is instituted at the tertiary structural level of the lineage system. In theory, each tertiary bait has its own 'aqila. But, in fact, not every tertiary segment is large enough and, therefore, powerful enough to constitute an authority group in the political structure of the lineage. [128] In the next section, we will draw a distinction between authority groups and tertiary groups. The 'aqila acts alone in juridical matters concerning his own

*613 segment. He acts in concert with other *'awaaqil* (plural of
554 *'aqila*) of the tertiary segments of his secondary group when
571 lineage matters call for decision-making at this level.
*613 Tertiary segments are replicate groups descended from one
571 ancestor, they operate with a common ideology pursuant of
183 common interests and goals. As we shall see, this common
675 ideology is expressed in a kind of code, or contract, which
all members of the group swear to uphold and abide by according
to the principle of blood responsibility. Tertiary codes in
[181] al-Qasr are a reflection and an affirmation of a wider system
of values and norms which bind the Bedouins of the Western
Desert together into a political system. This wider normative
[671] system is expressed in the customary legal system of the
Bedouins known as *'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali* ("the customs of the
Awlad 'Ali tribe").

*613 The primary duty attached to the office of *'aqila* is
578 the regulation of conflict. It is worth noting here that
571 conflict regulation is not equivalent to conflict resolution.
554 The latter process carries with it the intimation that the
causes of conflict have been treated and resolved, that conflict
has been eliminated. Nothing could be further from the truth
in a segmentary society where the various segments actually
constitute conflict groups; consequently, conflict between
groups or individuals who represent groups may be contained
but never forgotten. Conflict is an ongoing process among

*613 the Bedouins. Conflict regulation treats the expressions of
578 social ~~conflict~~ and not its causes.
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The _'aqila_ regulates conflict between the members of his tertiary segment, between this group and the other groups of the secondary unit, and between secondary units of the tribe. He operates in both the internal and external systems
*613 of authority relations. The _'aqila_ may pre-empt the authority
578 of the _shaib_ in the sphere of familial authority, though, the
593 Bedouins say, this seldom happens because the son is willing
554 to obey his father. Having been reared in the culture, and
[596] as a future father himself, the son supports the respect-
*613 discipline principle of Bedouin society. But in extreme cases,
578 such as the threat of a father to disown his son, the explicit
593 approval of the _'aqila_, and of all the _'awaaqil_ of the secondary
428 corporate group, is necessary. This is the procedure in all
554 cases of banishment. In one case (which I document below), a man disinherited his younger brother with the formal approval of his _'awaaqil_.

*613 The tertiary group in Bedouin society is by definition
682 the blood-vengence group. However, in view of the common
578 values and pragmatic interests of its members, the secondary
[181] group fulfills this function. Traditionally, when revenge
[681] killings were carried out according to the _lex talionis_, it was usually at the hand of some member of the victim's tertiary group. In the case of protracted conflict, such as extended

*613 feuds or war, secondary groups, and even whole tribes, became
682 involved. If the tertiary group is in the structural sense
578 a blood-revenge group, the *'aqila* is the corporate sole of the
*613 blood-revenge corporation: an important function of the
554 *'aqila's* office derives from this. The *'aqila* is responsible
682 for the collection and distribution of the blood-money. It
578 is this specific authoritative function of the office which
is the necessary condition for the existence of a corporate
group. If there is no *'aqila* to collect blood-money, then a
kinship segment is not a corporation and it will merge into
another group headed by an *'aqila* in order to realize collective
benefits.

*613 Bait Braik of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Figure 8) had no
554 *'aqila* while I was in the field. Their *'aqila* had recently
died and his office had not yet been filled. The person who
[666] would succeed to the office was known by all, but still his
election or formal appointment did not take place. In other
*613 words, the office of *'aqila* will remain vacant until conflict
554 and the need to regulate it force an election. The Bedouins
578 were pleased about the vacant *'aqila* office in Bait Braik:
"Thank God that it is vacant. When it is necessary, we will
meet and name an *'aqila*." Any of the *'awaaqil* of the lineage
[682] can mediate conflict, but no *'aqila* is willing to take the
responsibility of collecting the blood-money from another man's
bait.

*613 Each member of the corporate group contributes an
682 equal share to the blood-money due in a compensation case.
435 436 The blood-price for intentional killing is presently set at
178 400 L.E. In the olden days, the blood-price was 100 camels.
[571] If a man had no camels, he was expected to contribute his
share in cash, the value to be assessed at current market
prices. Eventually, cash came to replace camels altogether in
[231] the exchange of blood-money. This reflects the growing
unimportance of the camel in the Western Desert. Today, there
[556] is only one man in al-Qasr who may be considered a "camel
owner," and he is the richest man in the area. Since at least
1935 the blood-price has been met with cash.

*613 When it has been decided that the right of blood-
682 revenge as a retaliatory measure is to be waived, the _'aqila_
•554 must go to each member of the group for his share of the blood-
571 money. Each _'aqila_ of the secondary group does this, and together their collections make up the 400 L.E. blood price. For instance, if there happens to be 400 men in a secondary lineage group, then the share which each contributes will be 1 L.E. The _'aqila_ must account for his own group's share even if this means making up deficiencies from his own pocket. It is for this reason that the _'aqila_ "should be rich." Though the _'awaaqil_ of al-Qasr are generally members of the "status group," this is not always the case. Hussain, the man destined to become the _'aqila_ of Bait Braik, was comparatively poor. He admitted to this fact, and said that for this reason he was reluctant to become an _'aqila_: "The _'aqila_ is responsible for his _bait_.

*613 He must pay the diiya with the shares which he collects from
682 the others. It makes no difference if the 'aqila must pay
● 554 with his own money. He is responsible for this matter before
571 the whole tribe."

*613 The collection of the diiya is only one aspect of the
554 process of conflict regulation, but it stands out as the funda-
682 mental manifestation of the office of 'aqila. In the course
[692] of office, an 'aqila will spend much more time arbitrating
disputes, but it is his responsibility concerning blood-money
which defines his position and his jurisdiction as corporate
682 ones. During the present period in al-Qasr, the practice of
178 blood-revenge has all but disappeared as a mechanism of social
[626] control. Nevertheless, the possibility of its happening is
not too remote. The payment of blood-money is the alternative
[619] to blood-revenge, and blood-revenge is a condition for all-out
[721] tribal warfare--something which the Bedouins look upon with
[829] horror. One informant once likened a primary-level war between
the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat (should it ever occur) to
*613 "the end of the world." The 'aqila as a representative of a
682 group can prevent war by preventing reciprocal homicides: by
554 presenting his share of the blood-money he regulates conflict
578 and promotes integration. The blood-money is usually paid
over a period of from one to two years. In this case, the
[571] notion of "debt" represents a contingent, institutionalized
social relationship for the purpose of maintaining political
order.

000 order.

*613 554 666 The 'aqila is elected by the elders of the secondary lineage group. The election usually takes place when these men are gathered for some festive occasion, such as a wedding. [578] The name of the man chosen to succeed to the political office will not be made public until it is absolutely necessary, i.e., in the case of conflict within the man's bait, or more especially, in the case where blood-money is due. According to the Bedouins, the only qualification for the office of 'aqila is wisdom--the ability to arbitrate disputes. *613 554 556 On the other hand, it is implicit that the 'aqila be a member of the "status group." Prestige commands respect and obedience, and prestige in al-Qasr usually comes with wealth. In general, the 'aqila is an elder, i.e., one with wisdom, and a member of a wealthy and influential family.

*613 554 [428] Technically, the 'aqila-ship is not inherited, but succession tends in this direction. An 'aqila must "speak the good and show men how to follow the path of the good." Not all men have the ability to do this, and, the Bedouins say, it is natural that such a great gift resides with a particular family "because the son learns from the father." All of the 'awaaqil in al-Qasr claim that they knew how to settle disputes before they became 'awaaqil. If they had not, they would not [428] have been worthy of the office. Actually, the choice of an 'aqila is a restricted one: the office may pass, according to

*613 the unilineal rule, only to the son or the brother of the
•554 former 'aqila. In Bait 'Umar, for instance, the office went
428 from father to son to brother (see Figure 8). The election
[666] amounts to a choice between the son or the brother, and
partiality is usually shown towards the eldest of the two
candidates.

The 'aqila's term of office may be terminated by the members of the bait. Such an action may be the result of
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687 ineffectiveness due to old age, or it may stem from a violation of the norms of the office by the incumbent. Two cases of an 'aqila being impeached were reported to me. One, which did not take place in al-Qasr, was brought about when the 'aqila was accused of taking a bribe, and favoring one party to the conflict over the other. The second case, which happened about fifteen years ago in al-Qasr, involved an 'aqila from 'Ailit Ma'fas. This man informed Egyptian officials that his fellow tribesmen were storing guns and ammunition beyond the quantity permitted by national security laws. Not only was this man removed from his 'aqila-ship, but he was also expelled
*613 from his tertiary segment, and hence the tribe. But, in most
554 cases, term of office is ended by death or senility. The Bedouins say: "An 'aqila will be removed if he can no longer solve problems; if he says bad things about his tribe; if he is too old, or too lazy; in other terms, if he is not a good man, he is removed."

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554 Conflict regulation, in the formal sense, is the
578 province of the *'aqila*. All complaints should be taken before
692 the *'aqila*. In al-Qasr, every individual has certain rights,
and when any of these rights are infringed upon he may demand
a redress of wrongs: he demands his rights, or exercises
haqq al-'Arab ("the right of the Arabs"). The *haqq al-'Arab*
is opposed to the *haqq Allah*, "the right of God," which
concerns crimes against religion (i.e., wine-drinking, apostasy).
The dichotamy represents private claims over against the claims
of a religious state which is characteristic of Islamic society.
[688] In al-Qasr, crimes against religion have never occurred, and
if they did they would be handled in Marsa Matruh by the local
shaikh ("holy man").

*613 The litigation process is initiated when an individual
554 appears before his *'aqila* with a claim, and the statement: "I
69 do not wish so-and-so to take any of my rights." The *'aqila*
first attempts to persuade each party "to return to the path
of the good," to come together and to cease quarreling. This
type of moral persuasion is preliminary to a full court-hearing
in which both parties will appear with witnesses before their
respective *'awaaqil*, and other "third parties" who aid the
'awaaqil in their decision. The decision reached by the court
[671] is morally binding upon both parties. According to recent
[178] innovation in Bedouin customary law, the details of the litigation and the decision reached by the court are to be recorded

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• 554 on paper in triplicate, one copy going to each litigant and
69 a third copy to the chief of police of the Marsa Matruh sector.
[671] In practice, though, a copy usually goes to the litigants, but
[178] not to the chief of police (who had not a single Bedouin court
case in his files).

*613 As is not the case in Islamic law, in Bedouin customary
695 law the decision of the judge may be appealed. The system of
692 appeals may even function at the level of familial authority,
[671] i.e., the son may, in theory, appeal a ruling by his own
father. The Bedouins insist that this is an important right
of every man. In the situation where a man wishes to appeal
a decision of his own _'aqila_, he will generally take his claim
to another _'aqila_ of his secondary group. When an appeal is
to be made, it is done with the permission of the _'aqila_ who
rendered the original decision. The one who appeals his case
does so with the understanding that the decision returned by
the court of appeal will be final and binding. Further, if
[681] the court of appeal concurs with the findings of the original
court, the plaintiff pays a double fine (twice the original
fine), and also pays his own _'aqila_ an expiation fee (_kubaara_).

69 The Egyptians have preferred to leave the Bedouins of
648 al-Qasr to settle their own disputes except in the more serious
[682] criminal matters. Police from Matruh will enter homicide cases
[685] and those conflicts over property rights which threaten to
explode into tribal warfare. But these types of conflict have

692 police and not to his *'aqila*. This was a serious case because
685 the police were forced to imprison the dike-builder for two
648 days before he would agree to their demands. The two men in-
*613 volved in the conflict were from different lineages, and it
soon became necessary for Bedouin justice to intervene even after the matter had been settled by the police. The *'awaaqil* of each man met, along with other notables of the tribe, and investigated the area where the dikes had been; they listened to witnesses and tried to calculate the amount of water which each man should receive. In the end, the decision of the police was upheld.

692 Although, ideally, litigation should be instigated
691 through the office of the *'aqila*, alternatives do exist. As
*613 noted in discussing the values of Bedouin society, it is the
[577] moral obligation of each and every person to moderate between
conflicting parties; any one conflict situation may be moderated by many well-meaning parties. Or, if a person suspects prejudice on the part of his own *'aqila*, he may choose to take
627 his claim to another *'aqila*, or third party. The notion of a
•554 third party to a conflict, when it does not refer to the *'aqila*
692 or a close kinsman who may act as an arbitrator, has reference
to a non-institutionalized role in al-Qasr. This role-holder, the Bedouins call *rajal khair* ("good man") or *qawaal al-khair* ("the speaker of the good").

"Role differentiation implies organization" (Levy

554 1952:165), and the role *rajal khair* along with the other roles
627 concerned with political action, the *'aqila*, *shaikh*, and *'umda*,
692 represent political organization in al-Qasr. Although the
role of *rajal khair* is not institutionalized to the same
degree that the others are, we shall see in the next chapter
that it is an important one for an understanding of power relations in al-Qasr. All of these roles carry with them some
type of right to make binding decisions in matters regarding
conflict regulation. That is, an individual should take his
*[613] claims to the *'aqila*, but may take them to any of the other
political specialists. In any of the cases, the litigants
concerned become bound by the decision of the third party.
*[613] But only at the hand of the *'aqila* can a decision be made
[695] which will effect a whole group, i.e., only an *'aqila* can
[682] give judgment against a corporation for the blood-money in a
case of homicide (Schacht 1953:328).

691 If, however, blood-money is not an immediate concern,
692 the litigants may utilize any and all of the political roles
*613 available in the judicial system. A statement from one of my
554 informants, an *'aqila*, is useful here.
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> The *bait* is made up of thirty or fourty men, and there is one most important man (*rajal kabiir*), the *'aqila*. The *'aqila* puts an end to problems, he sees who deserves this and who deserves that. Problems must be settled. It happened five or six years ago that I and my paternal cousins quarreled over land at Wadi Raml. I went to the police station and complained to the *shaikh* of the 'Aishaibat. I asked him to choose a person to judge

691 between me and my cousins, according to Bedouin law
692 (yinafth al-'awaiyid bainaana). I went to the shaikh
*613 because my cousins did not agree that we go to the
•554 'aqila right away. We agreed that the shaikh would
627 choose the third party, and the judgment would be
binding on both of us. The shaikh chose Bu Halaiqa as the third party, and Bu Halaiqa chose three others as consultants. (Two of the three were rajal khair, and the other was an 'aqila.) The judgment was that my cousins were in the wrong. They were fined 10 L.E. and a dhabiiha("blood sacrifice"). 'Ali intervened and did not allow my cousins to pay the fine. He had them write a paper stating, that if they resume this quarrel in the future they must pay the fine plus another 10 L.E. fine. (Hajj 'Ali is a rajal khair.)

695 Sometimes the Egyptian police must be brought into a judicial
648 affair to insure the execution of a judgment. In one case,
696 an individual in al-Qasr did not accept the decision of his
'aqila; his 'aqila wrote the decision on paper and sent him to another 'aqila. The second 'aqila agreed with the first, but the man also refused this decision. The second 'aqila wrote his decision on paper and sent it to the shaikh of the 'Aishaibat in Matruh. The shaikh summoned the culprit and sent him to the police station. Finally, the police were able to convince the man to pay his fine, and also his expiation fee to his own 'aqila. My informant said that this was a minor affair, and that had it been a serious offense committed by the man he would have been threatened with expulsion from the corporate group.

*613 As the corporate sole, the 'aqila has political authority
554 which is legitimate and morally binding on all who wish to
571 maintain their status in the group and tribe. Any individual

*613 ● 554 571 or whole tertiary group may be expelled from the lineage group, or if they so desire, they may resign their status in the group. In either case, and both cases rarely occur, the permission and approval of the *'aqila* are required. Or, I should say, the approval of the *'awaaqil* is required, for both cases represent structural changes which affect the juristic personality and constitution of the maximal corporation. The legitimacy of the *'aqila* and the whole political structure are tied up together. Social structure and authority roles are both objects of legitimacy, as Easton (1965:278-301) says, and hence the legitimacy of the *'aqila* in al-Qasr flows from the structural legitimacy of a segmentary political system. Thus in al-Qasr, politics operates through authority groups in opposition to one another, each represented by an authority role. An *'aqila* once told me that "the tribe of the *'aqila* gives him the authority to judge between its members." Another *'aqila* said that "the *'awaaqil* are bound [675] by a contract (*rawaabit*) to perform their duty on behalf of their *bait*." The *rawaabit* ("bonds") we will discuss in the next section.

Spheres and Focus of Authority

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Authority, as it is used in this study, refers to the Weberian notion of "imperative control" (*Herrschaft*); that is, "the probability that a command with a given specific

121 the "political." Previous studies, then, indicate that a
114 conceptualization of a division between spheres or foci of
*613 authority relations is fundamental to an understanding of the
571 political aspect of segmentary societies. There is no need, however, to relegate the political to any particular social area if "we generally mean by 'political,' things that have to do with relations of authority . . ." (Weber 1947:155). Conflict, and the need for it to be regulated, occur at all levels of the lineage system, from the family to the tribal level. Authority must be exercised if the system is to
persist. The legitimate exercise of authority in al-Qasr is
•[554] expressed through two structures: an authority role and authority groups, the 'aqila and the tertiary segments, the corporate sole and corporate groups.

121 The analysis which follows considers society as a
554 composite of authority groups and authority roles. Roles are the basic elements of social structures which "order the human beings who make up the society" (Nadel 1957:11). The authority role is a focus for the study of politics at all levels of the social structure, and, also, the basis for extending role analysis. For the most part, political action in al-Qasr, from the family to the tribal levels, takes the form of the exercise of legitimate authority. Power, as illegitimate control, exists in the form of extra-processual authority roles which we will discuss in the next chapter.

121 •554 Here we are interested in the way in which roles and groups, and a whole structure of authority, operate over a wide area.

In the previous section, I presented the _'aqila_ as a specialized political role in Bedouin political organization. As Radcliffe-Brown (1940:xviii-xxi) has pointed out, in the political analysis of segmentary societies it is necessary to isolate incipient authority roles which function to make decisions concerning rightness and wrongness in disputes and which represent the community, giving voice to public sentiment. The notion of society as a functional system of authority roles and authority groups is clear in Radcliffe-Brown's treatment of politics.

121 554 571 *[613] Local groups of political significance, i.e., authority groups, are identified by the status position, or office, referred to as _'aqila_. The political relations within a local tertiary group, and between it and similar groups of a lineage and tribe, must be seen as relationships between authority roles.

554 596 *613 In the domestic field of political relations, the authority of the Bedouin _'aqila_ shades into the familial authority sphere of the household head (_shaib_). The _shaib_, as senior agnate of his _naja'_, is dominant over the other males of his tertiary sub-unit, but not to the extent that he can pre-empt any of their rights as members of the tertiary [888] [578] corporate group. A _shaib_, by virtue of his age, is supposed to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.

600 to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.
*613 Theoretically, as one _'aqila_ said, conflict should be stopped
578 at the familial level, either by the father or the paternal
593 uncle, and should never reach the level of the _'aqila_. Once
[604] before the _'aqila_, conflict assumes new structural poses, or different orientation in authority relations. Authority here is differentiated in terms of the context: the father's authority relates to the familial structural level, and beyond this level the father _per se_ cannot exercise legitimate authority.
*613 The _'aqila_, who is responsible for internal order and external
578 relations exercises legitimate authority at each level of the
182 political structure. The authority of the _'aqila_ is checked and prevented from growing into naked power in that any single _'aqila_ must consult with the other _'awaaqil_ of the secondary segment concerning matters which may concern the structural nature and continuity of the group.

*613 In many respects, the authority structure in al-Qasr
•559 corresponds to that defined for the Lugbara of Uganda
571 (Middleton 1960). The structural levels (see Figure 7 above)
171 of 'Ailit Ma'fas (secondary), Bait 'Umar (tertiary), and 'Ait Abd al-Malik (sub-tertiary) are approximately equivalent to Middleton's major, minor, and minimal lineages (1960:7-9). But
[596] whereas among the Lugbara authority roles are purely kinship roles, i.e., genealogically senior heads are responsible for internal control and representation, among the Bedouins of

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● 554 al-Qasr there is definite role differentiation between the
571 shaib and the 'aqila. The incumbents of the two roles may
171 have exactly the same genealogical position in the tertiary
596 segment, but they will never have the same social status. There are as many elders as there are households, but there is only one 'aqila for each group. Another difference between the Bedouins and the Lugbara is that in the latter society a kinship role which doubles as an authority role does not occur above the familial (i.e. shaib) level.

*613 The difference between the shaib and the 'aqila is
554 the distinguishing factor between informal and formal social
596 control. The shaib acts in accordance with the values implied by Bedouin authority structure: the action of the 'aqila is legitimate in the explicit terms of the Bedouin authority structure. These two spheres of political action represent familial and internal (or domestic) levels of authority and authority relations. Legal matters which affect the whole tertiary segment are dealt with at the internal level.
627 Affairs of a purely personal nature and of lesser importance
596 are dealt with at the familial level of authority. For in-
685 stance, it happened that the dog of one man killed a neighbor's chicken. No one sent for the 'aqila. They sent for the shaib of the woman who owned the chicken, i.e., they sent for her husband. He spoke to the woman, his wife, to determine the value of the chicken and this price he demanded as compensation

*613 have noted previously, informants very definitely disagreed
571 over the matter; by looking at the two genealogies one is
178 unable to say one way or the other. The process of fission
and fusion in the form of secession and adoption is another
instance of genealogical manipulation through patrilineal
ideology. In this case, patrilineal ideology also may succeed
in concealing real biological links in favor of political relations.
We shall see below how secession and adoption actually
function in Bedouin society.

*613 We have said that the authority of the 'aqila is
675 legitimate at each structural level. The Bedouins of al-Qasr
•554 often legitimate the authority of the 'aqila in writing, and,
571 at the same time, make an explicit statement of social compact
which outlines the pragmatic and moral values of the corporate
group. The corporate charter in al-Qasr is a document of self-interest
which defines expectations and consequences for corporate
members: it governs the conduct of members in situations
relevant to internal order, and gives the 'aqila powers
of representation in external affairs. The charter is a
[181] reflection of the high value the Bedouins place upon security
and order, and is a condition for a legal system of wider
*613 scope. Max Weber (1947:120) has expressed the idea of social
675 relationship as contract so well that it is worthwhile to
571 quote him extensively here.

*613 571 681 4 - The thief from the mentioned buyuut will be responsible for himself alone, and his relatives in blood (i.e. his bait) will be responsible for him.

539 675 5 - The one who is known to lie under oath from the mentioned buyuut, everyone who supports him must be a blood-relative from his bait.

6 - The one who delays paying the share which is requested by the 'aiela, his rich relative will pay.

7 - The one who asks for a barawwa from the 'aiela will pay what is asked for, and at the same time will also pay 20 L.E. barawwa fee for every man who fasts.

8 - The one who supports his relative from some other 'aiela against his paternal cousin will be required to pay 10 L.E. as a fine.

Signatures or stamps of the 'awaaqil of 'Ailit Ābu Qarasa, and the 'awaaqil of 'Ailit Ghriba (who are the former relatives of Bait Abu Qula, the reconciled bait).

*613 •554 571 [675] Every point of the above rawaabit shows the moral and political significance of the secondary group in the Bedouin community. Membership in a secondary compound authority group entitles one to political status without which the individual could not survive. The Bedouin community shares certain activities, relationships, and goals so that the aims of any individual can be achieved only by participation in social action with others: this the Bedouins have in common with every other human community (Firth 1951:41). Specifically, in considering society in terms of authority roles and authority groups, we are interested in the political community in which the Bedouins participate.

671 the Bedouins, the government soon discovered their own error,
182 for they were unable to effectively manage group and tribal
648 political relations: "They (the government) found out that they could not solve murders in the desert. They would arrest the killer but the trouble continued between families (i.e. feuding went on). There were more killings instead of less, and, finally, the government asked us to return to the *'awaiyid* because it alone can solve murders in the desert." I was unable to document the claim that the government had "abolished" the *'awaiyid* in 1933, but a number of officials who worked at the Governor's Office in Marsa Matruh said that it was true.

671 In al-Qasr, and in the Western Desert in general,
641 adherence to law and political order rests upon the conviction
577 that each individual and territorial group have guaranteed
571 rights which are related to honor and property. A violation
•554 of any single man's honor or property may easily be interpreted, according to the principle of collective responsibility, as an offense against the rights of a group. And in this sense, legal and moral violations in Bedouin society are relative to the structure of interrelations, and they must be regulated with reference to the various levels of the authority structure.

181 Bedouins place a high value on political order, but
641 also on the idea that political order can only be guaranteed
578 through a man's willingness "not to allow another to take any
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671 562 They said that if a man
684 insisted on keeping a promiscuous wife, his family would
681 "write a barawwa aginst him." I heard of no sex offenses in
[114] al-Qasr while I was there.

671 The penalty for stealing, according to the 'awaiyid,
685 is that the thief shall pay compensation, by himself, in the
amount of four times the value of the stolen object. On the
*[613] other hand, if the thief is a poor man, he will pay thrice the
value of the stolen object and the remaining fourth will be
paid by his lineage.

671 The 'awaiyid recognizes the territorial claims of the
685 lineage. Disputes arising over conflicting claims to land
*613 and wells are handled at Bedouin courts in much the same way
578 as personal injury cases are, with one exception. Usually, a
●[554] larger number of elders and rajal khair will be consulted in
an advisory capacity by the 'awaaqil handling the case. The
'awaaqil consider the specific history of a particular piece
of land or well (for instance, each well is known by its own
name), and determine the ownership in accordance with the
testimony of elders and individuals of high social status.
Most of the problems over land and water rights in al-Qasr
have reference to what is still considered lineage-owned
685 territory in the barley-and-pasture sector. In the 'izba
578 sector, conflict over land ownership rights, since they are
648 rights which are registered with the government, is settled
in the Egyptian court of law. Only one such case came up while

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

CHAPTER V

STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION AND AUTHORITY

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Political Role Analysis: Theoretical Framework

There is current confusion over the definition and use of concepts in political analysis. Ideas concerning power, influence, authority, and the general notion of leadership itself, are variously treated and dealt with equally well. But in every case, a necessary and common aspect of political studies is that of role analysis.

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"Role" is that part of the actor's behavior which constitutes and defines his participation in the social interactive process (Parsons and Shils 1951:23). Political roles define who does what with respect to the political aspect of the social interactive process, i.e. in the system of authority relations. In a most general sense, political role structure may be divided into the two categories of "followers" and "leaders" (Leach 1954:8-10; Easton 1965:205). From the level of the family to the largest social grouping, persons are assigned by the group, or take it upon themselves, to make and help execute decisions. This is to say, that some degree of leadership exists in all social groupings. Whether or not such leadership is institutionalized is another question with which we shall

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deal in the course of this discussion.

No political system can persist without a separation of duties between decision-makers and others. The specialized function of decision-making in the political sphere helps "to bring about some adjustment or accommodation in conflicting demands and to implement any settlement where necessary" (Easton 1965:206). It follows then that there is no society without some type of authority role, however simple, and, we assume, that this role can be defined.

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I do not consider this point a debatable one, though writings on the subject of political organization in primitive society seem to indicate that I should consider it debatable. For example, Steward (1938:247) reports on small bands of American Indians in the Basin-Plateau region who are without chiefs (leaders?). Sharp (1958:5) states that the Yir Yoront cannot tolerate even "mild chiefs"; Schapera (1956:93) notes that "chiefs everywhere in South Africa" are only part-time specialists, and this is taken to mean that the Bushman and Bergdama are without political roles. Service (1966:51) defines "leadership" as "administration" and finds that it is unstructured, which moves from one person to another, and, above all, cannot be associated with the word "chief."

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All of these discussions consider specialization to mean full-time spent in role-playing and the singularity of role assignment. On these bases conclusions are reached as to the presence

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554 or absence of political roles in primitive societies. It is obvious that in no society does an individual play one, and only one, role. Every social role is, in some degree, a part-time role. Even at the apex of role specialization and structural complexity (the presidency of the United States, for instance), an individual plays his political role along with others. Also, in trying to determine the presence or absence of roles in a society, it should be kept in mind that the notion of institutionalization refers to a process and not a state of being. Therefore, in any one society at any one point in time, there may be a number of roles "happening." This, it seems, will especially be the case in the dynamic field of politics.

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571 In political analysis, influential and leadership roles may be viewed in terms of differential responsibility. Authority is the institutionalization of a responsible relationship between the leader and other members of the collectivity wherein the former has the right to expect support from the latter in given situations (Parsons 1960:183-186). A role which is imbued with power, but not authority in the analytical sense which I wish to bring out here, lacks this institutionalized right to expect support. M.G. Smith (1966:127) makes this analytical distinction most clearly:

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> As a regulatory capacity, authority is legitimated and identified by the rules, traditions, and precedents which embody it and which govern its exercise and objects. Power is also regulatory, but is neither fully prescribed nor governed by norms and rules.

Authority is always attached to specific roles while power is a generalized control over others. For instance, power may be based on religious or economic grounds and operate with equal influence in the political sphere. The basis of the legitimacy of authority is the backing which it receives from the legal system. Power, however, is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be able to carry out his will regardless of the basis on which this probability rests (Weber 1947:152). Power over others is a type of influence which may operate without their consent, their "will," or even their awareness and understanding. For instance, when one party controls property or other values essential to person's existence, he has power over those others (Goldhamer and Shils 1939).

Influence of the authority type is explicit and institutionalized control of certain symbols which emphasizes group goals. Power-type influence is the control of goods and symbols, often the inexplicit manipulation of these things, which emphasizes particularistic goals usually with a private individual referent. Power and authority are two types of influence. For analytical purposes, they may be considered at opposite ends of a scale of institutionalization. In this

121 •554 571 way, each may be considered as having aspects of the other attached to it: a power role may at times take on an authoritative aspect, and an authority role, when its incumbent "pulls rank," may be said to be exerting power rather than authority.

I have found it necessary to utilize the concepts and ideas discussed here in order to understand the distribution of power in al-Qasr. The range of authoritative action is wide in Bedouin society, and no simple dichotamy between power and authority will suffice to explain it. However, authority does crystallize at certain points in the al-Qasr social structure, and political rights and duties at these reference points become relatively formal and well-defined. When we speak of the crystallization of authority roles, we refer to a tendency toward legitimacy as a process of institutionalization taking place in society. Authority among the 'Aishaibat tribe is legitimate, public, and representative because it is distributed and exercised with reference to imperatively coordinated associations, or corporate groups. 121 554 571 *613 Furthermore, the manner in which authority is segmented and distributed informs and legitimates the Bedouin lineage structure. On the other hand, power and power roles possessing no legitimate or representative influence with reference to the lineage structure, may actually inform "structures" and "modes" which combine and "are quite unlike the articulations

121 •554 571 *613 in a lineage system" (Peters 1967:280).

My own study indicates that authority roles are more easily studied since they are more easily observable. Power roles are subtle simply because they are less institutionalized; closer field work is required if we are to understand their structure and function. Al-Qasr is characterized by segmentation in communication structure which follows the lines of lineage segmentation. As a consequence of this, social intercourse is of a restricted nature wherein each lineage group tends to be its own audience. In cases such as these, where social interaction is anything but intense, the character of political relations between groups is difficult to perceive. Thus the operation of influence at the informal level, i.e. power, is difficult to comprehend. But it seems absolutely necessary that politics per se be studied in the tribal situation, and the only way that I can handle it in the al-Qasr case is to consider leadership in the context of an institutionalization process. 121 554 571

There are precedents for this approach, and these also serve to point up the importance of leadership studies in primitive societies. Radcliffe-Brown (1940:xi-xxiii), referring to decision-making processes in tribal societies, was convinced that even in cases of contingencies, and seemingly "spur of the moment" group activities, careful observation would show that "they were directed by leaders who had some

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measure of recognized authority" (p. xv). Radcliffe-Brown conceived of politics as a process, and actually worked with concepts of increasing specialization in decision-making and role differentiation to bring this out (p. xxi). The structural focus of political analysis is the role: he reminds us that analytical concepts such as the "State" do not exist in the phenomenal world, that there exists only individuals who play roles and interrelate as possessors and non-possessors of authority (p. xxiii).

More recently, Pospisil (1968:201-222) has claimed that all societies necessarily possess authority roles by virtue of the fact that justice and its administration is "vested in the decision-making activity, irrespective of its informality or subtlety, of an individual or group of individuals of influence." According to Pospisil, law and conflict regulation upon which political order rests cannot be divorced from "the decision-making process of authority or group leaders" (1968:206). In his study of the Kapauku Papuans, Pospisil (1963:52-55) describes the basis of a "power" struggle between different "authorities."

In this study, I have tried to use the concepts of decision-making process, power-authority continuum, and role-structure for an analysis of Bedouin leadership. Such an approach may be better suited for a study of peasant or modern-complex societies where roles are more differentiated

121 554 571 and better defined, but I feel that the area of leadership in tribal society is more complex and less well studied than we are led to believe. Both the decision-making process and some kind of authority are present in all societies, but we know less about such universals in tribal society. It is as Easton (1965:205) has said: "Even in the smallest group, we can expect to find that the power and responsibility of caring for recurring matters as well as crises tend to reside in the hands of the few."

Status and Role Differentiation

554 565 Although structural differentiation along class lines does not exist in al-Qasr, status differential does exist and a discussion of it is essential for an understanding of Bedouin authority structure. Classes exist only where individuals at a specific socio-economic level "become conscious of their common interests and organize themselves"(Linton 1936:110). Status stratification in and of itself is not indicative of a class structure, for "a size beyond the possibility of facial recognition" is an additional prerequisite (Bierstedt 1957:404).

554 571 Authority structure in al-Qasr, like any of the other structures of society, constitites a system of roles. The actors who act out the roles in this particular system occupy a special status, or position, in the Bedouin social system

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and political structure. This group of actors corresponds to Max Weber's concept of stand, or "status group," a group set apart from the rest of society by the amount of "status honor" which its members possess. In content, "status honor" is normally expressed by the fact that above all else a specific style of life can be expected from all of those who wish to belong to the circle. Linked with this expectation are restrictions on social intercourse" (Gerth and Mills 1946:186-188).

In the course of daily observation in al-Qasr, one begins to understand that certain persons communicate more frequently and more easily with certain others; that the member families of this group tend to intermarry; and even that the men of this group tend to dress similarly. In each case, they visibly and socially set themselves apart from other Bedouins in al-Qasr and the surrounding area: one can identify a member of this "status group" on the streets of Marsa Matruh. They do not represent a well-structured group, least of all an association. More concisely, Weber refers to these individuals as

> A status group (which) is always somehow societalized, but is not organized into an association. Commercium, in the sense of "social intercourse," and connubium among groups are the typical characteristics of the mutual esteem among status equals; their absence signifies status differences (Gerth and Mills 1946:300).

554 It would be considered "wrong" for the members of
571 this group to present themselves at an al-Qasr wedding party,
[579] [585] or the annual celebration held in honor of a local saint of
[796] the area. When I inquired about the conspicuous absence of
[124] some of my chief informants from such gatherings, I was told
[431] that "they will send their gifts," or that "it is not decent
554 that they come to something such as this." In terms of
571 Bedouin social structure, there are a number of plausible
182 explanations for this "status separation." Fathers should
561 [593] not attend public affairs at which their sons may be "performing," i.e., young men should be allowed to play a public
role outside the confines of the father-son authority
structure. By virtue of the extension of the father role,
and its corresponding authoritarian attitude, every member
of the elder age-set commands certain rights and obligations
which would prevent the free expression that is the hallmark
of Bedouin parties. Conversely, and at the more general
level, members of the "status group" who wish to remain
members of this circle accept certain restrictions on social
[114] intercourse. At the five different Bedouin "parties" which
I attended, there were "elders" present, but none of them
could be classified as members of the "status group." Bedouins
plainly state that elders should not attend parties, but, on
the other hand, they show much more concern and emotion when
they say that a member of the "status group" should not "be

554 seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism
571 at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger
182 generation with a tension-release situation, but also a
561 symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors
[154] and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the
political order.

[578] The avoidance practice, or separation, between the
old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural
fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be
defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in
the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach
554 to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change
571 in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market
178 economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital
[471] (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits
[439] this. The "status group," with business and social relations
[177] in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational
ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their
fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from
their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards
Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural
brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the
benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

[789] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an
[796] attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

554 concerns magic. Each August there is a celebration in honor
571 of al-Qasr's local saint. At these celebrations, the *darwish*
178 performs his special skills such as putting a red-hot iron
789 to his tongue, or standing on a skin drum held high by his
796 two assistants. No member of the "status group" attends these affairs because the *darwish* and his magic "belong totally to the old way of life." This is a restriction on social intercourse. It may also be a rejection of the saint's sacred power, or reluctance on the part of the "status group" to
554 share authority. The ideology which the "status group" in
571 al-Qasr has developed embodies attitudes of cooperation and
183 patience with induced programs of change. These attitudes are invoked in varying degrees corresponding to motives of economic gain, desire for power, and altruistic concern. But the result is a "status group" mood which may be described as one of disdain for the old way of life. Ideology and discontent in al-Qasr are mainly evident among the members of the "status group."

554 The pool from which the members of the "status group"
556 are recruited consists of the "status honor" possessors of
571 three lineages (two Sa'adi and one Marabit). These have been,
* [613] traditionally and presently, the wealthiest and most influential in al-Qasr. Wealth in al-Qasr is defined in terms of three things: sheep, land, and olives. Olives are becoming the measure of wealth in the modern al-Qasr: sheep are the tradi-

554 tional symbol of wealth. A comparison of wealth between
571 the "status group" and "other members" of al-Qasr, and the
556 picture of stratification which emerges, are shown on Table 6.

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TABLE 6

COMPARATIVE DATA ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION IN AL-QASR[1]

Average Per Person	Status Group	Others
OLIVE - trees	661	86
SHEEP - head	402	30
LAND - acres	91	5

554 One most important way of accruing "status honor"
571 in al-Qasr is by acting the part of the third party in conflict
627 situations. The role of the third party represents an effective
*613 and acceptable way of bypassing formal litigation through the
[778] office of _'aqila_. For instance, by mediating through the
process of **nazaala**, the third party prevents feuds.

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[114]
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[1] This data is both approximate and partial. Some data are excellent and completely reliable, others are not so dependable. Factors which could conceivably change the picture here presented would be a count of land and animals outside al-Qasr which would be extremely difficult to obtain. Also, some land is not in the name of the owner but in the names of relatives. Of all the data, land data is the most unreliable. Nevertheless, the addition of new data, I feel, would only serve to substantiate the picture of socio-economic stratification shown here.

554 process of nazaala, the third party prevents feuds. In this
571 sense, the third party is a legitimate moral and political
627 influence, but not formalized to the degree as that of the
*[613] 'aqila. A discussion of the authority structure in al-Qasr, then, requires that the allocation of authoritative action in terms of the loci, or roles, of political influence be designated.

[792] The central place of the third party role in the Bedouin political structure is manifested in the many laudable terms which refer to it: rajal khair ("good man") is the most general and often used referent; rajal saalih ("pious man") refers almost always to a "holy man," a specialized role in al-Qasr; quwaal al-khair ("the speaker of good"); and fa'aal al-khair or 'amaal al-khair ("the doer of good"). The latter three roles are approximately equivalent to that of rajal khair, though some informants argued that rajal khair is especially designated because he mediates quarrels while the fa'aal al-khair or 'amaal al-khair help a man when he is in financial difficulties.

554 The functioning of the third party in conflict media-
571 tion is formal to the degree that two parties agree on his
627 intervention and to abide by his decision; but the structuring
*613 of the third party is informal by comparison with the in-
182 stitutionalized role of 'aqila. However, the existence of the third party role, and its various expressions in al-Qasr

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571 politics, and the fact that it is differentiated from the
627 role of _'aqila_, are the bases for conceptualizing a structural
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[182] division of political duties and authority distribution.

554 Role differentiation in the authority structure may be
571 discussed from two points of view: the degree of difference between authoritative decision-making roles and the other roles, and, the way in which one authoritative role differs from another. These refer to the different degrees of specialization characterized by any one role as compared to another. I have already discussed the way in which the role of _'aqila_ differs from other social roles (such as the kinship roles)
[128] in the authority structure of al-Qasr. In the following discussion, I focus on role differentiation in the non-institutionalized aspect of the authority structure, on power and influence.

Societies differ from culture to culture in the complexity of role differentiation. Within any one culture it
554 may differ from social domain to social domain. The political
571 system in al-Qasr is from this point of view structurally
627 simple, the assignment of duties in the traditional authority
*[613] structure being divided between the _'aqila_ and the third party. What legitimate influence is possessed by the third party is derivative from the "status honor" of its members. The
[792] exception to this is the _rajal saalih_ who derives his power or influence as a result of his special relationship with God.

● 554 571 627 Thus within the "status group" a difference exists between those members whose power might be considered "secular" (i.e. the rajal khair), and those whose power might be considered "sacred" (i.e. the rajal saalih). Their right to mediate and to overseer the execution of decisions binding on parties to conflict derives from this status. In a way, authority role patterns may be seen to overlap, and the "status group" impinges on the legitimate authority of the 'aqila by virtue of the fact that they are, for one reason or another, his status equals inside and outside the political structure.

554 571 182 *613 This structural division of political duties for dealing with conflict corresponds to Eisenstadt's (1965:30) differentiation of roles in terms of degrees of instituionalization. The role of 'aqila is present and enduring in each tertiary authority group. There is an incumbent who can be pointed out. His rights and privileges are circumscribed, and his duties and obligations are well defined: the power of the 'aqila role is limited by the very fact that it is institutionalized.

554 571 182 627 The role of the third party, or the mediator in Bedouin society, is less institutionalized, and therefore, less structured and less confining with respect to the kind and amount of influence which the role-player might exert.

The role of the rajal khair, and this implies reference to all third parties, carries with it power. When power is

554 571 182 *[613] When power is institutionalized, such as it is in the role of 'aqila, it becomes authority. This is the Weberian notion of power and authority which has been used by Bohannan (1958) for an analysis of, what he refers to as, "extra-processual events." "Extra-processual events" refers to the operation of power in everyday social relationships, whenever some people make others do what they want them to do. In other words, possessors of "status honor" are also possessors of power, and, I would claim, by virtue of this, such people are recruited into decision-making roles. Not only do members of the "status group" manipulate others in everyday dyadic social relationships, but, more importantly, in the context of conflict control they are able to dominate in political triadic relationships. Furthermore, since they are not structurally bound in their decision-making role, i.e., they operate across group and lineage lines, they accrue even more power and widen their power-base or support structure. What is highlighted in this kind of political role analysis is the fact that different individuals play the game of power politcs in various ways, and with varying degrees of success. (128) In the next chapter, I will bring out this very point by presenting a case study of one such role-player.

554 571 *613 627 When we contrast the roles of 'aqila and rajal khair, we are defining a political role-set. In an attempt to differentiate between the two roles further than we already have,

•554 571 *613 627 and to clarify the concept of political role structure for al-Qasr, we may make the useful analytical distinction between an "arbitrator" and a "mediator." George Simmel (Wolff 1950), in his discussion of the sociological significance of the third element, i.e. "the triad," notes the important difference between the "mediator" who only guides "the process of coming to terms," and the "arbitrator" who "ends up by taking sides" (1950:146-149). In the process of mediation, the termination of conflict is in the hands of the parties themselves, and there is no final authority to which one may appeal. In the process of arbitration, the _'aqila_ may, after deciding that mediation has been unsuccessful, impose his will over the wills of the litigants and appeal to the _rawaabit_ as the final authority. The mediator attempts to reduce "will" to "understanding" (Simmel 1950:148). Mediation may be considered an initial stage of most Bedouin judicial processes; thus the mediating and arbitrating attributes of political authority are not always separate, as in the role of _'aqila_. In so far as the regulation of conflict is a political mechanism for the reduction of strain, then " . . . the existence of the third element serves the perpetuation of the group" (1950:152).

554 571 627 The _rajal khair_ and the "status group" in al-Qasr have much in common with Evans-Pritchard's _tut_ role in Nuer society (1940:178-181).

554 571 627 [171]

> A *tut* in this rather wide sense of 'man of good standing,' or 'social leader' is usually a scion of an important lineage, the head of his own family, and master of his homestead and herd . . . (His) authority is never formalized. He has no defined status (i.e. specifically delimited position), powers, or sphere of leadership . . . Beyond his domestic groups a *tut* has authority in his village only in the sense that he takes a prominent part in questions of procedure and other discussions.

The non-institutionalized third party role in al-Qasr has power and influence in political affairs, and this condition arises from certain structural features and economic facts about Bedouin society. In a word, outside the lone formal role of *'aqila*, a person's political influence is directly related to the traditional influence which attaches to his family, or to his economic status. In all cases, the person of "good" family and sufficient wealth has a high status on the social prestige scale of al-Qasr. The people who have high esteem do not have prescribed roles to play in al-Qasr, but their roles are indeed important. Furthermore, the *rajal khair* role can be just as important as any political role which is prescribed, and it may even become more important.

554 571 177 [634] Besides the *'aqila* and the third party, there exists two external but related roles which form part of the total system of Bedouin authority. The roles of *'umda* and *shaikh* represent institutionalized offices. They function, however, more as structural aspects of the Egyptian governmental authority structure. Of course, no complete separation between the two structures can be claimed. It is recognized

554 that these officers, as representatives of the Bedouin, must
571 figure in both structures. Therefore, we must understand
177 and explain the relationship between the two sets of roles extant in the Bedouin total political structure, one set pertaining to the traditional authority structure and the other to the relatively new legal authority structure of the nation state.

554 The one factor common to all Bedouins in politically
571 influential roles is that they possess a high degree of "status honor," and thus belong to the "status group" of al-Qasr. The "status group" is responsible for political order in al-Qasr and the political links which it maintains with other systems, Bedouin and Egyptian. Bedouins say that responsible action in conflict control belongs to one who knows how to give a man his rights while maintaining the honor of both parties; at the ideal level, it is the duty of all to do this. The fact that the power group and "the rich" comprise two coterminous groups is accidental and even incidental to the Bedouins. In theory, there could be a person of low economic status but who would belong to the "status group" simply as a result of his ability to mediate.
*[613] The authority of the _'aqila_ and the governmental offices of
[177] _'umda_ and _shaikh_ are legitimate only where formal litigation
[627] is concerned. Beyond this, they may have influence, not legitimate authority, and in this case, they switch roles and operate as a _rajal khair_.

● 554 571 and operate as a *rajal khair*.

554 571 177 *613 [627] There are two primary types of political roles in al-Qasr, the traditional and the modern legal. Modern legal political roles have been decreed from above by the government. The traditional roles of *'aqila* and "third party" represent autochthonous roles emerging from Bedouin social and cultural structures. Bedouin traditional roles correspond to Weber's ideal-type "traditional authority" which is based upon "piety for what actually, allegedly, or presumably has always existed" (Gerth and Mills 1946:296). The role of *'aqila* is "traditional" rather than "legal" despite its fully institutionalized status. The relatively modern roles of *'umda* and *shaikh* are what I term here "legal"; these offices are not, nor did any of my informants consider them to be, roles natural in the Bedouin political system. The legitimacy of these roles stems from, what Weber called, "legal authority" in which "submission . . . is based upon an impersonal bond to the generally defined and functional duty of office" [627] (1946:299). In this case, the norms to which conformity is demanded are not those espoused by the *'aqila* or the "third party," but are established by national governmental decrees and regulations.

128 In the remaining part of this chapter, the attempt is to show two things which I consider essential to an understanding of Bedouin political structure and a perspective of

128 Bedouin culture change: how the Bedouins perceive their authority structure, and how political authorities relate to members of the political system.

Traditional Roles

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627 The authority and role of the _'aqila_ has been discussed so that I can devote attention to the "third party" roles in this section. No formalized document exists to stipulate the rights and duties of the "third party," such as exists for the _'aqila_ in the form of the _rawaabit al-'awaaqil_. Nevertheless, Bedouin litigants have certain expectations of a _rajal khair_ when he mediates in a case of conflict. Before a _rajal khair_ agrees to take part in the judicial process, the disputants make it explicit that they will accept his decision as final and binding. Such an agreement is not put into writing. On the other hand, a _rajal khair_ can intervene into a dispute on his own. In so doing, he may gain in prestige relative to the manner and degree of success with which he handles the problem. By saving face for both parties in the quarrel, by cajoling an ingratiating attitude from both parties, the _rajal khair_ may reinforce or augment his "status honor" and his local following.

*[613] A person occupying the office of _'aqila_ can participate in the process of conflict regulation as a _rajal khair_. We noted that this is a case of role-switching. It is conceivable

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then that the _'aqila_ can increase his prestige and status beyond the limits of his formal role. When he does take the role of _rajal khair_, he does so only in conflict cases involving two lineages other than his own. Where any member of his own lineage is concerned, an incumbent _'aqila_ cannot be considered a neutral "third party" which is a prerequisite of this role. This factor constitutes a limit on the power of the _'aqila_.

One _'aqila_ explained the relationship between the _rajal khair_ and _'aqila_ roles in this way: "The two are equal. The _'aqila_ is responsible for one _bait_, but the _rajal khair_ solves any problem in any place, for any _bait_. He goes to them or they come to him. I am, for instance, responsible for the members of _Bait 'Umar_, but it is quite possible that any other _bait_ can ask for my advice in a problem. And so I go as a _rajal khair_."

In a general sense, the office of the _'aqila_ represents an ideal, while the real aspects of conflict regulation in al-Qasr center around the role of the "third party." In fact, many of the cases formally handled by the _'aqila_ afterwards undergo readjustment, as it were, by a _rajal khair_.
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This is done by the _rajal khair's_ suggesting a "more reasonable" settlement which is agreeable to both sides. For example, in a case of conflict over water rights the following was reported: "The _'awaqil_ passed the judgement that they should pay a

554 *dhabiiha* and 10 L.E. But Hajj 'Ali intervened and did not
571 let them pay the fine. Instead, he had them write a paper
627 declaring that should they reopen this matter, they would
have to pay the old fine plus a new fine of the same amount." Simmel (Wolff 1950) notes that the mediator saves group unity through his "intellectuality," but that he is also an exploiter of the situation. It is obvious that Hajj 'Ali could have increased his "status honor" in the eyes of both parties to this conflict. The *rajal khair* who is facile enough to salvage the honor of both parties in a dispute increases his chances for future mediation and, hence, the chance to further augment his "status honor." The minimal fine involved in most of Bedouin litigation indicates a concern, not with punishment *per se,* but with "taking one's rights" and lawful share of honor. Social harmony is viewed in terms of an equitable distribution of honor. The power which a *rajal khair* has over litigants, which derives from his status in the social structure, contributes to this social harmony necessary for the persistence of the community.

554 The Bedouins say that one goes to the *rajal khair*,
571 or *rajal salih*, because he knows that he will "get his
627 rights." Litigation is entered into with the understanding
829 [691] that neither party will emerge a "loser." On the other hand,
* [613] the *'aqila*, who is expected to be dispassionate and totally
objective, must rule on the rightness or wrongness of an act;

• 554 hence the rajal khair represents a face-saving mechanicsm
571 and an alternative which is needed. The rajal khair may even
627 [829] violate group norms in acting to restore the balance of
*[613] honor: he may lie with intent to deceive, behavior which at
[577] any other time would be considered "wrong" by the Bedouin.
An informant said that

> [539] the real rajal khair is a man who goes to men in a quarrel and asks them to be on good terms and to avoid the devil. He uses good judgement in quarrels. In this case, he may even have to lie. He goes to both parties and listens to them insult each other, but when he returns he tells each that the other is a good man and wishes to settle the quarrel. He tells them: 'Do not let the devil interfere.' He tells each that the other wants his friendship.

554 I pursued the detail that a rajal khair may lie to restore
571 peace, since other informants had made a point of this. My
577 informant then explained:
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> [539] I don't want to commit myself because no one knows if the rajal khair is really lying; the men at the time of the quarrel do not know that he is lying. Not all men are rajal khair: there are only a few. The rajal khair puts himself in trouble to help others, therefore, the people do not want to harm him (by thinking ill of him). The rajal khair must be a good man and help others, and he always speaks the truth. He lies but he is doing good, and the people do not want to harm him. When the rajal khair lies, a man does not lose his rights. A man tells the rajal khair this; he tells him that he does not want to lose his rights, and he does not care what he says as long as he does not lose his rights.

554 One 'aqila, who is famous for the sharpness of his tongue in
571 dealing with litigants, was explicit about the authority of
*613 the rajal khair as compared to his own in matters of conflict
627 regulation:
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> Both are one (i.e. the 'aqila and the rajal khair), for the rajal khair can also finish a problem. The rajal khair tries to solve the problem, but only the 'aqila judges (yahkum). The rajal khair worries about the feelings of the two men involved, but the 'aqila cares only about justice and what is right . . . The rajal khair does not want the two men to lose one another. It is a friendly way to solve problems.

554 Bedouins of low status in al-Qasr who are economically
571 linked to the rajal khair in what resembles a patron-client
627 relationship permit this fact to influence their own inter-
829 pretation of the authority structure. A common view of the
*613 'aqila's formal authority indicates that the Bedouins themselves are conscious of a structural comparison of political roles, but not of the underlying economic conditioners at work.

> [539] There are good men and there are bad men: the rajal khair is the opposite of a bad man. The rajal khair is not responsible for his group, but the 'aqila is. The 'aqila is chosen from among the elders of the bait so that he is not always a good man. But when they want a man to solve problems, they get him from among the rajal khair. The 'aqila is responsible before the 'umda and shaikh, and he is responsible for collecting and receiving the diya.

554 The rajal khair represents a vital element in Bedouin
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627 society. He is a symbol of security, the man to whom one
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554 turns in times of need dealing with financial and personal
571 problems. In view of the value stress which the Bedouins
627 place upon generosity, manifest in the redistributive system
182 [181] of the lineage, the wealth of the rajal khair is the wealth
[556] of the community. Wealth divides, not only possessors from non-possessors, but also, seekers after security from power seekers. It is as Peters (1965:145) has noted in Cyrenaica: generosity, not being entirely altruistic, wins repute and repute is an important aspect of political power.

554 In an interview concerning the justice of blood-
682 revenge, there was general agreement that if a man kills
627 intentionally, then blood-revenge must be taken by the
*613 murdered man's bait against someone in the murderer's aiela.
829 But one prominent man (a rajal khair) protested that "the best man in the killer's family must not be harmed." This statement generated a rather heated debate. One man said: "The best man should be killed for this is right in the Bedouin type of justice." (This comment was made by a man who is the 'aqila of a low-status lineage in al-Qasr.) The first speaker's reply to the protest was this:

> Nevertheless, it all depends upon the character of the best man . . . if he is evil and on bad terms with your family, then he will be the first one to be killed. But if he is a good man, then you kill the murderer himself . . . You must never kill a rajal khair because he may do good in the future.
> [178] In the old days, the killing started right away, and all problems were big ones: today there is negotiation--people are improving.

554 One *'aqila* claimed that the *rajal khair* is a person
627 who shares in his own authority and presides when he is
*613 away, but he separated the "rights" of the two roles. The
[779] *'aqila* is able to force two parties in conflict to read the
[578] *Fatiha*, the first *sura* of the Quran, in order to terminate
the problem; this is beyond the rights of the *rajal khair* whose
influence is not directly supported by sacred sanctions. But
[784] the role of *rajal khair* does have its "sacred" aspects, for
all Bedouins know that "you should never harm a *rajal khair*
or God will punish you for this." I never heard this same
thing said about the *'aqila*.

554 Historically, it was perhaps the case that the *rajal*
627 *khair* was the person of high status who represented the authority
*613 of an absent *'aqila*. The role never became institutionalized
182 but functioned as a support and substitute role in a structure
dominated by that of the *'aqila*. In a segmentary society
627 where the various structures exist in opposition to one
628 another, it is important that an institution, such as a third
182 non-partisan element, exists to facilitate communication
578 between parties for the purposes of conflict regulation.
Besides the *rajal khair*, an example of this would be the
traditional case of the wife from an outside tribe who alone
was permitted freedom of passage between the two warring
parties. Her purpose, it was assumed, was that of peace-making.

554 571 627 [681] The rajal khair, then, is a broker in social relationships, a manipulator of loyalties. As a member of the "status group," he can afford to spend time and money in courting his fellow tribesmen, and, as a result, can accrue prestige and loyalty. This role, like that of the 'aqila, is a secular one. The sanctions which it controls are as economical as those of the 'aqila's are political. In this sense, they are differentiated from the role of rajal saalih whose sanctions are sacred in nature.

554 792 [178] The traditional role which we define as that of the rajal saalih, "the holy man," was probably much more important in the past than it is today. In al-Qasr, there are only two rajal saalih who share in traditional power: the one is a resident of al-Qasr proper, and the other, a member of the prestigious Sanusi family, lives near Marsa Matruh.

[561] [793] The rajal saalih of al-Qasr, i.e. the local "holy man," is assured of status because he is an ashraf, one who claims descent from the family of the Prophet. He is also a member of the elder age-set, and while he is not rich, he cannot be considered poor. Though the "holy man" al-Sanusi lives near Matruh, he participates in the authority structure of al-Qasr and is a member of the "status group." He is sometimes referred to as rajal saalih kabir, "a great holy man," by virtue of his Sanusi heritage.

[771] The relative unimportance of this role as compared to that of the rajal khair in conflict regulation is a function

•554 792 771 of the Bedouin attitude, or lack of it, toward religion. Since the time of Muhammad, the Bedouins have been considered notoriously bad Muslims. Today, the Bedouins tend to joke about their lack of zeal, and often point out that "holy 619 771 792 554 [778] men" are not to be trusted.[2] This is seen in Sa'adi behavior toward the Marabtin tribes who are their vassals. Theoretically, the Marabtin who trace descent to the Prophet and might be considered "sacred Tribes" should be respected by the "secular" Sa'adi tribes. But the Sa'adi of al-Qasr tend to deride the 554 792 627 619 Marabit. For instance, the "holy man" of al-Qasr, 'Amm Salih, is a Marabit and well-known for his ability to successfully mediate in conflict situations. But one informant, pointing out this gift which 'Amm Salih possesses, said: "Amm Salih is a good man, he is not a Marabit." But 'Amm Salih identifies himself as a "rajal saalih" and a "Marabit"; he sees no role conflict here.

771 [522] The Bedouins also joke about the manner in which they practice the "pillars of Islam." Especially, they make light of the fact that they are irregular in mosque attendance. They say, with a slight smile, "we pray in the desert." A [124] common way for an interview to end was by an informant rising and saying: "Now I must wash for prayers." This happened

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[184] [2] Professor Abou-Zeid also notes this trait in his study of the Bedouin near Sallum, on the Libyan border (1966:248).

771 at any time of the day! As one Bedouin put it: "According to the idea of goodness (salih), we are not good. This is because we do not pray, we are part-timers in prayer."

554 A good rajal saalih is considered by the Bedouin to 792 have a special "blessing" (baraka), a concept somewhat 778 equivalent to that of mana. Someone such as 'Amm Salih is thought to have baraka, and this type of power naturally increases his influence and enhances his status. The following [124] informant's account brings this out and shows something of the magico-religious element at work in Bedouin power relations.

> [539] Hajj 'Ali does not believe in magic but he respects the "holy man" like anyone else. He owns a field from which are taken stones for building houses. One day he saw some men taking stones from this field. They were digging near a well so that the well would not be able to hold water after they had finished. Hajj 'Ali told the men to stop digging. One man answered: "I am cutting these stones for the Jaraira family (the family of 'Amm Salih), and only a few more and we will be finished." Hajj 'Ali replied: "For the Jaraira as for anyone else, we don't favor anyone, so stop the work now." Then Hajj 'Ali went home, never thinking that they would cause any trouble for him, and he was afraid of no harm. He slept and he had a dream. [787] In the dream he saw three of the Jaraira family, all of whom were dead and whom he had known in life. In the dream they only watched him and spoke no words. In the morning Hajj 'Ali went to the co-operative society's office and there he met 'Amm Salih. He said to him: "'Amm Salih, I want to tell you something." Then he related the whole story to him, and said: "I had no fear that you would do me any harm. But last night I saw your relatives in my dream; I had not even thought of them yesterday, so they are not the cause of the dream. [828] (The Bedouins believe that dreams reflect, and are connected with, what you saw or did during the day). So come and take all of the stones that you want, even if you are going to build a palace."

554 It is interesting to note that Hajj 'Ali is one of the most
[571] powerful members of the "status group" in al-Qasr. He is
[178] also a leading proponent of social change and a critic of
the old way of life which includes belief in magic. One can
[792] see how 'Amm Salih's influence and status might work in other
areas of social action.

554 Although it is conceivable that a rajal salih can
792 be asked to intervene in any type of conflict, it is more
627 likely that he will preside at cases involving marriage and
[695] divorce. The rajal saalih may also be asked to serve as a
[691] witness or consultant in litigation cases. The Bedouins
* [613] point out that the "holy man," like the rajal khair, is apt
[829] to be more trustworthy than the formal authority, the 'aqila.

> Sanusi is a good man and the people should listen to him. He is a rajal khair, a rajal saalih, not an 'aqila. He is better than an 'aqila--he is our brother. He is much better than the 'umda because he never changes the truth. The 'umda may go and accuse me wrongly to the government but Sanusi would never do this.

554 It is, of course, difficult to decide whether Sanusi's
792 charisma stems from the fact that he is a rajal salih, or the
facts of his wealth and family. Most probably it is a little of both, the sacred as well as the secular. 'Amm Salih, on the other hand, is neither wealthy nor from a particularly prestigious family by economic standards of al-Qasr: he derives his influence and status from the sacred aspects of

554 792 his role.

The people of al-Qasr identify 'Amm Salih as the
[124] [627] "holy man" in the area. In my interviews, when I asked for the name of a party, besides the 'aqila, who solves the Bedouins' problems, the answer was either Hajj 'Ali, the rajal khair, or "the Jaraira family." (This refers to 'Amm Salih and his brother.) When I asked for the name of a man who could tell me "how the Bedouin should act," the only name mentioned was that of 'Amm Salih.

554 792 627 'Amm Salih says that he solves many problems, not all of which deal with marriage and divorce. He claimed that he could settle conflicts over land and water. Just as a man may choose to go to the rajal khair, so also might he go to the rajal salih. Often enough, the selection of a "third party" will be determined by his propinquity. One 'aqila told me: "Salih Jaraira is a good man . . . If two men wish to accept Jaraira's decision, and if he lives near them, it is
* [613] [571] all right. If Jaraira cannot solve the problem, then they will return to the 'aqila. The 'aqila can solve it or he can call in other 'awaqil who can solve it."

[114] When I asked 'Amm Salih for case studies of problems which he has handled, he said that he would not reveal them because they are private affairs. He was willing, however, to describe the method in which he solves a problem.

> 554 Suppose the donkey of A (a man present at the interview)
> 792 gets into the barley of B (another man present). This is
> 627 actually a serious matter since it could conceivably lead
> to a big fight between A's *'aiela* and B's *'aiela.* First,
> I separate them and make each go to his home. Then I
> get A's three brothers (his father is dead), we take a
> *dhabiiha* (lamb) and go to B's place and all eat together.
> [779] After the meal, we read the *Fatiha* (opening *sura* of the
> Quran) together to show that all is forgiven. After the
> *Fatiha* has been read no trouble will start because this
> is done in the presence of the Jaraira.

[784] He explained that reading the *Fatiha* in bad faith would bring
the same curse from God that a bad oath would bring. He also
*[613] claimed that only he and the *'aqila* have the authority to
command men to read the *Fatiha*.

554 'Amm Salih says that he uses the *'awaiyid* as a guide
792 in solving problems, and that it is necessary because
627 "quarrels spread like fire, it is like fire; they spread to
671 killing and war." He was the only person in al-Qasr who
554 tried to conceptualize the difference between the *'awaiyid
792 Awlad 'Ali* and the *Sharii'a*. 'Amm Salih said that it is
627 wrong to lie, according to both the secular and the sacred
671 authority codes: "One who lies exceeds the word of God,
779 577 and God will punish him for this. No one can know how this
[784] punishment will take place, only God will know this . . .
Sometimes a car goes off the road and people will say that it
is the punishment of God. But you never know because the
554 punishment of God comes in the after-life." I asked him:
792 "If this is so, why may the *rajal khair* lie in trying to
627 settle quarrels?" He replied:
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•554 792 627 [577]

> Lying is bad (haram), but this is "the lie of a peace-maker" (kadhib musaalih). For instance, if you have a quarrel with Yunis here, then I have words with both of you. I use different words with each of you. I use different words than those which you used in the quarrel--I use good words. This is to bring you two together again. Maybe I see that you are going to kill, or I hear bad words from you; I do not go and tell him what you said.

'Amm Salih said that it is his "duty" to mediate disputes, and that he never hesitates "because God will reward me later." He did not want the quarrels to grow into wars. He also bases his pleas for conciliation upon moral discoure, the method used by the other traditional authorities.[3] 'Amm Salih said that in trying to solve a problem, "I give priority to the elder. I go to the younger man and tell him that he should make peace with the elder because no one cares more for him than his antagonist, and that he really cares more for his antagonist than for any other." The rajal saalih mediates but does not arbitrate: he attempts to redress the balance of good relations but does not impose judgements.

554 792 627 *613 [779]

This approach to conflict regulation is not that of the 'aqila in his formal role, but it is similar to what the rajal khair would use. The main procedural difference between the two informal roles (i.e. rajal khair and rajal saalih) is that, in each case, the rajal saalih reads the Fatiha with

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[3] The approach which I used in my interviews with 'Amm Salih derives from the work of John Ladd as presented in his book, The Structure of a Moral Code, 1957.

554 the disputants. As noted, the *rajal saalih* shares this right
792 with the *'aqila*. The *rajal khair* does not have recourse
627 to this mechanism which amounts to divine approval of the
*613 binding decision of the "third party." 'Amm Salih in his
779 discussion of the Bedouin moral code corroborated this
point: "Any *'aqila* can read the *Fatiha*. In this way, he
and the two parties involved terminate the quarrel. This is
a way to show that all agree on the settlement. Originally,
only the *rajal saalih* did this, but now the *'awaaqil* do it
in all cases." It would be interesting to know if in Cyrenaica
both roles perform this function or if it belongs only to the
role of *rajal salih*.

554 I cannot generalize concerning this role for the whole
184 of the Western Desert. Sayyid al-Sanusi and 'Amm Salih seem
627 to be special men. On the other hand, the *'aqila* and the
792 *rajal khair* are roles which we would expect to find all over
*613 the desert, and in Libya also. The *'aqila* is the focus of
institutionalized traditional authority structure, and the
rajal khair and "status group" represent the power structure.
554 This attempt to differentiate between authority and power
121 is essentially one which deals with the more general problem
of leadership. Any study of the structure of authority must
have reference to the notion of leadership. Role analysis seems
the best method of dealing with leaders and their functions.
Role analysis together with the conceptualization of institution
as a process is an adequate way of dealing with the tendency

554 toward legitimacy and the phenomenon of change in the
121 political structure. Peters (1967:271-279), in a long
awaited discussion of the political aspect of Cyrenaican
Bedouin society, adumbrates this problem of differentiating
between instituted authority and the distribution of power:

> In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary . . . there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason--because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise--that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies (i.e. lineage societies).

554 Foci of power and authority change and at times
178 irrespectively of the lineage structure. The role of the
792 rajal saalih was more influential during the days of the
571 Sanusiiya movement than it is today. At that time, "holy
[795] men" controlled economic, and thus political, relations
through the zawiya system: they were in a position to command
respect and obedience and could be considered a "status group"
in their own right. Today, "holy men" are rarely found among
the members of the "status group." As one informant phrased
it: "They used to solve problems more in the past than now.
People in the old days were not educated as they are today:
554 the mind of the son is larger than that of the father. In
178 the past, the "holy man" was so important that were he to ask
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554 you for your cloak, you would have immediately given it to
178 him. God was pleased with them at that time."
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This notion of changing foci of authority and power cannot be divorced from the related political phenomena of the tendency toward legitimacy and the role institutionalization
128 process. In the next chapter, I will attempt to show how such a conceptual framework can be utilized in an analysis of culture and political change.

Modern Legal Roles

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554 The roles of *'umda* and *shaikh* were created and imposed
[648] upon the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali sometime during the early
[177] part of the nineteenth century in order to facilitate administration, maintain security in the desert, and protect the Western frontier.

[619] Both of these roles are representative offices at the primary level of the tribal structure. The 'Aishaibat have an *'umda* and a *shaikh* who reside in Marsa Matruh and work in close relation with the Governor. In terms of a chain of command, these offices receive demands which may originate either with the Governor in Matruh or with Bedouins in al-Qasr. But these offices are subservient to both the Governor and the Bedouins since no decision-making powers of any consequence
[591] resides with them. With reference to the two authority
[635] structures, the Egyptian and the Bedouin, the *'umda* and the

634 554 [571] [635] shaikh are administrators, not executives, in the service of the Governor and the "status group" of al-Qasr. Nevertheless, under the influence of the bureaucratic principle, as a new structural principle in Bedouin society, these offices could conceivably become seats of power.[4]

634 554 666 571 The 'umda and shaikh are described as "elective" offices by the Bedouins but, in fact, they are appointive just like the office of 'aqila. Theoretically, every man has a vote but, actually, only the members of the "status group" vote. Paradoxically, perhaps, the Bedouins stress two major qualifications for these offices: the 'umda and the shaikh must be men "who know the needs of the Bedouin of the desert, and know how to talk to the Governor"; and, "they must be men who do nothing without the permission of the 'awaaqil (i.e. without the permission of the "status group" who elected the 'aqila in the first place).

634 554 The two offices are not equal in prestige and status neither in the eyes of the Bedouins or of the Egyptians. The office of shaikh is the lesser office. It amounts to a clerical post, and the shaikh really functions as an assistant

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[635] [4] The Governor, who is of Bedouin origin, has already recognized this potential and has moved to eliminate the possibility of a more powerful 'umda representing a more powerful "status group." When I left the field, the Governor was in the process of drawing up new ground rules for electing the 'umda and the shaikh which would call for public elections on a "one man, one vote" basis.

634 to the _'umda_. Both offices are for a life-term, only being
•554 terminated by bad behavior or senility. At the expiration
634 of an incumbent's term, the "status group" meets in al-Qasr
571 to decide upon his replacement. The name of a "nominee"
635 is passed on to the Governor who is expected to approve the
666 Bedouins' selection of a representative to the government.
It is this "status group"-controlled process which the
[178] Governor seeks to change. Since these are officially held
[177] offices in the U.A.R. governmental structure, he feels that
elections to fill their vacancies should be a public affair.
Naturally, he will exercise more influence over the naming
of candidates in this way, and the Bedouins perceive this as
a challenge to the traditional structure of leadership and
control of external relations.

634 The offices of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ are even more heredi-
*613 tary than that of _'aqila_, which theoretically should not be
666 the case. By definition, the role of _'aqila_ is functional at
[428] the _bait_ level, and so the recruitment pool of candidates
for this office is inherently limited. By comparison, the
offices of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ should go to the "best men" in
the tribe, and, therefore, the recruitment pool should be
634 tribal-wide. But, in fact, these two offices are considered
*613 "the property" of the wealthiest lineages in the al-Qasr area.
666 There is a traditional rationale behind this fact: there is
428 the structural necessity for, and conscious practice of, an
[571]

124 If the office left the family,

> *613 all of the lineages would be fighting over it . . . The
> 634 job should stay in Bait Bu Taram; if this is impossible,
> 571 then it should stay in 'Ailit Lazumi. In any case, the
> 666 *'awaaqil* will decide.

578 A change in the present locus of legal authority in
634 the Bedouin-Egyptian government structural relationship
178 would amount to a re-structuring process, and could lead to
121 serious conflict. In the very least, it would call for a
clear explanation and new statement of social reality since
it would challenge what is, and "has always been," a legitimate
distribution of power and political order.

634 The office of the *shaikh* is not a potential power-
•554 base by comparison with the office of *'umda*. The *shaikh*,
rather than being in direct communication with the Governor, executes the official orders made known to the *'umda.* As an administrator, he takes care of issuing drivers' licenses, notifies men of their military draft status, etc. The government sees this as a necessary post because of the difficulty of contacting Bedouins deep in the desert. In one sense, the *shaikh's* office is becoming less functional as the Bedouin move in from the desert and begin to take part in the national society, but in another sense it is becoming more functional as bureaucracy and red tape become increasingly complex. But the *shaikh* remains in the shadow of the *'umda*. He never substitutes for the *'umda*, for this would infringe on the rightful power of the *'umda's* family; when the *'umda* is absent,

634 his brother sits in his place.

•554 The present shaikh is a member of 'Ailit Ma'fas, and
634 this is to offset the fact that the office of 'umda is in
*613 'Ailit Lazumi. It reflects the need to distribute official
554 power and to symbolize the real power structure. Historically,
the Lazumi were more powerful than the Ma'fas. These two
lineages are the largest, wealthiest, and most influential
in al-Qasr and among the 'Aishaibat. When the present
[666] shaikh's father decided to retire due to old age, he requested
[571] that his son be allowed to take up his role. The 'awaaqil
of the 'Aishaibat in al-Qasr approved this "nomination" and
[556] the son was "elected." It is a fact that the shaikh's father
is the richest man among the members of the 'Ailit Ma'fas
and that the 'umda's father was the richest man of 'Ailit
Lazumi.

571 Power groups tend to interact so as to enhance not
*613 the official authority structure but the political status quo
582 (Peters 1967:279). This explains a practice of the "status
group" which Max Weber referred to as "connubism," the tendency
of the members of this group to exchange women among themselves.
*613 In Figure 10,[1] the marriages of 'Ait Abd al-Malik of Bait 'Umar
582 of 'Ailit Ma'fas show that out of seventeen marriages only
four of these were within the 'Aishaibat, and that three out
of four of these marriages were with 'Ailit Lazumi. Even
more impressive is the information obtained from considering

[1] [See p. 132--Analyst]

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all of the marriages in the history of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Table 1).[1] From a total of 197 marriages, 33 were within the 'Aishaibat tribe. Of these 33 marriages with the other lineages of al-Qasr (see Figure 3 for the lineages of al-Qasr), 2 were with 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, and 2 with 'Ailit Zallat, 4 each were with 'Ailit Zagharat, 'Ailit Dawlat, and 'Ailit Shraif, but 17, or just over 50 per cent, were with 'Ailit Lazumi.

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For the time being, the offices of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ seem to be modern symbols of the traditional power structure rather than loci of real power, though this does not preclude their becoming so in the future. But for the present, these roles are considered "not of the people, not of the desert, they belong to the government." Here is the way one _'aqila_ explained it:

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> The _'umda_ is higher in the government but the _'aqila_ is the responsible one in the _'aiela_. The _shaikh_ has nothing to do with _'awaqil_, he only makes contact between them and the government . . . The _'umda_ gets the request from the government and asks the _'awaqil_ to handle the situation, but he does not tell them how to do it . . . The _'umda_ and _shaikh_ go to meetings with the Governor, then they tell the _'awaqil_ about the matters discussed. There is no direct contact between the Governor and the _'awaqil_ . . . The _'umda_ comes to the _'awaqil_ concerning general problems . . . If the Arabs need something from the government, they go to the _'umda_. They tell him to go and tell the Governor what they want . . . The _'umda_ represents them and he does good in this. God only knows if he is doing a good job. If he is not it will show in the next election.

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From the standpoint of the political system of al-Qasr, we might conclude that the _'umda_ and _shaikh_ are roles

[1] [This should read Table 5. See p.115--Analyst]

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554 of little significance in the authority structure. Very few people of the al-Qasr area have had any contact with these officers, and very few want any contact. On the other hand,
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178 the direction of change in al-Qasr and the bureaucratic growth of the government in the Western Desert makes it likely that all Bedouins will be drawn into the total authority structure, and that the roles of 'umda and shaikh will expand. These roles will not increase in terms of traditional prestige and status, but they may gain the authority which they do not possess now. This is in view of the fact that the traditional authority structure remains relatively intact. The 'umda and the shaikh have no traditional basis of authority, so they cannot make decisions which are morally binding for Bedouins of al-Qasr at this time.
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178 It is obvious, of course, that the 'umda may refer to the Governor, and even the use of governmental force, as the basis of his legitimacy. But this has never happened. The incumbent 'umda is still a Bedouin, and this prevents him from challenging the traditional ways. Also, the Governor is concerned with restricting the 'umda's influence not increasing it.

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578 I do not mean to imply that there is, or will be, a struggle for power between traditional authority represented by the 'aqila and modern legal authority represented by the 'umda. Such a struggle could not actually occur since when, and if, the 'umda came to represent authority in a newly

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structured situation the traditional authority structure would have disappeared from the scene.

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But, there is a struggle for authority recognition going on in al-Qasr. It is related to the change from the old basis of traditional authority to a new basis of legal authority. At the heart of this struggle is the role of the rajal khair. The rajal khair has a firm public basis for establishing himself in an authoritative and representative role. Traditionally, the rajal khair has faced inward and outward: he has used his ascribed position on the al-Qasr prestige scale to augment his status and influence, and, at the same time, his economic rationality has oriented him [648] toward Marsa Matruh. In the present stage of culture change, the rajal khair is in a position to combine his ascribed and achieved attributes to gain entrance to a new reference group, the Egyptian bureaucracy. This offers him a new kind of prestige as well as affording him new opportunities for power, and even authority, over his fellow Bedouins.

The rajal khair, in view of his movement between the old and new in Egypt, maintains a tertium quid status in two camps. While he has one foot in the traditional community because of his role in conflict regulation and the manipulation of traditional values, the rajal khair also has a foot in the

178 •554 627 modern camp. He has been able to enter into dialogue with modernizing agents because his intra-tribal "status honor" renders him public recognition at the institutional level, and because his worldly style of life allows him to, in part, identify with a modern reference group.

554 178 634 *613 The _'aqila_ and the _'umda_ might be seen as the two extremes of a temporary and emerging authority structure for the Bedouin of al-Qasr: the traditional authority bound to the old moral order, and the modern legal authority identified wholly with an, as of yet, outside political and moral order. [627] Ideally, it seems that only the _rajal khair_, who is neither an _'aqila_ nor an _'umda_, is in the structural and ideological position to assume leadership and to guide the Bedouins during this period of culture change.

121 and political connections," with nation-oriented persons who operate at a national socio-cultural level of integration (1956:1075-1076).

Clifford Geertz (1960) has also examined the role of a "cultural broker" in Indonesia as an instance of "a vigorous, imaginative regional leadership, able to play a cultural middleman role between peasant and metropolitan life, and so create an effective juncture between traditional cultural patterns and modern ones" (1960:229). In the case of the Mexican "broker" described by Wolf, the major means of consolidating and obtaining power both at the regional and the national levels were through political channels. In the case of the Indonesian "broker," both religious and political channels are the means by which the local Muslim teacher, or kijaji, has obtained power: traditionally, he was a specialist in communication of Islam to the countryside, and today he has taken on the role of local party leader (Geertz 1960:230).

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In al-Qasr, the rajal khair seems to be the Bedouin counterpart of the Mexican and Indonesian "broker." With a firm economic base in the local community, and with his ability to adopt new patterns of public behavior, i.e., "he knows how to speak to the Governor and public officials," the role of rajal khair provides the means for one to move upwards through political channels (Wolf 1956:1071). Within the context of a newly emerging authority system based upon the

121 structural principle of bureaucracy, the *rajal khair* lacking
554 legitimacy in the traditional lineage-based system may en-
627 visage an authoritative role and increased chances to "improve
557 his status through the judicious manipulation of social ties."

121 Leadership studies in the context of cultural change,
554 such as those which deal with "broker" types, have important
178 implications for a more general and fundamental theoretical
problem: the role of the individual in culture and society. Radin, as early as 1927, Redfield (1960), Geertz (1960), Fallers (1964), and Mead (1964) have spoken of "primitive philosophers," "the hinge group," "the cultural brokers," "the new men," and "the evolutionary clusters." All terms have direct reference to role types constructed from the observation of individuals possessed of the ability and creativity to offer new ideas and methods of dealing with the pressing cultural problems of their times. The unitary goal of all these researchers was to understand culture change through a focus on the way in which the individual manipulates his cultural resources.

121 I would maintain that, especially in political analysis, the approach and focus of the researcher is directly related to his ontologic position concerning the concepts of culture and human nature. That is to say, whether or not the researcher believes that "man has no choice in life, that culture determines his behavior," then he will or will not find it relevant

121 tradition" and "the little tradition." The "little tradition" refers to peasant or folk culture, and the "great tradition" to a specialized and systematized body of thought which is, in most cases, esoteric, written, related to religion, and the property of an intellectual group (1960:40-59; 1962:302). Of course, Redfield's notion of a "literati" does not apply in the Bedouin case. But in an earlier work (1953:44) Redfield drew attention to the more general concept of "intelligentsia" which further refines the scope and types of leadership. Redfield refers to "the member of the intelligentsia . . . (who) belongs to two worlds, not one; he is a marginal man." He then goes on to differentiate between the "literati" type and the "intelligentsia" type, stating that the former type uses literacy to carry on the sacred tradition while the member of the "intelligentsia" may use literacy "to admit the ways of the world outside." While the rajal khair does not become the representative of the great and sacred tradition of Islam, he does utilize the bureaucratic means at hand to admit the outside world into al-Qasr. The rajal khair may be considered a member of an "intelligentsia."

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121 Gustave von Grunebaum (1962) has used Redfield's model of cultural dynamics to understand change and social mobility in the Arab World with special reference to Egypt. The author, an Islamicist, states that the "great tradition" of orthodox Islam in contrast to popular Islam is recognized as "the more

121 the values of a non-membership group in order to "find readier
177 acceptance by that group and make an earlier adjustment to
571 it" (Merton 1957:265). In a relatively closed society such as
181 al-Qasr, when those who qualify for membership in other reference groups are able to do more than merely aspire, when they actually anticipate and adjust their behavior to a type of status consciously desired, the local authority and social structures are likely to be transformed.

121 We can generalize from the literature on social
571 stratification that the hierarchial structure characteristic
●554 of traditional societies carries with it a relationship of mutual obligation. The "inferior" owes rent, respect, loyalty, obedience, etc., while the "superior" owes, in return, protection, advice, help in emergency, action in conflict regulation, representation in extralocal matters, etc. (Hagen 1962:
121 55-86; Parsons 1953: 108). In al-Qasr, the 'aqila fulfills
554 only one of the functions of the "superior," that which deals
* [613] with conflict regulation. The rajal khair role, as I have
[627] developed it, may function in full capacity as a "superior."
121 The rajal khair dominates the internal system through power
554 derived from rank on the prestige scale: he is prominent in
627 the external system as member and representative of a new power structure based on national and political consciousness. Traditionally, rajal khair-dominance was not by force but through influence and prestige: in the new situation, with a

121 fully organized government behind the role, the element of
•554 force may enter into the *rajal khair* style of domination.
627 Thus far, the *'umda* and the *shaikh* roles have functioned
[634] through the traditional roles of the *'aqila* and the *rajal*
*[613] *khair*, that is, the "status group." In the future, this pattern
[178] may change. It is also possible that new roles will emerge.
This is what I wish to explore.

121 The "status group" of al-Qasr operating with a sense
571 of identity with a modern reference group deem themselves
554 responsible for making decisions on the behalf of "the people"
or "the Bedouin." Members of the "status group" would
[177] occasionally dress in Western clothes; they would hunt gazelle for sport; they owned the few autos there were in the area; and a few partook of alcoholic beverages. Their rights and obligations in social relations are still relatively stable and depend on the ascribed values of al-Qasr Bedouin society, but one can detect the start of a power struggle within the group. It is a competitive desire for social mobility and is stated in terms of the achieved attributes considered important by the reference group to which they aspire, the Egyptian society. For example, one sometimes heard the complaint from various members of the "status group" that the Governor was not giving proper recognition to those "who understood the ways of the Bedouin," and "those who could speak for the Bedouin."

121 554 571 156 My approach here is to state the problem of authority and change using a case study of one man whom I consider the most prestigious member of the "status group" of al-Qasr. He is a member of the "status group" by virtue of his wealth and family connections; he has reinforced and enhanced his "status honor" by the practice of intervening into various conflict situations and mustering support, favors, and loyalty as he goes; and he has proved his "superiority" by excelling in the outside business world. All this he has done while remaining a "good Bedouin."

124 554 156 The name of Hajj 'Ali appeared time and time again as my research progressed and increasingly concentrated on the authority structure.[2] I asked questions which required the informants to name a person in al-Qasr to whom he would go if he needed help, money or advice. I asked: "Who is the leader of the Bedouin?";"Who knows the wants and needs of the Bedouin most intimately?" [571] On the basis of the data collected in this manner, I was able to perceive a "status group" and gain an idea of the real leaders of al-Qasr. It also gave me a working knowledge of the local role structure. Hajj 'Ali's name came up with the highest frequency in the questionnaires, and my observations and interviews with him corroborated his central place in the authority structure. [126] I also recorded the life history of Hajj 'Ali's son, and gained valuable insights from this data.

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[2] The name, Hajj 'Ali, is of course a pseudonym.

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I know that Hajj 'Ali consciously and actively seeks to be a leader among the Bedouin, that he seeks a place in the new governmental structure in Marsa Matruh, and hence that he desires power, however benevolent his intentions may be. In what follows, I hope to bring this out by presenting Hajj 'Ali as himself and as a "cultural broker."

When I say that Hajj 'Ali desires power I mean nothing derogatory. Power-seeking is a kind of social phenomenon which characterizes man-in-society around the world: the quest occurs in primitive and modern groups, and university structures alike (Moore 1958:1-30). Hajj 'Ali's desire for power, and also authority, has not wrought change in the whole structure of the al-Qasr social system. As we shall see, Hajj 'Ali is discontent with the present structure of al-Qasr and feels that the Bedouins must accept change. His discontent is related to the changing conditions in and about al-Qasr; the chance to express it or re-channel it, at this time, derives from his ascribed place in the al-Qasr system. Whether his desire for power is a result or a cause of his discontent I cannot tell. Only a personality study in depth could answer this question.

In terms of this study, one way to look at Hajj 'Ali's case is to view it as his attempt to convert power in the internal system into authority in the external system. But in this context "external" refers to the national level rather

156 than the Awlad 'Ali societal level. In the traditional
•554 system, his influence and power have been informal, and,
121 although this has been advantageous over against the formal
role of _'aqila_, his political activity was ultimately limited
by this structural differentiation and definition of authority.
[177] In gaining access to the bureaucratic structure of Egyptian
officialdom with its firm allocation of rights and duties,
Hajj 'Ali could operate as an authority within the total authority
structure which has reference to both the internal and external
political relational systems of al-Qasr.

Practical Application

*613 In al-Qasr, the two most influential and powerful
lineages, 'Ailit Lazumi and 'Ailit Ma'fas, each have a
[634] "most powerful _bait_." We have noted that in 'Ailit Lazumi
it is Bait Bu Taram which controls the office of _'umda_: in
*613 'Ailit Ma'fas it is Bait 'Umar which has Hajj 'Ali. Hajj 'Ali
159 is fifty three years old. He has married five times, divorced
581 one wife, and at present has four wives. Whatever his motives
156 for these marriages, at least some of them have obviously
[595] been made as economic and political moves. A check on his
wives' tribal origins will show this. In each case, Hajj
'Ali's wife is from a lineage which holds land contiguous to
his own property in the _'izba_ sector of al-Qasr. The one
exception to this is a marriage contracted to establish ties

*613 159 with Bait Bu Taram of 'Ailit Lazumi. These marriages and
581 their resultant alliances enhance the political power and
156 social status of Hajj 'Ali within and without al-Qasr.

Although he has no education himself, and neither reads
159 nor writes, Hajj 'Ali has sent his son to the University of
156 873 Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali's son is the only boy from al-Qasr
[212] ever to attend the university. Hajj 'Ali desired that his
son study law at the university or enter the military academy
"and become an officer." But his son objected to this, saying:
"Either way I will be employed by the government and will not
be permitted to travel and see other countries." Hajj 'Ali did
not argue with this: he said that his son should study what
he wished. The son is now studying in the Faculty of Commerce
156 at Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali is also sending his daughters to
159 the primary school in al-Qasr. Not all of the Bedouins believe
872 562 that girls should receive an education.

156 Hajj 'Ali places among the "status group" in terms
159 of wealth. Although he has now committed himself to olive-
•554 farming as a way of life, he remains one of the biggest sheep
472 owners in al-Qasr. Therefore, he is identified with both tra-
ditional and modern symbols of status. Hajj 'Ali differs in
156 159 one important way from other members of the "status group"
554 in that he owns three small general stores, two in al-Qasr
443 and one far to the west in Sallum. This fact has several
423 472 significant implications. Shops in al-Qasr (there are five
*[613]

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156 of them) cater largely to the needs of the lineage in whose
159 territory they are located. They are operated mostly on a
● 554
443 credit basis. Lineage members, as debtors, feel gratitude
423 but also, and more importantly, loyalty toward their kinsman
472 and creditor. Hajj 'Ali is the only member of al-Qasr who
*[613]
[452] owns two shops, and the only Bedouin in the whole Western Desert
who owns three shops. His brother owns a shop in Matruh.
156 Furthermore, the shop in Sallum is in a strategic position on
159 the Libyan border which, coincidentally or not, is a point
554 for importing, and also smuggling, foreign goods into Egypt.
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439 The possession and utilization of foreign products is definitely
472 a status symbol all over Egypt. Hence, the person in this
area who can control, however slightly, the distribution of
such goods has a lever with which to exact prestige and
favors from the "status group" in al-Qasr who now welcome
these symbols (tobacco, pistols, rifles, radios) and the
bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh who crave them (food goods,
clothing materials, car parts).

156 Besides all this, Hajj 'Ali is involved in a small
159 stone-cutting operation which supplies stones for house
554 building, he cooperates with his three brothers in a well-
[316]
[312] cleaning concern, and contracts government heavy equipment
[427] to build earth dams. The material evidence of his status
[342] is that he is the only man in al-Qasr with two compound-type
[595] houses (one he built thirteen years ago), and the only man
with four wives.

156 with four wives. It is not hard to understand why the people
159 554 of al-Qasr consider Hajj 'Ali a rajal khair par excellence.
627 For instance, when I asked one man if he could give me some
124 examples of court cases, he replied: "The one who is not an
'aqila pays no attention to anything save getting food for
his children. The rajal khair has money and men (a reference
to the "old days" when a person needed cohorts for battle),
and so he always pays instead of us. He lends us money and
helps us in doing anything, like Hajj 'Ali does." In another
124 interview, one man showed great respect for Hajj 'Ali's tradi-
156 159 tional status and modern ability to deal with the outside
554 world by giving him the honorific title of "shaikh," and
439 showing that the Bedouins of al-Qasr put their trust in him:
472 245 "When the olive merchants come from Alexandria, they go to
Shaikh 'Ali, someone who knows about olives. They ask him
what kind of olives al-Qasr has. He shows the merchants, and
they say: 'I will give you so much for them.' They make an
agreement, and Hajj 'Ali collects the olives and gets the
price for them."

156 In terms of local politics, I would guess, but do
159 554 not have data to prove, that Hajj 'Ali was the third party
[627] most frequently referred to in seeking a termination of
[114] conflict. He was commonly asked to participate in these
matters not only by the disputants themselves but also by
the 'aqila or other third party presiding. He was sometimes

156 159 554 675 He was sometimes asked to sit-in as a witness for important contractual matters. Note that in the rawaabit al-'awaaqil of Bait Shafaila of 'Ailit Lazumi (presented in Chapter Four), Hajj 'Ali who is neither from 'Ailit Lazumi nor an 'aqila was present to sign and validate this document.

156 159 554 Hajj 'Ali, then, operates in the micropolitical system and the traditional authority structure of al-Qasr. But what is just as important, he has secured a firm foothold in the modern bureaucratic structure of the near-by town. He straddles both camps. 635 634 156 159 554 124 [648] The Governor of Marsa Matruh was an important aid to my understanding of Hajj 'Ali's role as "broker." The Governor claimed that the British first introduced the roles of 'umda and shaikh; they did this to "control the Bedouin" and to"get the men out of the tents." He explained in his own way what he considered to be the structural differentiation of political roles in al-Qasr.

> *[613] Let me tell you, these fellows are very clever. They have an 'umda . . . he comes to my office and says: "I want this and this." I say, "No." Then he goes back to the 'awaqil and tells them that, and then these fellows begin to think in what way they can get what they want. But the 'umda is nothing; it is the 'aqila whom the Bedouins listen to and love . . . The 'umda is elected (at this time) by the Bedouins. They put forward a man who hesitates, one who can say yes or no . . . But there is a real leader for the people, this is a man such as Hajj 'Ali, here is a man the Bedouins love.

124 635 156 159 554 *[613] The Governor said that Hajj 'Ali speaks well and thinks well. Twice in the interview the Governor said that

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635 Hajj 'Ali "became an _'aqila_ by his way of life." Of course,
156 the fact is that Hajj 'Ali is not an _'aqila_ at all. Although
159 I feel that the Governor should understand the Bedouin authority
•554 structure, he is not alone in his misconceptions. The chief
*[613] agricultural engineer for the G.D.D.O., who works very closely
156 with the Bedouins of al-Qasr, also thought that Hajj 'Ali
159 was the _'aqila_ of Bait 'Umar in 'Ailit Ma'fas. Furthermore,
554 and most impressive of all, one _'aqila_ in 'Ailit Dawlat and
*613 his four sons all thought that Hajj 'Ali was the _'aqila_ of
Bait 'Umar. There is more here than just ignorance of
Bedouin society on the part of officials, and disinterest
on the part of the Dawlat _'aqila_. There is good reason for
these different parties to mistake Hajj 'Ali as a key
traditional "authority," or spokesman for his corporate group.
It seems clear that in their respective dealings they must
have encountered Hajj 'Ali in some kind of representative
capacity. The _'aqila_ who insisted that Hajj 'Ali was an
'aqila, even after I pointed out that he was not, lived
outside the _'izba_ sector and hence mistook an important
rajal khair for an _'aqila_. The Governor understandably
mistook the most influential man in al-Qasr as an _'aqila_.

635 There are other traits which qualify Hajj 'Ali as
648 the singular leader of the Bedouins. A few years back, the
[554] Governor of Marsa Matruh formed a Governor's Council
[156]
[159] (_Majlis al-Muhafza_) made up of representatives of the Bedouin

635 [648] population of the whole Western Desert, and representatives of the Egyptian government employees working in the province. [634] The Bedouin representatives appointed to this council need not be an _'umda_ or a _shaikh_, although they may be. The oldest Bedouin member of the council, who happens to be an _'umda_, told me that "the Governor picks the men who he feels understand the problems of the people."

635 124 *613 The Governor himself thinks that every Bedouin on his council is an _'aqila_. He replied to my question about the criteria for membership on the _Majlis al-Muhafza_: "I am using a new selection system. Rather than choose the _'umda_ or _shaikh_, I choose the _'aqila_. Every man on the council is an _'aqila_, and the number is determined by the population of the area . . . But I appoint more men from the [619] 'Ali Ahmar (see Figures 3 and 7)[1] than from other tribes. This is because they are more numerous, and they are near Matruh where I am able to contact them immediately. The 'Ali Ahmar are represented by six men and the other tribes by just three men."

156 159 •554 635 648 [114] Hajj 'Ali is one of these six men and the only member of the Council who resides in al-Qasr. I attended and observed the December meeting of the Council. The Governor sat at the head of a long table with the Egyptian representatives on either side of him. At the other end of the table sat the Bedouin representatives, Hajj 'Ali among them. Purely

[1] [See pp. 65 & 77 respectively--Analyst]

156 administrative business took up most of the time at the
159 meeting, and only the Governor and the Egyptians took part
● 554 in the discussion. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
635 Governor asked if any present had comments to make. Hajj
648 [871] 'Ali rose, and delivered a formal and well-prepared speech
[537] on the inadequacies of the educational facilities in Matruh.
He noted that the Governor had promised the Bedouins that if they sent their sons in from the desert for secondary schooling, their material needs would be taken care of, but that in fact the Governor had not kept his promise for there was not enough space and beds for the boys. The Governor apologized for this condition and said he was trying to correct it. I noted that a few Egyptians found something amusing about this incident, but that all of the Bedouins present were serious and nodded in agreement with the points made by Hajj 'Ali.

156 We should note that Hajj 'Ali was the only Bedouin to
159 speak up at the meeting, that he spoke in the formal, tradi-
554 tional manner, and that he showed concern for the real problems
635 of the Bedouins. Hajj 'Ali is careful to protect his identity as a Bedouin, and in this he differs from the 'umda and most of the "status group."

121 In situations of induced change, the cultural problems
156 involved differ in their conception and immediacy as defined
159 554 by the agents and the recipients of change. Hajj 'Ali, who
177 is both an agent and a recipient of change, is intimate with
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121 156 159 554 635 177 the problems of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. He knows how to phrase them, and his place on the Majlis al-Muhafza gives him the right and the opportunity to air them. This is the role of the "cultural broker." Before the meeting of the council, Hajj 'Ali had gathered a group of the men from al-Qasr and they had talked about which demands should be presented to the Governor. This is purely a political process which Hajj 'Ali manipulates. The formulation and presentation [648] of demands became, in the hands of Hajj 'Ali, "inputs" into the Egyptian political system with the hope that they will materialize as "outputs" and the satisfaction of needs - to use the terminology of David Easton's "systems analysis" (1965b).

156 159 554 635 177 On another occasion, Hajj 'Ali demonstrated his status and political leadership and the fact that he has assumed the position of spokesman for the Bedouin of al-Qasr during this period of change. Once each year the Governor makes a tour of al-Qasr to inspect the school, the cooperative building, the government experimental farm, and the area in general. After the inspection tour, he holds a reception in a ceremonial tent set up for the occasion. At this time, he states his evaluations and opinions, distributes some clothing material to the poorer families of the area, and asks for suggestions from the Bedouins who sit on the ground before the tent. The only suggestion forthcoming from the Bedouins was

156 by the secretary of the cooperative society who requested
159 that the government furnish bus service between Matruh and
554 al-Qasr. The Governor thought this a good idea and said he
635
177 would inquire into the matter.

156 As the Governor suggested that the meeting be adjourned,
159 Hajj 'Ali stood up, faced the Governor and began another of
554 his formal speeches in the rich tradition of Arabic; it was
635 the best Arabic I had heard spoken in the desert. This speech
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537 was for the benefit of all present, Bedouins and officials
alike. Hajj 'Ali made no requests but simply thanked the
Governor for honoring al-Qasr with his presence. In this
short well-prepared tribute, he said:

> We feel the efforts of the government and we can scarcely imagine or dream of this development. For instance, we were living in tents and now only five per cent remain in tents while the remainder are in houses. We were dressed simply, but now we are dressed in poplin material. Those who could afford one set of clothes now can afford two. Thanks be to God, all this is due to Jamal Abd al-Nasser.

156 It is significant, of course, that smiles once again
159 played on the faces of the Governor's entourage and nothing
554 but admiration on the faces of the Bedouins. As Hajj 'Ali
635
537 spoke he did not face the Governor directly but turned aside,
speaking both to him and the Bedouins--Hajj 'Ali, the Bedouin,
had been sitting on the ground before the Governor. The
[634] 'umda and shaikh had accompanied the Governor on his tour

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159 and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to
554 Marsa Matruh in the *'umda's* car (1964 Ford, highly polished)
635
537 with the *'umda* and the *shaikh*. They openly joked about Hajj
[634] 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of
[122] his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's
[522] reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj
'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 We can see how these details carry larger implications
177 within the context of political and social structures under-
178 going change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds
important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is
159 politically active and representative in both the traditional
554 and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that
177 he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction
178 of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social
and personal reasons.

156 Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came
159 around to the subject of international politics, whether this
554 was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial
177 problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole
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124 Marsa Matruh area who was neither *shaikh* nor *'umda* to attend
829 the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In
[577] all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to
identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

156 draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has
159
554 committed himself to work-hand-in-hand with the Governor of
177 Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics
178 and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact.
124
829 When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of
[571] changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the
time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring
me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes me to
cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which
Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated
in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in
the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

156 Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference
159 between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the
554 others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the
571 difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's
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796 house for 'iid al-fitr, the feast marking the end of Ramadan.
123 I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe
the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised
to find present no members of the "status group" but only
[556] their exact opposites. On the occasion of this feast it is
[735] the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional
surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts,
and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not
have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

156 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only
159 conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also
554
571 has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a prerequisite
574 of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous
796 one for a modern leader.
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He is aware of most traditional institutions and how
156 they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own
159 marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages
554
829 in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His
582 interest in getting on with the business of change, so to
speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the
Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual
male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female.
[177] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and
[178] duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element
[562] of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the
Middle East in general.

*613 The bait, as a political group, is in part structurally
602 defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin
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*613 602 571 682 at this lineage level must bear collective responsibility in matters of compensation and blood-revenge. This principle, as we have seen, is extended until the whole 'aiela is included in a symbolic expression of corporate group solidarity. In order for this expression to persist, of course, the mechanism, or ideology, of blood-revenge must be maintained. [124] All of my informants, though they disagreed over the details of revenge, insisted that it was the inviolable right of the 156 159 •554 829 682 Arabs. But Hajj 'Ali took exception to the practice of blood-revenge for a number of reasons. He said:

> The world changes. Before it was only the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali and the Border Guards which kept order. The government now enters into the matter of killings. Personally, I do not agree with the custom and the way it operates. In the case of killing, for instance, someone who is not worth anything, and has no brains, kills one from another tribe. Then the tribe of the [778] killer asks for the nazaala, and a third party becomes involved. The third party agrees to guard the killer's bait for twelve months and the business of all those involved must stop. A member of the third party's family must accompany each member of the killer's tribe. But even after the twelve months one must live in fear at his own home, for after the twelve months the tribe of the deceased will try to kill the best man in the killer's tribe. How many good ones do we have in one tribe? I have heard that in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia the deceased man's family has the right to kill the killer only . . . (I then commented that perhaps blood-revenge functions to discourage killing in the desert.) But there are unbalanced people who actually commit murder just to tease their tribe: they have nothing to fear because no one is interested in killing them in retaliation.

In challenging the Arabs' traditional right to blood-revenge, Hajj 'Ali--besides questioning a structural basis of

156 the group--in effect questions a great deal about the whole
159 traditional authority structure. Blood-revenge functions as
• 554 a deterrent to social disorder in that it represents an
829 automatic mechanism for restoring a balance of good relations
682 [182] in the society. Actually, Hajj 'Ali exaggerated to make a point when he spoke of the existence of "unbalanced people."
682 A person would indeed be "unbalanced" who did not take into
672 consideration the repercussions of his acts with respect to
*613 the personal danger and the dishonor and shame it would bring to his _'aiela_ and _bait_. Although the _'aiela_ members are willing to share in the blood money for accidental or unpremeditated killings, it is wrong to suppose that the Bedouins do not attempt to weigh the justifiability and culpability
[671] in matters of killing. The very existence of the _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_ argues against this. Obviously, the dichotomy made between killing in the _'awaiyid_, i.e., intentional and accidental, and the concomitant gradation in compensation points to some kind of reasonable consideration in cases of killing.

156 Hajj 'Ali is discontent with yet another aspect of
159 the traditional authority structure. He questions the logic
554 and authority represented in the oath as a sacred sanction.
695 This says something about the degree of secularization which
829 Hajj 'Ali has undergone. Although he does not say so, he apparently favors a more secular and logical procedure for determining a man's guilt or innocence.

> 156 Another thing which I do not like about our old ways
> 159 is the idea of swearing the oath. For instance, if
> 554 I steal 1,000 L.E. from you, then you will accuse
> 695 me. The 'aqila will then come to me and say: "If
> 829 you did not steal the money, swear the oath." Some
> of my family will support me in this, swearing that
> I did not steal the money. The swearing of the oath
> will take place at a tomb, in the presence of the
> Quran. This tomb belongs to a dead man, and they
> tell you that he is a saint. First of all, the thief
> will swear the oath and then they will believe him;
> and, secondly, what is the sense of swearing in front
> of a dead body?

[784] Hajj 'Ali made no mention of God or of the Bedouin belief that misfortune will be visited upon the one who swears the oath in bad faith. There is an Arabic proverb which Hajj 'Ali repeated here which says in effect that "the thief will always swear."

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Hajj 'Ali actively challenges the traditional basis of the Bedouin moral and political community. Striving to do away with prescribed cousin-right in marriage and the mechanisms of blood-revenge and the oath as means of supporting law and order in al-Qasr is a course which we might expect from an Egyptian official who seeks to integrate the Bedouins into national society. And, in fact, these are all customs which the Governor believes must eventually be eradicated. It is not surprising that Hajj 'Ali's son believes that "it is not civilized" to lay claim to his cousin for, like his father, he also is redefining morality vis a vis "civilization."

It appears obvious in all that he says, including his comments at the Governor's reception, that Hajj 'Ali has

156 undertaken to transform his rajal khair role into an authority
159 which transcends the bounds of the local community. During
• 554 my talks with him, he never once insinuated that the people
829 of al-Qasr, nor even the 'Aishaibat or 'Ali Ahmar (terms
178 he rarely ever used), owe anything to a larger entity or
community known as "the Bedouin" or "the Awlad 'Ali."
If Hajj 'Ali is to legitimate his own authority in a new
political system, he must, at the same time, show the Bedouins
the legitimacy of the new political community. The Bedouins
829 must feel a moral commitment toward the new national political
178 community or else it has no meaning or authority. Most of the
177 Bedouins of al-Qasr still take it for granted that the alloca-
tion of political values and distribution of power in terms of
traditional and modern legal roles will be carried over into
the modern community and its politics. Hence, if anyone should
[634] go on to Cairo to represent the Bedouin of the Western Desert,
[648] naturally it should be the 'umda or the shaikh "who knew how
to deal with the Egyptians." The majority of the people of
the al-Qasr area see change coming but do not conceptualize
it as any threat to the traditional authority structure.

156 Hajj 'Ali anticipates the change as fundamental
159 enough to require a new sense of identity. I think this is
554 evident in the following statement in which he takes issue
829 with the traditional way of doing things and appears to be
178 preparing himself for a role in the readjustment process.
177

> 156 There is another objection which I have concerning
> 159 our customs. I mean the case of elections. For
> •554 instance, one from the 'Aishaibat and one from the
> 829 Sanagra, of the 'Ali Abyad, are nominated. Then,
> 666 each man must vote for the one from his own tribe.
> He must vote for the 'Aishaibi even if the other is
> the better man. But, we should consider that the
> best man is the man with the best qualifications.
> 'Umda Ibrahim, for instance, knows how to greet an
> official or a minister, but he does not know the
> _'awaiyid_ nor the problems of the Bedouins. His
> brother (who will probably be the next _'umda_) is a
> good man and is educated, but he does not know
> the _'awaiyid_ either.

829 This view contrasts sharply with the traditional stand
666 of most Bedouins in al-Qasr, including the members of the
"status group." For instance, one _'aqila_ voiced what is a
prevalent opinion when he said:

> [619] If a man chooses to become a political candidate
> [186] against a Bedouin, he must understand that the
> members of the tribe should and would vote for
> their _'umda_ because he is a member of their own
> tribe. Even if a man is crazy and his opponent
> has the highest college degree, the Bedouins must
> vote for the man from their own tribe.

156 Hajj 'Ali is modern in his evaluation of the political
159 situation here: a politician should know the problems of his
554 constituents rather than follow principles based on traditional
178 relationships. His motive is not to promote the _'awaiyid_ as
177 a good way of life, for we know he does not think this to be
829 the case. Instead, Hajj 'Ali believes that in order to help
[671] the Bedouins through a period of change one must know what
they are changing from. Through his negative appraisal of

156 the 'umda, Hajj 'Ali seems to imply that he himself is capable
159 of understanding and leading the Bedouins during this period.

554 178 177 829 Hajj 'Ali has formulated some positive and constructive ideas relating to the period of transition which now faces al-Qasr, and they are related to his analysis of the pressing needs of the day.

> The Bedouins need many things: they need factories
> as there are in the Nile Valley. For the desert,
> here in particular, we need olive presses. This
> will raise the profits of the farmer . . . We need
> [244] a factory for canning tomatoes, for the whole desert
> [489] plants them and the transportation is such that we
> cannot get them to the market . . . The biggest
> change in the desert results from the presence of
> 12,000 government workers; there were only 20 or
> [871] 30 before the World War. There were no schools,
> now there a few. You cannot find a six year-old
> boy who does not go to school; about thirty per cent
> of the girls in al-Qasr go to school also . . .
> Another cause of change is due to the fact that
> everyone now watches his neighbor, he sees what he
> [207] does and he imitates him. Today, I listen to the
> radio and tomorrow my neighbor buys one. Evolution
> (tatawwar) is taking place, and the people here are
> [212] realistic about it. For instance, I do not know
> reading and writing, and sometimes I must dictate a
> letter to my son . . . My son knows better than I,
> and I know better than my father did, who lived in
> al-Qasr for thirty five years without knowing anything about the streets of Marsa Matruh.

156 Hajj 'Ali is both subjective and objective about
159 change, as we can note from the comment about the radio.
554 178 In a non-doctrinaire fashion, Hajj 'Ali stresses the great
177 value of education while being aware of his own deficiencies
in this area. However, as a counterbalance, he seems to

156 imply that one cannot be educated and know the 'awaiyid at
159 the same time--the attitude of a self-made man. Hajj 'Ali
554 realizes his marginal position between the new and the old,
178 and his attitude concerning change through education seems
177 to be that of an unselfish leader. Elaborating further on
156 the role of education, Hajj 'Ali showed insight into some of
159 the psychological aspects underlying social change:

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> 178 As I said before, the people here are realistic about
> 177 change. There are now only about three or four of
> 829 us who send our sons to study at the university, the
> 871 rest of the people are waiting to see what these boys
> will amount to. The other day, one of our educated
> boys, an officer in the army, came to visit al-Qasr.
> All of the women are now hoping to see their sons
> become as successful as this. This is exactly like
> the first time we cultivated olives in the desert:
> the Bedouins mocked those who planted the olive.
> After the olive began to show profits, everyone regretted
> that they did not cultivate it. Time is
> changing, and the people are changing. Education is
> the basis of everything in any nation. Now the
> agricultural engineer directs me, telling me what to
> do and how to do it . . . and before 1952 (pre-Nassar
> regime) they knew nothing about us and we had nothing.

156 As culture and social change proceeds in al-Qasr, it
159 is evident that Hajj 'Ali and the national political community
554 are becoming legitimate authorities in the eyes of the Bedouins.
829 This is indicated by the following event. One month before
574 I left the field, the first vice-President of the Republic was
648 expected to visit the province of Marsa Matruh, and al-Qasr
was named as one of the places which he would tour. Hajj
'Ali took it upon himself to set up three tents in the tradi-

156 159 554 829 574 648 tional style of Bedouin hospitality--"as we used to do in Cyrenaica"--and spent a total of 50 L.E. for the welcoming ceremony. "This money was from his own pocket," as the Bedouins of al-Qasr complained after it was learned that the vice-President would not visit Matruh after all. As a matter of fact, all of the Bedouin leaders who had been invited to the reception by Hajj 'Ali refused to eat the food, for they said that it had not been prepared for them. [576] This act was taken as a show of respect for Hajj 'Ali and anger with bureaucrats.

156 159 554 648 668 Hajj 'Ali is the representative of al-Qasr to the Arab Socialist Union which meets in Marsa Matruh and has cell meetings in al-Qasr. The socialist cell in al-Qasr meets about three times a month. When I asked why Hajj 'Ali [124] was the man chosen to represent all of al-Qasr at section meetings of the Union, the reply was: "Because he is a member [635] of the Majlis al-Muhafza." There was one section meeting of the Union in Matruh while I was in the field. The theme of the meeting was "The Meaning of Socialism." Hajj 'Ali attended this meeting.

156 159 554 In sum, it seems not too far afield to say that Hajj 'Ali is prepared to take over the leadership of the Bedouins in a much more sophisticated manner than one could possibly expect from the traditional style of politics. Hajj 'Ali's [634] comments about the 'umda and the 'umda's probable successor

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imply that he feels they are not really equipped to represent their traditional constituency. Hajj 'Ali, as everyone in al-Qasr knows, is traditional and modern at the same time. It seems that he has only alienated those whom he threatens and those who are a threat to him, i.e., the _'umda_ and the _shaikh_.

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He may not be educated, but he knows the _'awaiyid_; at the same time he stresses the fact that his son will have the education which he never had. Empathy is a primary trait of the charismatic leader and the "cultural broker" who seeks to manipulate social relations. No one could explain to me why Hajj 'Ali did not have an education while his brother (who is only three years younger) and other members of the "status group" do read and write. He perhaps only became concerned in the period of change. Hajj 'Ali, the "cultural broker," is more politically conscious and creative within the context of two worlds in change.

236 Wool is also very important to the economy of Awlad Ali. Lamb's
286 wool is either sold or spun and woven into rugs. Goat's wool is spun
and woven to provide the cover for the tents.

231 Sheep and goats are rarely slaughtered for meat except on special
[262] occasions. Most male and many female lambs and kids are sold in the
[432] market and the money is used to buy the necessary supply of food (like
[438] tea, sugar, salt, etc.), clothes, and other household items. Most of
438 these items are obtained from the shops in the settled communities in
439 the area, although some of the major items can be obtained only from
443 large urban centers like Alexandria.

231 The other domesticated animals that Awlad Ali keep are the donkey
492 for transport and riding, a few camels for heavy transport and also for
[236] wool, very few horses for riding on special occasions (they are con-
● [554] sidered as a status symbol for those who own them), and the dog to
guard the camp and to protect the herds from wolves and other predators.
235 Poultry are usually kept for meat and eggs which are sometimes sold by
432 the women in the nearby markets.

233 The main occupation in the area is stock raising. Grazing lands
137 extend generally south of the cultivated land in the northern strip.
[132] The growth of pasture plants is affected by the amount of rainfall in
a particular year. Low rainfall causes acute shortages of pasture and herbage, and leads to the death of animals by both starvation and thirst. Pasture plants comprise a wide variety of bushes, scrub, and many other species of grasses, most of which have a very short life span. These plants normally persist from December to May; then the land is turned into arid, hard desert with only a few dispersed patches of dry grass.

619 [563] The name also includes various peasant groups and individuals who migrated from the Nile valley and who were incorporated into the tribal organization by a system of tribal adoption called "Iktitab." Most of these peasant groups came to the desert [701] to avoid military drafting by becoming part of Awlad Ali, who, until 1947, were exempted from serving in the Egyptian army. Although groups [554] and individuals thus adopted become part of the pedigrees of the adopting tribal segments and are supposed to enjoy equal status, yet, insofar as their origin is still remembered, they are looked down upon by the Sa'adi and occupy a position somewhere between that of Awlad Ali Sa'adi and that of the Murabiteen.

619 173 The Sa'adi tribes consider themselves to be the descendants of a certain Aqqar Ben Sa'ada or Aqqar El-Sherif, a descendant of Bani Suleim, who settled in Cyrenaica in the Fifth Century. Although they claim to [144] be of pure Arab ancestory, all sources agree that a considerable amount of mixture between Arab and indigenous Berber populations took place during the period they have been in North Africa.

[missing in copy provided --Analyst]



Fig. 1. The Sa'adi Tribes

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* The exact relationship of the Gemeiat tribe to the Sa'adi tribes is not exactly known. Many informants, as well as accounts of earlier travelers in the area, assert that descent from Hkadiga, a sister of Ali and Harb, and therefore are cousins of Awlad Ali. Others, especially members of Sa'adi tribes, themselves, deny any genealogical

613 619 173 551 The two charts show the same unit of Awlad Mansour. The first of the two charts shows the tribal segments in which Eilat Gedaida (a female name) appears as one of the segments. When the actual genealogical chart of one of the living members of that segment was drawn, descent was traced to Mohammed, the husband of Gedaida, as shown on the second chart. In this case Gedaida is not a member of Awald Mansour segment. The unity of the full brothers is emphasized without changing the affiliation of the segment. It is simply a means of carrying on the patriline using the mother's name. This is not always the case, however. Examination of other cases in which the female name was used reveals the fact that in certain instances using the female name is a means of carrying on the line of descent through a daughter. This meant incorporating within the tribal segment a whole group of individuals who otherwise would have belonged to a different patriline. Carrying the line through 613 619 551 597 the daughter in this manner has the same result as adopting her husband unto the tribe. The question then is why wasn't adoption used. Examination of the two cases in which this happened indicates that a possible explanation may be that this occurs whenever the husband is unadoptable. Adoption is possible whenever a man does not have any tribal affiliation. 613 619 551 599 554 In one of the two cases the husband belonged to the Gemei'at tribe, a Murabiteen tribe which enjoys a relatively higher status than the other Murabiteen tribes by virtue of their being the original settlers of the area and helping the Awald Ali in their fight with the Hanadi, yet compared to Awlad Ali proper occupies an inferior position. In this case, relating to the patriline of the mother carried with it a

613 definite political advantage. In the second case in which the female
619 name was used, the husband was a member of the Bara'asa tribe of Libya.
551 Although this tribe is one the powerful tribes of Libya, it has no
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554 political influence in the Egyptian Western Desert. Changing affiliation carried with it the strong political support of the mother's tribal segment.

619 In general the Reds occupy the western half of the coastal area of
131 the Western Desert from the town of Matruh westward to the Libyan border, while the Whites occupy the eastern part which stretches to Alexandria. The Senenah are fairly scattered although their largest concentration is located in the extreme western part overlapping that of the Reds. The territorial division of the area among the three major sections of Awlad Ali is not a strict one. Historical evidence shows that there has been
[174] a considerable tribal displacement throughout the area. This displacement occurred mainly during the intratribal war era and during the Second World War when the area was a main battlefield. In general, however, there is a significant relationship between territorial distribution and tribal segmentation, and this is especially true on the higher levels of segmentation than on the lower ones.

619 Each of the three sections of the apex of a three-tiered order of
613 segments which, following the native usage, will be called Kabila (tribe), Eila (family), and Bait (house).

619 The first order referred to as tribes are structurally equivalent
173 units but of highly variable size. Each of them has its traditional history. Some of these histories are important to the tribe as a whole.

613 563 619 This makes it possible for those adopted by the tribe to keep in touch with their relatives and friends they left behind in the Delta while enjoying the military exemption gained from their adoption by the Awlad Ali population. It is also believed that Eilat Aggary, made up mostly of peasants themselves, are very lenient in the conditions they put for tribal adoption. Finally, the Eilat Aggary is not among the most powerful tribal segments of Awlad Ali, possibly because of their composition. This assures the adopted peasant groups an equal status not normally obtained if adopted by one of the powerful tribal segments of Awlad Ali.

613 [675] The Amar paper of the Aggary explicitly states some of the basic characteristics of the Amar as a unit in the tribal organization of Awlad Ali. The most distinctive aspect of the Eila or the Amar as a political unit is the absence of any formalized leadership. Although the Amar is viewed by outsiders as a corporate group as far as its legal responsibility in certain cases, from the standpoint of its members, the Amar is no more than the sum total of its constiuent units or Baits. This is shown in the Amar paper of Aggary which states that matters affecting the Amar be decided upon by all the bait represented by their respective leaders, the awaqil. There is no formalized authority above the 613 554 627 awaqil, although one of the awaqil might acquire a position of informal leadership by virtue of personal or other qualities. He will be considered as a mediator and go-between for the various leaders of the Baits. In the case of the Aggary, Sheihk Selouma, the Aqila of Bait Eweida, has acquired such a leadership among the Eilat Aggary. Although Shiehk Selouma is relatively young, (he is about 40 years old), he has the reputation of getting things done. His Bait is the wealthiest in the

His Bait is the wealthiest in the
613 554 Aggary and he himself has recently acquired a great amount of wealth,
627 mostly from smuggling goods across the Libyan borders. Because of his
[556] position as a Government Sheihk, he is believed to have influencial con-
nections in the government. He is the only member of the Aggary Amar
who has a car. He considers himself to be the spokesman of the Aggary
Family, and he is known to be able to persuade the reluctant awaqil to
conform to decisions made by the rest of the awaqil. In a number of in-
[682] stances he was able to collect bloodmoney from members of the Amar who
had previously refused to pay. Some people in the area believe that had
it not been for the persuasive abilities of Sheihk Selouma, the Aggary
Amar could never have persisted, and it would have long ago been divided
into smaller units due to the lack of agreement among its members. The
613 lack of formalized leadership of the Amar or the Eila makes consensus of
extreme importance for the Amar. The emphasis on the unity of the Amar
[675] is stated in Article 2 and is implied in a number of other articles in
[578] the Amar paper of Aggary. Disagreement among the awaqil is very rare al-
613 though not unknown in the area. The relative consensus among the awaqil
682 stems from the fact that the Amar as a group has a fairly limited function.
[182] Until very recently the only practical function of the Amar was the collec-
tion of money to pay for a murder commited by one of its members. Since
establishing the innocence or guilt of the accused is not the duty of the
Amar, once his guilt has been established, there is no question about
613 the payment. Disagreements are likely to occur in the case of new circum-
682 stances where money has to be paid, since payment in such cases are not
578 yet institutionalized, even when specified in a given Amar paper. This
000 has not yet become a major problem. If any disagreement between the

613 If any disagreement between the
578 responsibility of the majority of the awaqil to persuade the minority to
571 conform to the majority's decision. This is usually done by simple per-
613 sonal persuasion. In certain instances, however, when a particular aqila
● 554 is known for being troublesome to the Amar, refusing to abide by the ma-
571 578 jority decisions, an attempt may be made by the others to build up pop-
ular support around another person in the Bait which the aqila represents.
If this strategy is successful, it might lead to replacing the aqila by
another who is more abiding to the Amar's decisions. This approach is
more likely to succeed if the aqila is not a popular person in his own
Bait, for if he is popular, any attempt by the other Baits to disqualify
the aqila would be viewed by the members of his Bait as interference in
their own affairs and might lead them to rally even more strongly around
their leader.

613 The other tendency occurring when the size of the Eilat increases
is toward the separation of one or more of its constiuent Baits. Origi-
613 nally this was done by merely refusing to share in the payment of blood-
682 money. If this refusal continued, it was considered as a sign of
[178] separation of the Bait. In recent years this created problems with an
increasing number of individuals claiming separation from the Amar to
avoid the payment of the bloodmoney, while claiming membership when dis-
613 tribution is done. This led many tribal segments to require that the
675 "barawa" or separation of individuals or tribal units from any particular
Amar should be put in writing, after getting the approval of the Amar to
which he belonged. When the approval is given and the separation in put
in writing, it is announced to all other tribal segments. If this is
[672] done, members of the separated tribal segment are not held responsible

628 the settlement achieved. In many such interest is best served by taking
613 into consideration the welfare of the other party to the dispute as well.

613 Reasonableness is an important prerequisite for the success of the
554 Aqila in performing this functions in dispute settlement. This is true
157 whether the Aqila is dealing with disputes between members of his own bait or between members of his bait and outsiders. But while reasonableness and the personal qualities constitute important assets for the Aqila,
613 they are not the basis of his political authority. Proven abilities are
554 admired but they are, or had been until very recently, irrelevant to the
178 question of succession to the position of Aqila. The structurally significant source of the Aqila's authority is patrilineal succession. This principle has recently been challenged under the impact of social and economic changes that are taking place in the area. To analyze the role
121 of the Aqila and the source of his authority, I shall utilize, to some
613 extent, Turner's concept of "social drama" by presenting and analyzing a
128 case of dispute whose developmental stages happened over a period of more than eleven years. The major part of these developments occurred at the time of the field work and I had a chance to observe at lease part of it. The case in all its phases offers a rare example of a disturbance that happened in the social life of a particular tribal segment. It offers what Turner called "... a limited area of transparency in the otherwise opaque surface of regular, uneventful social life" (p. 93). The political unit involved is that of bait Asabe'i, the largest in size of all baits in the Aggary Eila. As events of the case unfolded themselves, some of the important principles of social structure, at least as they operate at a given point, were revealed.

156 equipment from the government projects and from smuggling sheep and mer-
[685]
[439] chandise across the Libyan border. Although some of these stories might
be exaggerated, they all point to the fact that Hakim, despite his wealth,
is not the most popular or reputable individual in bait Asabei', and that
although Shei'eb is not a popular individual either, he definitely comes
up the winner in any popularity contest between the two. The question is
156 why Hakim was selected by the Awaqil to replace Shei'eb. The case in-
613 volved more than Shei'eb's inability to collect the money from members of
558
682 his bait. Shei'eb's ineffectiveness seemed to have been taken as an ex-
683 cuse rather than as the direct cause. Many Aqaqil, before Shei'eb, had
failed in collecting money from their own bait without being subject to
direct challenge. What seems to be involved is more than a challenge to
a particular member, Shei'eb. It is a challenge to the whole principle
by which Shei'eb acquired his position as Aqila of bait Asabei': pat-
rilineal succession.

156 Shei'eb is the youngest of four sons of the former Aqila of bait
159 Asabei', Sheikh Elewa. For more than fifty years Sheikh Elewa was the
613 undisputed Aqila of bait Asabei'. He also had considerable influence
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683 among other tribal segments throughout the whole of the Western Desert
● 554 by virtue of his position as "nazzar", that is, the expert who assesses
the amount of compensation for wound inflicted in a liable case. The
[428] position of nazzar is a hereditary one and had been handed down from
[779] father to son. The basis for his assessment of wounds are a number of
old books believed to be obtained from Mecca and contain all the judg-
ments of famous Islamic leaders in their assessments of wounds.

[428] Eleven years ago when Sheikh Elewa became blind and too old to

156 exercise his functions, he invited all the important people in the area
159 into a large gathering during which he announced that he was handing the
613 sacred books to Shei'eb, who was to become the nazzar and also to succeed
463 683 him as the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Although at that time Shei'eb was
● 554 fairly young, twenty-six, nobody questioned Sheikh Elewa's decision.
428 (779) "He is the Aqila," said one informant, "and he has the right to decide
which of his sons is to succeed him. After all, he knows his sons better
156 than anybody else and knows which one is best for the job." Most people
159 thought that Sheikh Elewa, being still alive and with clear thinking,
613 would help Shei'eb in performing his duties as Aqila. A few months after
554 Shei'eb took over his father's position, it became apparent that he was
578 too immature for the job. He tried to use his position to take money
[661] from members of his bait and when they refused to give him any money, he
entered into fights with a number of them. Rumors spread that he took
bribes from the disputing parties who came to him for him to assess the
legal compensation for wounds to raise or lower his estimate. But still
people within bait Asabei' as well as outside it respected Sheikh Elewa's
decision and did not challenge Shei'eb openly. But as time passed the
dissatisfaction with Shei'eb grew. This dissatisfaction came mainly from
members of the Amar who were affected directly by Shei'eb's actions, especially those actions which resulted in the payment of compensation for
wounds inflicted in fights.

PHASE II

439 On the evening of May 16, 1966, two members of the Geneishat tribe of Matruh area came to Burg-el-Arab with a large shipment of smuggled cigarettes to leave with their partner in the area, Hadi, from the

685 refused to see them. Later Hakim had Shei'eb spread the rumor that Qudura
627 had taken a bribe from the Geneishat to refuse to take the oath, and the
578 [521] story of an old dispute between Qudura, on the one hand, and both Hakim
613 and Shei'eb, on the other. This dispute dates back to the time when the
156 Awaqil of the Aggary Amar decided to replace Shei'eb with Hakim as the
554 Aqila of bait Asabei'. Shortly after the decision of the Aggary Awaqil
578 was publicly known, Qudura was very unhappy and refused to recognize it. His reaction was not out of loyalty to Shei'eb whom he thought was a very unfit person for the position, but it stemmed rather, from a deep resentment of Hakim. According to my information, Qudura's position was met with sympathy by the majority of the people outside the Aggary Amar who share with him the belief that Hakim was a dishonest person who could not be trusted as a representative of bait Asabei'. It was at that time that the stories of Hakim's dishonest dealings were being discussed publicly, mainly by Qudura and members of his camp. At that time many believed that Qudura was the best man for the position of Aqila of bait Asabei' and that he was the only qualified member of that bait. He was the oldest able man in the bait, and although he was poor, yet he was known throughout the area for his honesty and sound decision. In fact many people in the area told me that they believe Qudura to be the only honest member of bait Asabei'. Realizing that Qudura was getting all the attention, Hakim sent his son Rabbu to Qudura with a message that Hakim acknowledged Qudura as the Aqila and that he (Hakim) had neither the time nor the interest in taking the position himself. Hakim also conveyed the view that he would support Qudura if the latter denounced Shei'eb and appointed himself in his place. Qudura agreed and a date

613 was set for a meeting in which Quadra was to announce his decision.
156 Meanwhile, Qudura stopped attacking Hakim and directed his attack to-
554
578 ward the inadequacy of Shei'eb as the Aqila.

The meeting was held two weeks later and all the important people in the area were invited. After dinner was served Qudura announced his agreement with Hakim to become the Aqila of bait Asabei' replacing Shei'eb. Everybody expected Hakim to support Qudura in his claim, but instead Hakim directed his comment to Qudura telling him that there had been a misunderstanding on Qudura's part and that all his message to Qudura was to acknowledge the latter as the Aqila for his own camp alone not for bait Asabei' as a whole as Qudura claimed. This announcement was a surprise to everyone in the meeting since this meant recognizing the camp of Qudura as a separate bait, a result which nobody, including Qudura, had ever anticipated. Qudura was very angry and dissolved the meeting immediately. Ever since that incident, the relationship between
578 Qudura and Hakim has been very unfriendly. Almost all of my informants
156 explained Qudura's failure to show up at the oath as a means of revenge
695 against Hakim who had embarrassed him among the people who attended the
685
627 meeting. Qudura himself had told me later that the reason for his not
[124] coming to the oath was that he was not sure that Rabbu was innocent:

> Rabbu has been known to do these thins (inform the police) and I cannot trust him. I cannot take a false oath and endanger myself for someone like Rabbuh. Besides, Hakim never came to me to discuss the oath like he did with all the others who were to swear with them. If he had brought his son and come to me before I would have been able to tell whether they were lying or not, and If not, I would have sworn with a clear conscience and without fear. The oath is something that one does not take lightly. It involves the supernatural.

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627 When Qudura refused to see Hakim and Shei'eb, Hakim asked Sheikh
156
196 Saleh, the Aqila of one of the most powerful baits in the area, to talk

613 627 182 underlying the authority of the Aqila and the source of his political support. Three such principles were evident in the above case: patrilineal succession, wealth, and social and personal renown.


Ability to deal fairly with disputes involving members of his bait and outsiders
(wisdom and social renown)
Ability to fulfil financial obligations of the bait (wealth)
Patrilineal succession
other tribal groups
'Eila
Bait

613 554 To better understand the importance of the three principles to the authority of the Aqila, it is important to examine the domains within the Aqila normally functions. First, the Aqila is the leader of a certain kinship unit: the bait. Historically, the bait has been the main field of action for the Aqila and from it he draws his main political support. 613 627 554 As the leader of his bait, the Aqila settles disputes among members of his bait and represents the group for political and administrative purposes. His function is to hold the bait together by preventing major disputes between members from leading to the fission of the group into smaller, separate units. He performs his function by exercising authority and/or personal influence to establish long-lasting agreements.

613 In performing his functions within the bait, personal qualities such as
554 wisdom, soundness of ideas, personal persuasiveness are of importance.
[157] [428] But the main basis of his authority is patrilineal succession. The Aqila
[556] has no economic power to speak of. Although many aqila are among the
wealthiest members of their baits, many more are among its poorest. The
nature of the economic process and the pastoral life of Awald Ali is
such that the economic position of the individual is always flucuating.
Nor does the Aqila have any military power at his disposal, or any command of the use of force to back his decisions or to make them binding
[428] upon members of his bait. The main source of compliance to the Aqila's
decisions comes from the knowledge that the Aqila has the authority to
make such decisions and that he has acquired this authority through the
legitimate channel of patrilineal succession.

613 Where membership in formal groups is transmitted by descent, Awlad
428 Ali always choose the patriline. The son of Awlad Ali is regarded as
562 [619] Awlad Ali even though his mother might not be from the tribe, while a
woman who marries outside the tribe transmits no rights in the tribe to her children. The importance of agnatic kin is reinforced by an solidary of brothers which is extended laterally to patrilateral cousins. It is also shown in the fact that sons are favored in inheritance usually to the exclusion of daughters. The male line is viewed by Awlad Ali as the natural principle when it comes to anything which is inheritable, whether property or position. In an attempt to defend Shei'eb's position and his right to be the Aqila, one informant told me: "The main purpose that a man has in life is to have sons because it is the son who makes the man live forever. Daughters don't count. A man gives his son

613 428 [562] everything ... his property, his name, and anything he can give him, like the position of the Aqila. This is only natural." While the office of the Aqila is inherited through the male line, there seems to be no special regard for seniority. Any son of the Aqila can succeed him in the position and it is usually left to the Aqila to select the son who is to succeed him. 613 428 593 This decision is not usually the subject matter of brotherly rivalry since the position of Aqila is regarded more as a duty than as a privilege. There has been only one case in the entire area of the Western Desert in which such a decision has lead to open fighting between brothers. "When my father became very old and his eyes bothered him, he told me that I should become the Aqila and could not say no to him," said Shei'eb. "I didn't want to become the Aqila but this was the choice of my father and I have to obey .... You owe it to your father and family to carry on his responsibilities the same way you carry his name." It was patrilineal succession upon which Shei'eb based his case. Most uninterested parties believe that he and he alone had the legitimate claim to the position.

613 627 554 The importance of patrilineal succession as the basis of the Aqila's authority may be better understood by contrasting it to a closely related position, that of the "mardi". A man within a bait may acquire, by virtue of personal qualities, a reputation for wisdom and soundness of opinion which may overshadow that of the Aqila. Such a person becomes known throughout a certain area as a successful mediator and go-between; and therefore is called upon to solve disputes not limited to members of his own bait. He thus acquires an informal position which cuts across a number of baits and sometimes larger political units.

613 The word mardi is derived from the Arabic verb "yardi" which means
627 to accept or agree upon. The mardi therefore is the person who is
554 accepted by one or both parties to a dispute as a mediator. If he is
[192] accepted by only one of the parties, his work is more that of a legal
representative of that party. He makes all efforts, using all powers of
persuasion to get the other party to concede to the demands of the party
he represents. If, on the other hand, he is chosed by both parties to
a dispute, he acts as an impartial judge and avoids taking sides in the
case. His fame is determined by his ability to achieve permanent, long-lasting
settlements. His success in this area depends, in addition to
personal qualities, upon the respect he has within his own tribal segment
and the weight that tribal segment has among other tribal segments.
Similarly, his success and the fame he gets as a mardi may give him considerable
influence within the bait. But this influence does not develop
[182] into authority because the mardi in this case does not have an established
[428] basis for the effective maintenance of that authority, in this case, patrilineal
succession.

613 The other domain within which the Aqila performs his duties is that
554 of the Eila or the amar. His main function within this area is to represent
682 his bait in matters involving the collection or the distribution of
bloodmoney within the vengeance group. Within the amar, the aqila is
considered successful insofar as he is able to fulfill his bait's financial
obligations to the amar. This ability is in turn determined by his
success in collecting money from individual members of his bait and/or
his willingness to pay from his own money for those members who are unable
or unwilling to pay their share. Where kinship ties are strong, the Aqila

613 usually has no difficulty collecting the individual shares. His own
682 financial ability is rarely called upon. When a member is unable to
●[554] pay for any reason, his share is divided among the able members. However,
[178] in recent years this seems to be changing, especially among the baits
closely located to the settled communities or the urban centers. Among
613 178 these baits individual mobility has increased significantly with a large
166 number of younger members either leaving the area for the urban centers
464 or accepting salaried jobs with the government organizations. Among
369 certain baits in the area of Burg el-Arab, for example, the percentage
of adult males engaged in such jobs sometimes reaches sixty percent.
More than thirty-five out of fifty-six males constituting bait Asabei'
have a full-time or part-time job.

613 The individualistic attitudes accompanying the dependency on sal-
178 166 aries and living in towns and cities have their effects on the kinship
464 ties among members of these baits. With the prevalence of the individ-
682 ualistic attitudes among members of a certain bait, they become more
369 reluctant to pay their financial obligations and the Aqila finds it more
and more difficult to rely, for the fulfillment of the bait's financial
obligations, on the willingness of members to pay. His success within
613 554 the domain of the amar becomes more determined by his ability to pay
556 from his own money for those members of his bait who refuse or are un-
682 able to pay. Wealth becomes an important asset for the Aqila's performance of his duties within the amar. When this happens, there seems
to be a certain shift in the source of political support for the Aqila.
613 In a well-integrated bait the popularity (or unopopularity) of the Aqila
554 among the other Awaqil of the amar had very little influence on his

613 position as the leader of the bait. The principle of patrilineal succession
554 is so respected in such baits that it overshadows any other consideration.
613 554 This continues to be the case as long as the kinship ties
428 within the bait remain strong. When the kinship ties in a given bait
178 weaken, the principle of patrilineal succession also weakens. This is
[166] more likely to occur in baits where a relatively large number of the
[464] members leave the area permanently or for a more or less prolonged period
of time, seeking jobs on a part or a full-time basis. Many of these
613 178 members maintain only a minimal contact with their respective baits.
166 They become more reluctant to fulfill their kinship obligations, especially
464 561 when they entail any financial liability. The older members
369 complain about how younger persons are less loyal to their elders and
how selfish they have become. "All they care about is their jobs and
the pleasure they get from the city; they are becoming city people."
Younger members, on the other hand, maintain that their reluctance to
fulfill their kinship obligations stems from their feeling that they
do not get anything in return. "Life is expensive and money is hard to
obtain. I cannot make enough money to support myself and my wife and
children and at the same time pay my cousin's financial debts," said a
member of eilat Asabei', who works as a driver with the Desert Organization
in Alexandria.

613 When this happens, there seems to be a tendency toward shifting the
554 emphasis from the bait to the eila or the amar as the source of the political
[556] support of the Aqila. This is turn makes wealth an important
basis of the Aqila's power. No more can the bait impose an ineffective
Aqila on the amar unless it is ready to back him by their own share of
money. If this is lacking as was the case with Shei'eb, there is nothing

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554 that prevents the Awaqil of the amar from rallying support around another person.

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554 In the case of the Aggary amar Hakim was their choice as the man to replace the original Aqila. What happened in the Aggary amar could never have happened if bait Asabei' were more cohesive than it was or if the kinship ties "were still strong and durable" as one important member of the Sanagrah tribe commented. "If there was any respect to the forefathers left, Hakim could never have agreed to replace Shei'eb....Nobody would dare take a position from someone who inherited it from his father.... but bait Asabei' is not as it used to be."

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554 The third domain within which the Aqila normally pursues his activities is that of the wide scope of tribal society in the area. The Aqila represents his bait in all matters involving the bait either as a unit or any particular member of it with other tribal segments. When an individual from the bait is involved in a dispute with a member of another tribal segment, the Aqila acts as the legal representative and the attorney of that member trying to achieve a settlement which is not fair for his client but also fair for the other party. To be successful in this area, the Aqila relies on his own personal qualities and persuasive abilities. If the Aqila is known to be fair and honest, a quick and permanent settlement is usually achieved since he is trusted also by the other party. If, on the other hand, he has the reputation of using dishonest techniques, mistrust prevails and achieving a settlement is usually delayed.

Like the domain of the amar, the present field of activities is no major source for the Aqila's political support in the baits where kinship solidarity is strong. His success in solving disputes between members

His success in solving disputes between members
613 628 of his baits and outsiders might enhance his prestige within the bait,
554 but it is not a substitute for patrilineal succession as the basis of
[428] the Aqila's authority. But in less integrated baits the situation is
[627] different. The ineffectiveness of the Aqila in solving disputes may
lead members of his bait to seek another man as their representative who
would act as a mediator in their behalf. If this continues for a long
time the Aqila might find himself with no functions and the new person
would become a de facto Aqila.

613 The Aqila represents the only effective indigenous form of leader-
554 ship among Awlad Ali at the present time. The camp headman provides
622 another form of leadership on the camp level, but, as mentioned before,
the leadership of the headman is very limited and involves minimal
634 authority. In addition to the indigenous leadership represented by the
622 Aqila, there is the superimposed administrative structure of the govern-
656 ment representative in the form of the "omda" system introduced into the
177 area by the government decree no. 1187 of 1958. The system of omda or
mayorship is essentially that applied to the rural areas of Egypt with
certain modifications to fit the tribal organization and the semi-nomadic
existence of the populations of the Western Desert. In rural areas, the
622 omda is the administrative head of the village. He is appointed by the
[554] government from among the village inhabitants who have certain qualifi-
[212] cations with regard to education (must be able at least to read and
[556] write), wealth (own at least 5 feddans of land in the area), and sound
reputation. As such, the omda system in the rural areas is a territorial
system. The omda's authority covers the territory of the village and
all individuals living in it regardless of their kinship affiliation.

622 His main function is to manage the affairs of the village, apprehend
554 criminals, report and register births and deaths, collect taxes and
represent the government in all matters involving the relationship between
the government and his village. Because of his position as the
[661] representative of the govrernment, he usually enjoys a considerable
amount of power which, over the years, many omdas have used it to obtain
personal benefits.

361 In 1958 the committee appointed for the examination of the possibility
631 of applying the system to Awlad Ali noticed that villages in the
sense of a compact settlement similar to that existing in the rural area
simply do not exist in the Western Desert region. There are a few
settled communities in the area but they are scattered homes or a few
stores. These communities have no identifiable boundaries or administrative
631 existence. The area as a whole is divided into ten administrative
634 districts, each having a police station. These districts correspond
[625] to the old Senusia Zawyas which played an important role in
[795] maintaining order in the era until the First World War. Until that time
[175] the area was divided into fourteen zones each of which was under the
795 jurisdiction of one of the zawyas. The zawyas were mainly religious
175 centers, or shrines, inhabited and directed by a member of the Senusi
[793] order of Cyrenaica. The role of the head of the zawya was to teach the
Qoraan and spread the teachings of the Senusi order. One of the ways
[794] the zawyas attracted followers was through distribution of food and
clothing to those who joined it. The zawyas also provided places of
[778] refuge for those who needed protection since no one could force his way
into the sacred zawyas. Because of their religious position which put

554 The most powerful
177 and numerous segments are then represented by the omda, and the lesser
634 ones are represented by a sheikh. Unlike the system in the rural areas
619 where the sheikh is a subordinate to the omda, the sheikh in the Western
[622] Desert does not occupy the same position. Instead he has the same functions and occupies, with regard to his tribal segment, the same position the omda occupies with regard to his. He does not take orders from the omda and has direct relations with the administration. Sheikhs and omdas from one district are supposed to meet periodically in the police station and discuss with the police officer in charge of the station matters concerning the district and their own tribal groups. The only difference between the omda and the sheikh in the Western Desert seems to be the label of the office. The label itself carries a certain amount of prestige to the tribal segment represented by the omda, since it is an acknowledgement by the government of its importance. This is why many of the tribal segments try to be represented by an omda rather than by a sheikh. In certain districts where two or more strong tribal segments compete for the honor of being represented by an omda, the district may have two or more omdas representing the strong tribal segments and a number of sheikhs representing the lesser tribal groups in the district. Not every tribal segment in a district is represented by an omda or even a sheikh, however. Very small tribal segments may join together and have one sheikh, while others may agree to be represented by one of the larger segment's sheikh or omda.

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657 Obviously, the number of omdas and sheikhs differ from one district to another depending on the number of important tribal segments in each. There is no specific rule whereby a certain tribal segment is considered

634 554 619 657 by the government to be significant enough to be represented. This matter is left almost entirely to the ability of members of a given tribal segment to convince the authorities that their group is sizable enough to give them the right of omda, or at least sheikh's representation. A segment represented by a sheikh may later ask for an omda because of the prestige involved. It is worth noting in this respect that the various tribal segments in the area are eager to be represented in the government administrative structure. Gaining prestige among the other tribal segments is only one motive for such eagerness. Unlike the omda in the [622] rural areas who functions mainly as a representative of the government to the village, the omda or sheikh in the Western Desert is a representative of the people to the government. This is not a theoretical difference but involves a real difference in the relation of the government and the omda, on the one hand, and between the latter and the people 622 554 657 his represnets, on the other. The omda in the village is a symbol of authority to his people. He is the undisputed ruler of the village. His authority is backed by his ability to mobilize and use the force put at his diposal by the government, in the implementation of his decisions. Since he is appointed by the government and not elected by the people, he does not have to rely on his popularity to hold or maintain office. His main concern is to please the government, rather than the people of the village to whom he is merely a symbol of authority. There is very little that the village omda can bring to his people form the outside, while he has to implement government policies, collect taxation, apprehend criminals, all tasks which the villagers are not eager to have done.

634 The situation is quite different in the Western Desert. Although
666 657 it is the government, represented by the province council, which makes
554 the final decision in appointing the omda or sheikh, yet this appointment
619 is made on the basis of nominations given by the gribal segment
635 or segments which he would represent. Since the tribal segment usually nominates one person, the decision of the council is limited to the examination of the credentials of the nominee and to see if he meets the basic requirements of the law. If a certain nominee is rejected by the council, a very rare occurrence, the matter goes back to the tribal segment to make another nomination. In practice, then, the omda of the Western Desert is elected by the people and the appointment by the government of the omda is significant only in cases where the omda is to represent more than one small tribal segment and each nominates one. Here the council has to choose between the various nominaees and appoints the best
634 qualified. Unlike the omda of the village, the tribal omda is a real representative
554 657 of his people. Despite the fact that he becomes part of a
619 governmental structure, his basic function is to look after the interest
[622] of his tribal group. Or, as one informant put it, "The omda is the servant of the people." In many cases the best interest of the tribal segment is served through full cooperation of the omda with the government. So far there seems to be very little conflict between the interest of the tribal populations and that of the government. There is very little in
[651] the area that the government demands or needs. There is no taxable land to speak of. There are only a few acres of barley land and even these
634 are minimally taxed. The main responsibility of the omda to the government
554 657 is to report births and deaths and give a yearly list of young men

634 who reach the age of military service. He is also supposed to report
554 the presence of any fugitive or crininal in his district and report
657 crimes accurring in that district and which involve members of the tribal
segment he represents.

634 The first two duties of the omda to the government do not involve
554 any conflict of interest. Unlike the rural areas where sons are con-
657 sidered a very important economic asset to their parents, and therefore,
562 there is a general resentment of military service which takes the sons
701 away and deprives the parents of their important work around the fields,
178 Awlad Ali look at military service as an opportunity to have their sons go to the city, obtain guaranteed pay-
ment, and escape the hardship of nomadic existence. Economic activities
[233] in the area do not require the cooperation of a large number of individ-
uals, and most of the grazing of animals is done either by a paid shep-
herd or by one of the grown-up sons. Although there still exists an
[183] ideology which values having many sons, yet with the cessation of hostil-
ities between the tribal segments, their presence in the area has lost its
[464] value. Many of the younger generation are seeking jobs with the govern-
ment projects in the area or in the city. Neither one is easy to find.
Joining the army is increasingly considered as an easy alternative.

634 The omda's function which seems to involve some conflicting loyalties
554 is that of reporting crimes involving members of his tribal segment. But
657 even this does not pose a serious problem as it might seem. Almost all
674 minor crimes committed against property or persons as well as all civil
disputes are left to be handled by the tribal proceedings. The duties of
the omda are limited to reporting the cases of murder and serious assault

1 On the basis of one percent of the yearly yield.

634 which result in permanent bodily harm. Reporting such cases is a fairly
554 657 minor proceeding since such cases come to the knowledge of the authori-
674 ties through other channels, mainly from talks involved in the mediation
[743] for the bloodmoney or from the hospital to which serious assault cases are usually taken. Besides, reporting a crime does not mean convicting the offender. This latter depends on evidence which, in case the dispute has been settled by tribal proceedings, is hard for the police authorities to find.

634 While the government demands do not impose serious conflicts of
554 loyalty on the part of the omda, if successful, his position with the
657 government can bring to his tribal segments great benefits. These benefits are usually in the form of various social and economic aids including fodder for the animals and food and clothing for the people during the dry years. Other benefits including providing the tribal population with olive trees and helping them clear many of the old Roman wells and establishing wind mills for nominal fees. Not everyone in the area can have such benefits. Some do not even know they exist. A successful omda could manipulate the administration to get as many benefits for
[871] his tribal segment as possible.. Some successful omdas were able to have
[474] the government build schools in their districts, establish cooperative units to market local products such as wool, sheep, and olive oil.

634 This should not lead us, however, to conclude that the position of
554 the omda in the Western Desert does not involve any kind of conflicting
657 578 loyalty or that he is always supported by his people or even trusted by them. One informant said that the omda of his biat is "...government man, not ours....He would sell us all if this pleases his masters in the

634 government." But due to the nature of the representation and the spe-
554 cific relation of the government to the area, the position of the omda
657 [578] does not pose serious demands upon the loyalty of the omda to his tribal
group.

634 Because of the omda's ability to bring benefits to his tribal seg-
554 657 ment from the government, the ability to manipulate the administrative
666 officials is the most important basis for the nomination of a given
individual for the position of the omda. "The omda is one who can speak city talk and knows how to deal with the government officials." Age is not important; young people know more about city ways than old people. "A man may be a cheat, but as long as he can get our things done, he is the best man for the job...of course, we don't want to nominate someone with a bad reputation who may blacken our face in front of everybody. However, if he has a bad reputation the council would not approve his appointment...he just has to be someone who can get things done..."

159 Muftah Mughaieb, the sheikh of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the
634 district of Haman, described the circumstances of his nomination as
554 follows:

> 657 Before the former sheikh of that tribal segment died (he
> 666 was Muftah's uncle), one member of the group got into an argu-
> 578 625 ment with the police officer in charge of the police station in
> the district. The tribesman insulted the police officer who insisted on arresting him. Rumors also had it that the police officer was using his authority to reduce the share of the tribal segment in the government aid which was badly needed during that particular year. Sheikh Muftah, whose father is the Aqila of

159 bait Mughaieb of the Sanagrah tribe, went to the officer and apol-
634 554 ogized to him on behalf of the whole group and invited him to a
657 lavish dinner party. The charges against the tribesman were soon
666 dropped, and it was concluded that it was because of the way Muftah
[578] [625] had handled the situation. Since that incident, Muftah has been
known as an expert in handling the government officials. One year
later, the sheikh of the tribal segment died, and a meeting was
held during which the important members of the Sanagrah tribal
segment in the district decided to nominate Muftah for the posi-
tion of the sheikh, vacant by the death of his uncle. Muftah, who
was attending the meeting, was asked to accept the nomination, and
he agreed. "...I accepted the nomination reluctantly." Muftah
159 later told me, "I did not really want to become the sheikh. The
634 position does not bring any personal benefit, and it involves a
554 lot of responsibility. The sheikh has to act as an attorney for
657 his tribe, represent it to the government and competes with other
sheikhs to bring his people things that the other sheikhs cannot
get for theirs, like more membership in the cooperative units or
in the socialist union. And what does he get in return? Nothing...
not even the gratitude of his people. To them, he is a servant of
the tribe, and his duty is to look after its interest. If he
doesn't, then everybody is quick to criticize him. I had to ac-
cept the nomination because I felt it was my duty to do so and not
to embarrass the awaqil and the important people of the tribe who
[465] put their confidence in me. As far as the government, all I get is
six pounds a month."

634 "The omda or sheikh is both a blessing and a curse to his tribe,"
554 said one member of the Aggary 'eila. "He can bring benefits to his
619 tribe, but at the same time, he has to report his own people if one of them breaks the city laws... His position is like that of a double-edged razor."

Most of the people in the area, however, tolerate the negative aspects of the omda's functions as a moderate price for the possible benefits they may get through his position. This is why each tribal segment does its best to be represented by an omda, or at least by a sheikh.

Within his tribal segment he enjoys a great deal of respect. He does not, by means of position alone, command any power over members of his group similar to the power the omda of the village has over his
[613] people. It seems, however, that although the position itself does not carry with it any power, yet, when the holder of that position is at the same time a native tribal leader or aqila, it tends to enhance his position as a tribal leader and to give him more respect among members of his tribal unit as well as among the rest of the tribal groupings.
634 This may be explained by the fact that the establishment of the omda
554 system in that area did not involve direct interference with the native
619 182 political system except in a minimal way, mainly to keep the tribal
657 populations in the area from interfering in the progress of various
613 government projects in the area. As such, the system did not impose too many demands upon the tribal loyalties of the omdas or sheikhs. In the relationship between the government and the tribal population, the balance so far has been in favor of the latter, who, by means of

634 omda representation, are taking from the government much more than
● 554 they are giving in return. Being the link between his people and
619 the government in such a system gives the aqila a new basis of
182 political support.
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593 spent the night inside. In the morning Muftah ordered his daughter to
574 pack her clothes because she was to leave with him. He refused to give
606 586 her husband any explanation as to why he was taking his daughter away.
The husband could not prevent him from taking her away because, as he said, "He is her father and has the right to take her away with him at any time."

When the wife did not return for two weeks, her husband went to her father's house to take her, but her father refused to let her go. Hemeida
593 then went to a religious man in the area and asked him to intervene in
574 606 the matter and see why Muftah had taken away his wife. He also asked him
586 to arrange a mi'ad with Muftah to discuss the matter.

627 792 The religious man was selected in this case because he was a close
friend of Muftah and was believed to have influence over him. He was also known throughout the area to be fair and of sound opinion. It is important in the cases of disputes that the person selected as a mardi is known as a wise and fair man. It is only then that he is able to mediate between the two parties without being accused of taking sides.
792 The religious men, members of the Murabiteen tribes in the area, by their
619 relative position outside the formal tribal organization of the Sa'adi
627 tribes, are the most likely candidates for such activity. Yet, this is
554 not always the case. For this aspect of assumed impartiality is frequently balanced off by the fact that these religious men lack the support of a powerful tribal segment behind them. To be effective, the mardi has to be respected, not only for his personal qualities, but also for being a member of a respectable tribal segment whose power lends authority to the mardi's decision. This is not usually the case with the client
600 tribes of Murabiteen. Wealth in many cases is also considered an important

Wealth in many cases is also considered an important
792 requirement for the selection of the mardi. This does not mean that
627 554 religious men in the area have no role in dispute settlement, for they
[556] do. It simply means that the mardi is selected according to a number of criteria that vary from case to case, and that in some of these cases sound wisdom and fairness characteristic of religious men are not enough basis for their selection as mardis. This means that the religious men have no special mediatory role based on their religious nature alone. In certain cases religious men offer the best possibility for mediation; in others, a non-religious person might offer a better chance for settling the dispute. In cases of women seeking
[586] divorce from their husbands, the wealth of the mediator, more than any-
(556) thing else, seems to determine the selection of the man whom the woman asks to negotiate on her behalf, a point to which I will return later in the chapter.

593 The Mi'ad was held in the house of Muftah. Present at the mi'ad
574 were Muftah, his son-in-law, Hemeida, the heads of households in Muftah's
606 586 camp (one of them was his brother and the other five were members of
627 different tribal segments), my driver (who was a member of the neighbor-
792 ing Sanagrah tribal segment), myself, and the religious man. After the tea was served, the religious man said that the discussion should start. He reminded the gathering that this case is a family one and should not develop into a larger dispute. "After all, the daughter's husband is a son, and the case is actually a misunderstanding between a father and a son and should be viewed in that context." Then he turned to Muftah and said that in that spirit he was asking him why he had taken his daughter away from her husgand. Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away

681 The ten pounds paid to the husband in this case is considered as
558 a kabara for the husband's injured pride. The kabara is one of the
[684] vaguest and least determined fines in the tribal law. As a face-saving
device, it varies from one case to another. It is determined in each
case by the seriousness of the insult, the publicity of that insult
(insults in a public place require a much larger kabara than insults
[561] in a private place). The relative age of the insulted and the offender
is also taken into consideration in assessing the kabara. If the insulted
is older than the offender, the kabara is much higher than if the
situation were reversed. In fact, in the last case the insulted might
● [554] not be able to collect any kabara at all. The relative status of the
two parties is also a factor. A member of a Murabiteen tribe who insults
a Sa'adi is likely to be charged with a larger kabara than the reverse
situation. The amount of kabara is left for the bargaining of the two
parties and their representatives and varies greatly from one case to
another. As such, the kabara is not exactly a fine or an independent
punishment. In most of the cases it is an additional punishment added
to a regular one. It is hard to imagine a crime in which the victim is
not considered in one way or another insulted or belittled. The only
681 specified kabara that I found in the tribal law was in the case of adultery.
558 The kabara in that case is the same regardless of the relative
684 position of the people involved. The kabara differs, however, according
to a standardized set of circumstances surrounding the place in which the
adultery is committed. Adultery committed in the husband's tent requires
kabara of the maximum L.E. 20; adultery within the camp of the husband
but outside his tent can bring a kabara of only L.E. 10, while adultery
committed outside the camp brings a mere L.E. 5. The justification for

586 626 divorce only under specific circumstances in the absence of which the
593 husband can force her to live with him. Following the Koraanic rules,
[562] Awlad Ali give men the right to dissolve the marriage at will and without
[779] any necessary justification; however, they differentiate between
cases where divorce is justified and those in which it is not. In a case of justifiable divorce, the husband can take back the mahr and possibly all other marriage expenses. In the case of unjustifiable divorce, the husband forfeits his right to regain the mahr. Divorce is justified whenever one or more of the husband's rights are violated by the wife or members of her family. Not all degrees of violation are considered as justification for divorce, however. Only intolerable violations can be considered as such. In deciding whether or not an act constitutes an
[183] intolerable violation, Awlad Ali judge it against the standard of the reasonable man, the customary man, and what he would have tolerated in a similar situation.

586 What constitutes reasonable behavior does not only vary according
183 to the situation and the manner in which the actions are taken, but also
554 with the relative position in the social structure of the parties involved and their initial relations to one another. In the case of divorce, what constitutes grounds for justifiable divorce in one case may not be sufficient grounds for justifiable divorce in another. In one of
586 183 the cases I witnessed during the year of study, a man who divorced his
554 wife because of her insistence that he buy her meat from the market
511 every day of the week, was forced to forfeit his right to redeem the
[114] mahr on the basis that the wife's actions had not established a basis for justifiable divorce. In the negotiations that followed, the position of the husband, as well as that of the family of the wife, were discussed.

586 The husband had a big herd by the standards of the tribe (600 sheep
183 and goats). In addition, he also cultivated a large stretch of the fig
554 land in the coastal area and was making good money. In other words, the
511 husband could afford the standard of living the wife demanded. The other
question that was discussed was the actions of the wife herself. She was
the daughter of one of the wealthiest members of the same tribe as her
husband; and according to the people who knew her, she was used to meat
every day of the week. In other cases, similar demands by the wife to
have a certain kind of food or to be clothed in certain kinds of material
were considered as an intolerable situation, and the husband was justified
in his divorcing her and had the right to retrieve his mahr. This
was obvious in the case of one of my informants whose wife insisted that
every time he went to Alexandria, he bring her silk material for a dress.
Since the husband could not afford to meet her demands, her insistence
586 was considered as grounds for the husband. The assessment of reasonable-
183 ness on the part of the husband in his divorce action and therefore his
554 right to the mahr paid is frequently influenced by the relative position
of the husband and the wife's guardian in the social structure. An influential
man who marries his daughter to a poor relative or nephew rarely
has to return the mahr.

586 Although women among Awlad Ali are not given the same legal right
562 of divorcing the husband by pronouncing the "dismissal formula," they are
given the right of certain customary procedures which in practice give
them equal facilities for dissolving the marriage. This is known as the
574 right of the woman to "throw herself." This means that the woman takes
all her clothes and sometimes her children and goes to the dwelling of

586 the man she chooses. She informs him before she enters his house that
562 she is the wife of so and so and the daughter of so and so and that she
574 is throwing herself on him to protect her from her husband with whom
she no longer wishes to live. Like the right of refuge, the man cannot
[778] refuse to let her in; and from this moment until her dispute with her
husband is resolved, she is considered as his house guest and is entitled
to all the hospitality a guest receives. If he refuses to extend
[627] that hospitality or refuses to take her in, she can ask for a mi'ad
[681] and is entitled to kabara from him. There has been no reported incidents
in which a man refused that right to a woman. As soon as she settles
down in the host's house, the latter takes immediate measures to find
the husband and to convince him to let his wife go. In doing this, the
man uses all the power of persuasion. The man selected for this purpose
586 is usually a respected man who can put pressure upon the husband. Sometimes
562 he has to bribe the husband to release the wife, paying from his
574 ● 554 own money. The man has to have money, not only to be able to support
[556] the wife during her stay in his house and to bribe the husband, but also
because in certain instances he has to pay the husband the mahr that the
father of the wife had taken in order to free her. The next step after
getting the agreement of the husband to divorce his wife is to contact
the father of the wife or her guardian and convince him to pay the mahr
to the husband. If the father does not agree, or if he is financially
unable to do so, the man on whom the woman has thrown herself is supposed
to pay from his own money. In cases where the woman left the husband to
be married to another man with whom she had had a relationship, the respected
man tries to have the future husband pay the present husband the
mahr he is supposed to pay the woman after she is divorced from her

586 husband. In a number of cases the husband was willing to divorce the
562 574 woman after a promise by the man that she would pay him the mahr when
● 554 she got married. In most cases, however, the process costs the man a
considerable amount of money. Sometimes, when the woman is young and attractive, the man finds it to his advantage to keep her as his wife, since she will cost him no more expenses. On the other hand, the man cannot refuse a woman the right of refuge, since to do this or to deny her the right of hospitality will make him liable to pay kabara if she made the refusal known publicly. On the other hand, it is prestigious to be known in the area as a man to whom women go to be released from their husbands. In fact, a man who acquires a reputation of getting wives released is likely to be sought as mardi in other cases as well.

Due to the nature of his role in mediating, the woman must be careful in selecting the man over whom she throws herself. These considerations are manifested in the following case taken from my field notes.
[584] Hadia was forced by her father to marry a man from the same tribe who
[583] paid her father L.E. 100 as mahr. She did not want to marry him because
she was in love with someone else of whom her father did not approve. One month after she was married, she left the tent and never came back.
586 Later, she appeared in the house of Omda Ali, the chief of another tribe,
562 and everyone knew that she had thrown herself on him. She later told me
574 554 why she had selected Omda Ali and not the Omda of her own tribe. "Be-
634 cause my husband works for the Omda of my own tribe, and I thought he
would be biased. Of course, I couldn't have gone to my father; he was the one who forced me to marry that man. Omda Ali is very respected and can support me... He is also rich and is known for releasing wives from their husbands." Omda Ali called the husband in and asked him to divorce

586 his wife. The husband agreed but insisted that she pay him L.E. 300
562 (this included the mahr and the marriage expenses). The Omda tried to
574 reduce the amount but could not. He then tried to get the father to
554 pay, but the father refused. He had to pay the husband L.E. 200 of
634 his own money and promised that the rest would be paid when the woman
remarried (it would be paid from the mahr). The husband divorced Haida.
One week later she was married to her lover. I have no information
about whether or not the 100 pounds was paid.

586 In another example, Sabha was forced by her father to marry her
562 cousin (ibn 'amm). She could not live with him, so she threw herself
574 on one of the holy men in the area. The holy man convinced the hus-
554 band to divorce Sabha and then went to her father and convinced him to
792 pay back the mahr to the husband, and the case was settled. People say
[626] that both the husband and the father agreed to the demands of the holy
man because they were afraid of his supernatural curse. Sabha went
back to her father's house.

586 It is obvious from these and similar cases that the success or
562 failure of the procedure depends on the careful selection of the man
593 on whom a woman throws herself. It is also apparent from the above
(554) examples that his right of refuge is resorted to only in cases where the
(574) woman cannot go to her father or to her closest kin to help her get a
divorce because he is either unable or unwilling to help her. A father
is unable to help if the husband is powerful or if he is the woman's
ibn 'amm (father's brother's son) who has, according to the tribal law,
the undisputed right to marry his bint 'amm (father's brother's daughter).
The father is usually unwilling to help his daughter if he is the one

682 settlement is usually made after the parties have agreed to it,
627 yet, in certain instances where one of the parties later feels that
672 the settlement was not just or that he was coerced into accepting
695 it, he may ask for a second Mi'ad during which new procedures start
in the case. In the present case, although Mahdi had originally
accepted the judgment of the awaqil, as time passed and he realized
that he was unable to pay the bloodmoney, he started to question
682 the feasibility of the settlement. He discussed the matter
672 with Sheikh Suliman el-Gerery from the Murabiteen tribe of Gerera,
695 a tribe whose members are feared throughout the area for the belief
● 554 that they have certain supernatural powers. Sheikh Suliman himself
792 is highly respected, and people believe that after his death he will
[776] become "wali" or a saint. After hearing Mahdi's complaint, Sheikh
Suliman told him that the settlement was unjust and told him that he
would do something about it. The following Thursday, Sheikh Suliman
called on Mahdi and asked him to bring his donkey and follow him.
They rode to a small desert town called Bahig where the local market
613 is held every Thursday. On market day, the awaqil of various tribal
517 segments usually gather in front of the general store in the town
571 drinking tea and chatting until their sons or the younger members
443 576 of their families sell the sheep and buy the necessary items. Everyone
passing by the gathering is expected to greet the gathering, getting
off his donkey as a sign of respect to the prominent people.
[689] Failure to greet a fellow tribesman is considered a serious offense
liable to a fine of more than L. 50 and ten goats in certain cases.
[673] It is considered a very serious crime. One informant once told me,
000

124 One informant once told me,
576 "If you don't greet me, this means that you hate me, and if you
829 hate me, there is no limit to the kind of harm you can do me and
my family. One who hates you can kill you, and none can walk
safely anywhere if he fears that he will be killed."

682 As Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi reached the general store, every-
689 one was gathering there as usual, including the two awaqil who
672 were involved in the original settlement. Sheikh Suliman told
695
554 Mahdi not to dismount his donkey and not to say the customary
792 greeting as they passed by the gathering. When they passed the
576 gathering, everyone stood to greet Sheikh Suliman who ignored them
and left with Mahdi. No one believed that Sheikh Suliman, who
should be the guard of the tribal tradition, should commit such an
unforgivable violation of the norms of the people. The next morn-
682 ing the whole area was talking about a big Mi'ad to "take the right"
689 from Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi, who had insulted the gathering. The
672 Mi'ad was held a week after the incident. During the Mi'ad, Sheikh
695
554 Suliman was asked to explain his behavior, and his answer was, "How
792 do you want me to greet all those people who were sitting in front
576 of the store? There were more than thirty men in that gathering,
627 and I was afraid that if I said the customary greeting, I might
have startled some of them causing them to harm themselves, leaving
me with the payment of so many bloodmoneys." Immediately, the
attendants of the Mi'ad knew what Sheikh Suliman was referring to,
and that his action was to prove that the settlement reached in
the case of Mahdi was wrong and that it set a very dangerous prece-
dent which would cause people to avoid greeting one another, "and
hatred will prevail among brothers and nobody will be safe in his
own home."

105 On the other hand, there is always a feeling of rivalry and hostility
598 between the different tribal segments which goes back to the era of
571 tribal warfare. Thus, the social relations among the tribal population
are characterized by a certain amount of ambivalence which is hidden behind
a facade of formality in the way tribal members treat one another
105 in day-to-day activities. There are certain rules of etiquette describing
571 the way members of the same tribal segment should behave toward one
576 another and toward other tribesmen and outsiders. Failure to abide by
[589] these rules may subject the violator to a symbolic fine of a goat or a
[574] sheep slaughtered for a feast to which everyone is invited. These feasts,
[182] or dinners as they are called, have various functions, the most important
105 of which is the integrative one. In an area where the population is usually
571 dispersed, these dinners offer an opportunity to the tribesmen who
574 happen to be in the area at the time of the feast to attend, where they
182 eat, meet other tribesmen, and exchange information about what is happening
in other parts of the area. It is from such dinners that the tribesmen
get to know about the available pastures, about the prices of sheep
and goats in different markets, and about who is doing what and where.
The occasion also signifies the restoration of the violator of the rules
to the social life of the group and the reinforcement of those rules.
105 This is also true with the tribal meetings, or mi'ad, which are held to
627 announce settlements in more serious cases. It is on this basis that
182 [illegible] the mi'ad should not be considered as a tribal court. It is more of a
574 social occasion where food and drinks are served and where parties involved
and all those invited by them talk about everything except the
[589] dispute itself. In certain instances, the financial settlement agreed
upon in the informal mediation is exaggerated when announced in the mi'ad

105 627 182 681 554 so that part of it may be reduced in honor of some prominent members who are attending the meeting. When part of the financial agreement is reduced in honor of a person, this creates an obligation on the part of that person to reciprocate in a similar situation when one arises. This creates an active interest in the settlement on the part of individuals who otherwise are not involved, and insures the durability of the settlement. The social cohesion is maintained.

105 571 578 627 182 The need to keep friendly relations with all tribesmen is reflected in the judicial process in its procedural aspect, as well as in judicial reasoning, that is, the logic according to which facts in certain cases are assessed. With regard to procedures, there is an emphasis on avoiding face-to-face confrontations between the disputing parties until an agreement has been reached by means of the mediators. Only then is it that the parties see and talk to one another. This is especially true in serious cases such as homicide or serious assault where face-to-face confrontation is likely to lead to more hostilities.

105 571 627 182 The emphasis on reconciliation may explain, at least in part, the informality of the judicial process. Leaving the process of dispute settlement informal gives it a measure of flexibility which permits the treatment of each case as unique without being tied down by rigid formal rules. This does not mean, however, that there are no rules to be followed, or that there is no place for legal precedents. It simply means that the rules are very general and that the legal precedents are used merely as a guide in solving similar cases. The main guide remains, however, the desire to achieve a successful settlement that satisfies all parties. It is only through achieving such successful settlements that the social order is maintained and the tribal cohesion is secured.

tions of soil, water, and grazing. We trace the segmentation of 619
the Qalabta alone and see that it has two divisions, the Muasa 613
and the Mahamda. We follow the line of Muhammad alone and note that it splits into three lineages, *'Ailat* Brahim, *'Ailat* al-Mzatal, and *'Ailat* al-Shauqi (there is dispute, arising from quarrels over land, about the legitimacy of this branch). From Mzatal descend the three minor *'ailat*, al-Slailikh, al-Aqta', and Balraba'i. Following only the first line we note that *'Ailat* al-Shlailikh then divides into the various *biyut* shown on the chart, al-Habal, Mustafa, Brahim, &c., the male membership of only one of which, *bait* al-Habal, is presented in the genealogy. Where the name of an *'aila* or *bait* is different from that of its founder, it almost invariably means that the founder's nickname has been used, the Cyrenaican Bedouin having a partiality for nicknames.

Each section of a tribe, from the smallest to the largest, has 619
its Shaikh or Shaikhs. The tribal system, typical of segmentary 554
structures everywhere, is a system of balanced opposition between tribes and tribal sections from the largest to the smallest divisions, and there cannot therefore be any single authority in a tribe. Authority is distributed at every point of the tribal structure and political leadership is limited to situations in which a tribe or a segment of it acts corporately. With a tribe this only happens in war or in dealings with an outside authority which for its own purposes recognizes the tribe as an administrative unit. There cannot, obviously, be any absolute [643]
authority vested in a single Shaikh of a tribe when the funda- [671]
mental principle of tribal structure is opposition between its segments, and in such segmentary systems there is no state and no government as we understand these institutions; and criminal law is absent and civil law exists only in a very rudimentary form. Consequently the exact status of a Shaikh can 554
only be defined in terms of a complicated network of kinship ties and structural relations. It is only necessary here to emphasize that his social position is unformalized and that he must in no sense be regarded as a ruler or administrator. Bedouin respect their Shaikhs, but they do not regard them as superiors. Rather their influence and wealth are considered as capital to be drawn on for the benefit of whoever is in need of them. So long as a Shaikhly family can keep their prestige,

554 derived from the strength of their section, their wealth, their
traditional place in Bedouin society, and the character of their
leading members, so long only are they regarded as Shaikhs of
whatever the grade may be.

554 In recording his impressions of the Aulad 'Ali tribe the
generous and unfortunate Pacho gives an excellent picture of
619 the Bedouin Shaikh's position in tribal society. He says that it
[642] is difficult to discover any government in their society, which
might be called aristocratic, though it is such in form rather
than in substance. The precarious authority of the Shaikhs
rests not on force but on the renown and esteem they enjoy in
554 the tribe. He adds that at the time of his visit it had become
619 customary, after Muhammad 'Ali Pasha had broken the
tribe, for the Shaikhs to get their titles confirmed by the
*648 Pasha of Egypt but that when they returned to their camps
with the robes of honour bestowed on them by the Pasha of
Egypt, these garments, far from adding to their prestige and
making them objects of regard, excited derision and aversion
unless the backing of the tribe had preceded the approval of
the Pasha.[1]

554 The Italian lawyer Savarese has also written an illuminating
description of the status of a Cyrenaican Bedouin Shaikh. Each
613 *bait* and each *'aila* has its Shaikh, chosen for his age and
wisdom or for his prowess, though the Shaikhship is generally
[556] hereditary in certain families. A Shaikh receives obedience and
respect from his dependants but ought to be rich because the
demands of hospitality are considerable. He takes a leading part
in the settlement of disputes and must have the tact necessary
to maintain the unity of the group in opposition to other groups
of the same order. He represents his group in relations with
these other groups and in the larger group of which it forms part.
In matters in which his group as a whole is concerned he takes
the advice of the Shaikhs of its divisions. He commands the
men of the group in war and he collects the tribute due from
554 the group to the Government. Nevertheless, a Bedouin Shaikh,
however large the group he represents, lives and dresses like his
fellow Bedouin, though, being rich, his tent may be larger than
most and he has more horses and they are more richly appointed.

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[1] J. R. Pacho, *Relation d'un Voyage dans la Marmarique, la Cyrénaïque et les Oasis d'Audjelah et de Maradèh*, 1827, p. 67.

He also has more wives than other Bedouin and is usually more cultured and intelligent.[1] 554 [595]

The most important of the Shaikhly families of the country, those which represented large tribal divisions vis-à-vis the Turkish Government, the Sanusiya, others sections of their tribe, adjacent tribes, and attached client groups, lost much of their influence with the loss of their stock and the exile of some of their more prominent members during the second Italo-Sanusi war. The authority of these traditional Shaikhly lineages was also undermined by Italian policies, first of recognizing and paying salaries to so many Shaikhs, some of whom were persons of little importance, that the office of Shaikh lost much of its virtue in the eyes of the people, and afterwards of ignoring the Shaikhs altogether. The better known of these Shaikhly families are the house of Bu Bakr bu Hadduth among the Bara'asa, the house of Lataiwish among the Magharba, the house of 'Abdalla among the 'Abaidat, the houses of Kizzih and 'Abbar among the 'Awaqir, the house of Asbali among the 'Arafa, the houses of Suwaikir and 'Ilwani among the 'Abid, the house of Bu Khatara bu Halaiqa among the Hasa, and, in the Sirtica, the most famous house of all, that of Saif al-Nasir among the highly nomadic Aulad Suliman. 554 558 648*

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[1] Op. cit., Pt. II, pp. 39–40.

778 to act as mediators between tribes and between one tribal
619 section and another. Even to-day their tombs are regarded as
792 neutral points, as it were, and are often the place chosen for a
776 meeting between the Shaikhs of one tribe, or tribal section, and
those of an adjacent tribe, or section, when some matter has to be settled between them. It has sometimes happened also that when two tribes have disputed the ownership of territory, they have settled the dispute by allotting it to a Marabout, which means to his descendants, so that one then finds a *Marabtin* strip between two *Sa'adi* tribes or tribal sections. One of the best examples of this is the strip of country owned by the Aulad al-Shaikh tribe between the 'Awaqir and the 'Abid and 'Arafa tribal domains. In the same way tribes made gifts of disputed wells to dead saints. Where a *Marabtin* tribe has grown out of a Marabout family they will be found living in the area around their tombs. Thus the Aulad al-Shaikh territory spreads out from Sidi Mahiyus, part of the Masamir live near Sidi Nuh, the Mshaitat live around Sidi al-Mshaiti, and the Qat'an live near Sidi Hashim and Sidi Suliman al-Tair.

792 So, long centuries before the Grand Sanusi began his mission
776 in Cyrenaica, the Bedouin were used to the sight of an *'alim*, a
212 learned man—for anyone who can read and write is a learned
554 man to the Bedouin—coming from the west to heal their
children and beasts, break droughts, write talismans, and teach them the beliefs and law of Islam. Such a man was also a *muhakkam*, one who arbitrated in their disputes and said the *fatiha* at their settlements and undertakings to make them binding. He could arbitrate among them because he was not of them. He was not like them a tented son of the steppe, though his descendants may have learned to live as such, but a *Marabat*, a man who follows religion and not the rains. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica owe much to these holy men, for, ignorant and superstitious though they may have been, they taught the tribesmen to respect learning and religion and kept those twin lights burning, even if dimly, through centuries. The Bedouin do not forget them, or to say a prayer for them, when they pass their tombs; and they have given the freedom of their earth and water to their descendants. Without these forerunners the
[182] Grand Sanusi could not have planted his Order in the country.
*[795] It is planted in their bones.

*795 find hereditary transmission of Shaikhship of lodges most
793 accentuated, such as the Bara‘asa-Tamia section (al-Zawiya
613 al-Baida), the ‘Awaqir-Sdaidi section (Msus zawiya), and the
428 ‘Abaidat-Ghaith section (Tart zawiya). In the same way the
[792] earlier Marabouts became, as has been noted, founders of
lineages which were on the pattern of the branches of the
Bedouin clans among whom they lived, and attached to them.

*795 Also it must be remembered that the lodges were tribal
institutions built by the local Bedouin so that they might
778 participate in the *baraka* of Sayyid Muhammad bin ‘Ali al-
793 Sanusi. They participated in it through the Shaikhs of their
619 zawiyas who received their *baraka* direct from the hands of the
182 Grand Sanusi himself, or from the hands of son Sayyid al-Mahdi, and passed it on to their sons. This *baraka* belonged to the tribe, or tribal section, which built a lodge just as the *shaukha*, the secular Shaikhship of the tribe, or tribal section, belonged to it and had to be kept in it. In both the continuity of family succession had to be maintained, unless there were good reasons for acting otherwise. Thus each tribal section emphasized its autonomy in its hereditary line of religious Shaikhs, through whom the *baraka* of the founder of the Order was transmitted to them, whilst proclaiming its membership of a tribal federation with common allegiance to the Head of the Order.

*795 As I have pointed out when speaking of the sacred *Marabtin*
793 tribes of Cyrenaica, it was customary for the descendants of a
778 Marabout to reside near his tomb. I have further mentioned
[776] that the Shaikh of a Sanusiya lodge, who is also called a *Marabat* by the Bedouin, might, if he had during life a reputation for piety, rather easily gained in Islam, be venerated as a saint when he was dead and his tomb become a shrine. This is another reason why Shaikhly families have tended to become hereditary directors of lodges.

*795 Just as almost all the Marabouts of Cyrenaica were foreigners
793 from the west, so were almost all the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya
● 554 lodges. The Dardafi and Isma‘ili families came from Tripoli-
[167] tania, the Ghumari family from Morocco, the ‘Ammur, Bu Jibali, and Khattab families came from Algeria, and so on. As a class they enjoyed, and still enjoy, a reputation for sanctity among the Bedouin on account of their knowledge of the Koran

and of reading and writing, and of their strict performance of 795*
religious duties. This reputation was doubtless enhanced by 793
their foreign origin, for the Bedouin of Cyrenaica were ac- 554 ●
customed to look to the west for piety.

At one time many, perhaps all, the Shaikhs of lodges were
fairly well educated in such subjects as theology, canon law, [212]
and commentaries on sacred texts. To-day most of these alumni
of Jaghbub University are dead and their successors, brought
up in the bitter years since 1911, are for the most part very
ignorant, some being almost as illiterate as the Bedouin themselves.
The Bedouin regard them with a curious mixture of
respect and condescension. They look up to them as learned
and pious men who possess *baraka*, they kiss their hands, they
call them '*Sidi*', and they listen respectfully to their admonishments
and arbitraments. At the same time they look down on
them for not being tribesmen and Bedouin, children of the
tents. The Bedouin harmonize these conflicting attitudes by
saying that a *Marabat* is a different kind of person from a
Bedouin and cannot be expected to behave in the same way or
to have the same outlook. He has been brought up to read
books, pray, wash, and to do other things the Bedouin finds
unnecessary in his own life. He has not been reared in the
roving life of the tents nor learned the shepherd's art. Since [582]
they regard the *Ikhwan* as a different kind of people, the
Bedouin do not intermarry with them nor with the Sanusi
family, who belong to the same category. The *Ikhwan* families 795*
marry among themselves. The Sanusi family marry the 582
daughters of *Ikhwan*, but do not give their daughters to persons
outside their own kin.

The importance of the *Ikhwan* families in the history of the 795*
development of the Sanusiya is evidently very great. From the 554
foundation of al-Zawiya al-Baida in 1843 to the appearance of
Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif in Cyrenaica in 1912 the Heads of the
Order were absent from the country, either in Arabia or in
distant oases, and its direct influence on the tribes was exercised
by the Shaikhs of its lodges in their midst. Their ritual position
within the tribal system combined with their structural position
outside it enabled them to settle disputes and to unite and lead
the various sections which had sponsored their lodges when the
Order required their support. It was they who roused the [648]*

*795 Sudanese against the French in 1902 and, as we will see, it was
• 554 they who roused the Bedouin of Cyrenaica and of large parts of
*648 Tripolitania and Fazzan against the Italians in 1911; and it was
they who attempted, unsuccessfully, to rouse the Bedouin of Egypt against the British in 1915. It was, above all, their propaganda and personal example in the field which made the struggle against Italy a national war and a religious crusade.
[178] To-day they have been broken by death, exile, and expropriation, and are poor and ignorant, but in the heyday of their power the Turks rightly estimated their influence and were careful not to encroach on their prerogatives.

VI

*795 The thesis I have maintained in the foregoing pages, that the
121 Sanusiya kept its cohesion and developed into a political
182 organization largely because it was identified with the tribal
system of the Bedouin, is supported by the lack of cohesion, common direction, and political influence of the other Islamic Orders in Libya, which won adherents only in the towns of Cyrenaica and among the citizens and peasants of Tripolitania, and in neither country found support among the Bedouin. I mention these other Orders for this reason, and also because a reference to them, however brief, places the Sanusiya in a more general setting as only one among many Darwish Orders. These other Orders are, however, described barely, since the part they have played in the political history of Cyrenaica is negligible.

*795 The following Orders besides the Sanusiya are represented in Cyrenaica: Qadiriya, Rifa'iya, 'Arusiya, 'Isawiya, Tayyibiya, 'Azuziya, Madaniya, and Sa'adiya. The Qadiriya and the Rifa'iya are the only two classical Orders with lodges in the country, though the others eventually trace their descent from classical sources by those tortuous ramifications so confusing to the student of Islamic fraternities.

The distribution of the lodges of these Orders in Cyrenaica at the present time is shown in the table opposite. A knowledge of the history of the Orders is not necessary for an understanding of the history of the Sanusiya in Cyrenaica and is therefore omitted. It is necessary only to know that they all entered Cyrenaica from the west, both those, the majority,

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 86]

mon symbol which stood for their common interests. Faced 175*
with amorphous, but seemingly ineradicable, opposition from 648*
the Bedouin the Italians more and more directed their hostility 795*
to the Sanusiya Order as a tangible head to the resistance which 619
could be destroyed. Failing to crush opposition they were forced [793]
to come to terms with it, but they could not come to terms with
a tribal system—only with an organization and through a
person, the Head of the Order, who could speak for that
organization and for the tribes which it represented. Both in
fighting the tribes and in trying to come to terms with them,
the Italians thus threw the Sanusiya organization into political
relief, and the *tariqa*, the religious Order, began to speak of
itself as a *hakuma*, government. The peace negotiations, therefore, centred round a contradiction. The Italians attempted to 175*
exact recognition of sovereignty and this implied recognition of 648*
the right of the Head of the Order to surrender sovereignty, 728
which he could do only if he were in a position analogous to 795*
that of the Head of the Italian State, a status the Italians would 793
not concede. Nevertheless they were compelled, in order to 554
establish relations with the tribes, to grant the Head of the
Order the title of Amir, and implicitly to recognize him as not
only the Shaikh of a religious Order, but the Head of a political
organization. As will be seen, the dilemma led to much equivocation and finally to a second Italo-Sanusi war. In this
second war the Sanusiya was entirely destroyed as an organization, political, economic, and religious. It persisted nevertheless
as a sentiment, and the Head of the Order in exile in Egypt still
retained the allegiance of the Bedouin who saw in his freedom
the hope of their own.

When the last European war broke out and Cyrenaica became 175*
a battlefield of first importance it was in the interests of each 648*
side to ensure that the local population would be favourable 795*
to it. The Italians, having destroyed the Order, the one
organization through which they might have made effective
propaganda among the Bedouin, were confronted in the country
with an unimpressionable mass of sullen resentment which
could in no way be influenced to their advantage. The British,
on the other hand, who sought to rouse the Bedouin to renewed [793]
rebellion, at any rate up to the point at which they gave what [554]
assistance to British arms they were capable of, had a ready

*175 means of influencing them to this end in the exiled Head of the
*648 Order and many influential Shaikhs of tribes who recognized his
*795 authority. But the British Government, which in the past had
793 consistently refused to admit that Sayyid Muhammad Idris was
● 554 more than the Head of a religious Order, were in the new
circumstances compelled to accept his offer of help as coming from a person who could act in a political sense and for the whole population of Cyrenaica. The Sayyid had, therefore, to be recognized as an Amir and to be permitted to recruit his own army under the Sanusiya flag. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica could only take part in a world struggle between states as a unit within their structure, as a political unit of the same order as the other allied countries, which were autonomous states acting through their own governments in their relations with the British Government and Armed Forces. The recognition of Sayyid Muhammad Idris as a political leader was easier for the British in that in war national sentiment is at a high pitch and those engaged in the struggle are particularly sensitive to national aspirations and sympathetic towards them. They are then anxious to placate national movements in their own empires and to encourage those in the empires of their
*175 opponents. To the British all the people of Cyrenaica were Sanusi
*648 and they so spoke of themselves in their dealings with British
*795 troops, and not as members of particular tribes or as citizens of
particular towns. Through the long years of struggle Bedouin and townsmen alike had come to identify their interests with those of the Sanusiya Order, and to see in the Order the symbol of their particularist aspirations. 'Sanusi' had become a word which could be translated 'Cyrenaican'. It had ceased to have a religious content and had acquired a purely political one.

II

*175 This is a history of the Sanusi of Cyrenaica and not of Italy
*648 so that there is no need to record the domestic and international
circumstances in which Italy went to war with Turkey. Nor is it necessary to narrate the reasons the Italians gave for their declaration of war. Italy had certain historic claims to a sphere of influence in Libya and her strategic interests in the coast of Africa opposite her shores are obvious. It is easy to understand

than in Tripolitania, and they had learned the reason for this: 175*
'Inasmuch as in Cyrenaica the opposition to our rule was not 648*
fractionized and enfeebled by the personal ambitions and 795*
rivalries of numerous chiefs, but was retrenched and assembled 619
around a single will, the Sanusiya, which manipulated it as it pleased.'[1] They started the war afresh in 1923 with this conclusion firmly fixed in their minds: *delenda est Sanusiya*. But they still believed, not understanding the place of the Order in tribal life, that the attachment of the Bedouin to it was superficial, that it was some kind of parasitic growth which could be cut out of the tribal system. They further believed that their incessant propaganda had already undermined the hold of the Order on the Bedouin.

The Sanusi family, as will be seen, played an inconspicuous 175*
and inglorious part in the resistance. Italian writers confess 648*
surprise that the Bedouin should have continued to show 795*
devotion to persons whose character displayed so few of those 793
qualities Bedouin admire. The Bedouin may indeed have 554•
expected a higher standard of conduct than some members of the family lived up to, but they did not suppose that they would distinguish themselves as military leaders. They knew that the descendants of the Grand Sanusi had been brought up in the oases to a sedentary and bookish life and not in the hard way of their own children and that they were unsuited to the frugal and exhausting life of a guerrilla. Their duty, in most cases little in evidence in fulfilment, was to pursue holiness and learning that their presence among the people might bring down on them God's blessing. In the eyes of the Bedouin they lacked in full measure the manly qualities of courage and endurance that Bedouin demand in their own folk, but they were credited with the scholarship and sanctity of the religious, which Bedouin admire in their spiritual guides rather than seek to emulate in their own lives. Italian writers sometimes refer to a member of the family accompanying the guerrilla bands, as did Sayyid al-Hasan and Sayyid Saddiq, as having the role of a standard (*insegna*), a word which well describes their peculiar position in the resistance. Where in a man the qualities of *marabat*, holy man, and of *mujahid*, fighter for the faith, were combined, as in Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif and Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar, the

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[1] Agostino Gaibi, *Storia delle Colonie Italiane*, 1934, p. 344.

*175 Bedouin followed them at great sacrifice. They were combined
*648 in many of the Sanusiya Brothers.

*795 The Shaikhs and Brothers of the Order, with few exceptions,
793 played a prominent part in the war, both in the field and by
● 554 keeping the Bedouin, submitted and unsubmitted alike, in a
ferment. The Italian soldiers and administrators constantly
*175 complained that whenever the Bedouin were tiring of the
*648 struggle the Brothers of the Order urged them to continue it.
619 It was their example and exhortations which made it something
793 more than the usual piecemeal resistance of a barbarous people
794 to colonial conquest or more than a succession of raids of the
kind Bedouin have enjoyed for so many centuries. Their parti-
*795 cipation made it both a national and a religious movement. It did much also to establish the Sanusiya in the hearts of the Bedouin. Some of the best-known names of the resistance, like Salih Lataiwish, ‘Abd al-Hamid al-‘Abbar, Saifat and Muhammad bu Farwa, Husain al-Juwaifi, Brahim al-Fallah, Fadil al-Mahashash, and Qtait bu Musa, were those of Bedouin Shaikhs, but most of the leading figures were Sanusiya *Ikhwan*, men like ‘Umar al-Mukhtar, Yusif bu Rahil, Khalid al-Humri, Sharif al-Mailud, ‘Abd al-Qadir Farkash, Fadil bu ‘Umar, Salih al-‘Awwami, and Muhammad bu Najwa al-Masmari.

*175 The indomitable Sidi ‘Umar al-Mukhtar was the soul of the
*648 resistance and the struggle is always associated with his name
as similar struggles against French aggression in Algeria and
*795 Morocco are associated with the names of ‘Abd al-Qadir and
793 ‘Abd al-Karim. Sidi ‘Umar, ‘our irreducible enemy, the faith-
159 ful and able servant of Idris, the heart and soul of the Cyrenaican rebellion’, as Graziani called him,[1] was that rare combination of Bedouin and Sanusiya Shaikh. He was born about 1862 of the ‘*Ailat* Farhan of the Braidan section of the Minifa tribe of the Marmarica and was educated first at the Sanusiya school at Janzur and afterwards at Jaghbub. He was nominated by Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif Shaikh of al-Qasur lodge among the stubborn ‘Abid tribe but only performed his duties there for two years before being summoned to Kufra to serve against the French in the Wadai. He returned to al-Qasur about 1906 and later took a prominent part in the first Italo-Sanusi war and in obstructing Italian penetration in the years of peace which

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[1] Op. cit., p. 235.

There are, in Cyrenaica, three major status groups among the 619
tribes: the noble or free-born tribesmen (*al-Hurr*), those who 554
have been adopted or grafted on to a tribe (the *Laff*), and the 608
clients (*Marabtin*).

Those who claim to be free-born also claim ownership of the 619
natural resources. The *Laff* do not own these. They are people 608
thought not to have originally been of the lineage of the tribe 621
with which they are resident. They are found sometimes in ones 613
and twos in the camps of the free-born, but sometimes constitut- [423]
ing tertiary groups themselves. Now when such people have re- 619
sided with their free-born hosts for several years and one of them 608
has married one of the host's daughters, they are grafted to the 613
genealogy at the point of tertiary segmentation, that is, where
ambiguity occurs in the genealogy. Obviously, persons thus 621
grafted to the lineage cannot be shown as descendants of one 173
of the living or of the recently dead, remembered perhaps by some of the elders still living. It is equally true to say that they cannot be grafted to the lineage at a point superior to that of the tertiary segments, since this would involve recognition by a number of tertiary groups whose members may know little or nothing about them. When a person enters a new tribe, the only way in which he can do so is to go to live in a camp, and it is the concern of the people of that particular camp whether or not they accept him, since it is they who have to decide whether their resources are sufficient to support a newcomer. Once a man has been accepted as a full member of a tertiary section, membership of superior tribal sections is automatic, although to enter into tribal membership he requires the permission of members of a tertiary section only. To graft at a point superior to the tertiary would be the same as giving a man superior structural status, but without a camp in which to dwell. There is only one place for his incorporation, and that is where the ambiguity in the gene-
alogy permits manipulation to include new lines. In this way the [597]
adoption of a person into a lineage does not offend the sense of kinship of the receiving group since the point of inclusion is an ancestor about whom little or nothing is known and whose authenticity is frequently doubted by some. What has been referred to as an area of ambiguity is, moreover, something of a jumble of names, and it is not a difficult matter, if a new line has to be

days on which kin of various sorts should attend the mourning 613
ceremonies, which extend over a period of a week. Allowance is 621
made for those who may be away temporarily, although they are 765
expected to hasten to the mourning camp as quickly as possible.
Agnatic kin are expected not only to be present on the appro- 613
priate day, but are required to offer gifts consistent with their 621
relationship to the bereaved; agnates of the tertiary segment are 765
expected to offer a sheep, while some cognates ought to bring a 431
goat and others a quantity of sugar and tea. At one funeral in a camp where I was resident, soon after the death occurred, the main concern of its inhabitants was whether or not certain men of their section would attend the mourning rites and bring appropriate gifts with them. These men lived at the time in another camp a few miles away, as they had been doing for several years past. They did not come when they were expected, and when they finally arrived at the end of the week they brought with them gifts of sugar and tea only—gifts which were totally inappropriate for agnates of the group. They were, in fact, now no longer members of it, and my neighbours were able to tell me, 'They have branched off from us. We will never live together again.' The lineage had proliferated and this was the first occasion for showing it.

Wide-spread in Cyrenaica is a cult of saints. The number of 794
saints' tombs varies from tribe to tribe, there being fewer among 776
the camel herders of the semi-desert than among the cow- 778
herding, almost sedentary, folk of the plateau area. Whatever [788]
the number, the members of the group that venerates a particular
saint make an annual pilgrimage to his tomb, and sometimes
more frequent pilgrimages are made. In one area there were two 794
men, accepted by their respective kin groups as leaders, who vied 554
against each other for the leadership of their section. One of them [648]
had been a famous warrior during the Italian wars and, after
being injured, fled to Egypt where he lived for seventeen years, until he returned to his homeland in 1947. The other had also fought against the Italians, failed to win renown, was a captive for a time, later released, and subsequently appointed leader of his section by the Italian authorities. The first, during his period of exile, had become impoverished. The second during his years of freedom had prospered. As far as their personalities

794 were concerned, there was little doubt who was leader—the
554 name of the former was known throughout the land. Now when
the warrior returned from his Egyptian exile, his rival offered
794 him a sheep as a gift. This act was wholly appropriate. Subse-
554 quently they continued to compete fiercely, but it soon became
578 clear that the returned warrior was winning the greater support.
[788] In the face of this, the rival, in 1948, decided to break with tradi-
tion by staying away from the annual pilgrimage to the tomb of
[175] the local saint. Instead, he and his followers made their pilgrim-
age to a different tomb in the vicinity of their camp, and later
built a low wall round the tomb, whitewashed it, and made it
known that henceforward they would regularly use it for pilgrim-
[613] ages. The two kinship groups of a tertiary section now had their
[778] separate saint's tomb. Some months later, the rival decided to
794 move with his small group to an area in which they had not pre-
viously resided. It is the custom among the Bedouin when they
554 pitch their tents in a place for the first time, that the people of
578 the neighbourhood should bring them gifts to mark the event.
431 The returned warrior, who had now become a close neighbour
[166] of his rival was obliged, like others, to offer the latter a gift; he
was also obliged to return the gift of a sheep that he had been
given on rejoining his section in 1947. He brought a gift within a
few hours of his rival's arrival, but it was a goat.[14] The rival and
his followers were furious, and the argument that the warrior was
too poor to give more was dismissed summarily. This was the
final insult. The donor, in return, had been given less than he had
presented. The reciprocity of gift exchanges had not only been
arrested, it had been reversed. From then onwards the two groups
made no attempt to conceal their hostility and went their sepa-
rate ways.

613 Disputes stemming from circumstances such as these are the
578 occasions which mark the proliferation of groups, although in
all three cases cited, difficulties over water supplies had pre-
ceded the outbreaks of quarrelling.

613 In this discussion of the ways in which proliferation of seg-
602 ments takes place, the emphasis had been put on the tug of war
121 between the interests of people in their agnatic connexions and

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[14] A goat is inferior to a sheep in gift exchanges.

121 kill within this range is, in terms of the general pattern of behaviour, stupid. What is of
613 interest is that such killings do occur. I recorded three instances of men killing the
682 mother's brother in the contemporary population, not to mention many others
674 based on hearsay evidence only. Clearly, the relationship is more than a merely per-
829 missive one. The mother's brother may well be the only person who can help in
certain crises, and if he withholds his assistance the sister's son is left in a dilemma.
604 The form of behaviour in which demands are made is, as the Bedouin rightly say,
121 that of asking a favour, but this does not mean that it is any the less urgent than a
613 demand made against agnates. The range of favours is large, and only a few can be
detailed here. If a group has insufficient water to meet its needs a man first seeks help
604 from his mother's brother. The request has a number of aspects to it: it is a test of
● [554] the relationship itself; it is a matter of pride and status that a man can 'call' on
another to help his group out of difficulties, it is an assurance that resources other than
those jealously guarded by his agnates are available to him, and if a man is seeking
to increase his power he must have available more than an agnate's share of local
[682] water resources to supply his flocks and herds. When a blood-money payment has to
be made, the mother's brother is expected to come forward—it is his right to give
[584] without being asked. If a man wants a wife, he is not permitted to approach his father
directly, but his mother's brother can put pressure on the father instead. If a man dies
[429] while his eldest son is still a minor, his brother may be required to act as guardian,
and in this role he controls the son's property; disputes frequently break out as a
result, with the son at a considerable disadvantage, for he cannot engage his father's
brother in hostilities—but his mother's brother can do so for him. Whenever men
[422] come to possess animals before the demise of their fathers or when the father's
brother is acting as guardian they mark them with the tribal and personal signs of their
[583] mothers' brothers. Men have the right to demand contributions for bridewealth
from their agnates if they lack wealth; in practice it comes not from them, but from
the mother's brother. Finally, in certain circumstances, if a man does not have male
heirs, his sister's son might inherit all his wealth.

121 Affinity also carries with it a large number of rights. A poor man may take up
residence in the camp of his father-in-law, and be kept by him. The latter may come
613 to his son-in-law's aid in many of his dealings with his father. Like the mother's
606 brother, the affine is a potential source of water-supply when rain has been insufficient
on the homeland. He also helps with blood money and bridewealth, and he is expected
to aid his daughter and her husband with gifts of food and wool.

121 The details given above by no means exhaust the list of rights a man possesses in
his matrilateral and affinal relatives. Obviously, these are not the only forms of
613 relationship either, and the other forms carry with them yet other claims of various
sorts. Enough detail has been given, however, to make clear the point that local
agnatic groups are so differentiated, and inter-group relationships are so important,
that each aspect of homicide settlement previously described will require further
examination, not in the sense that additional complications must be introduced, but
with the question in mind, is not the structural presentation false? Before beginning
this stage of the argument it is necessary to establish the fact that the links of affinity
and matrilaterality which a group has with another are of a kind which necessitate
their inclusion in an analysis of the arrangements for settling homicides.

121 celebrated war between the ʻAbaidat and the Baraʻasa tribes occupying a large part
619 of central and eastern Cyrenaica. This war took place a hundred years ago, so that the
682 evidence is mainly hearsay, but it is significant that when asked for details of the
726 groups taking part the Bedouin make it clear that the entire tribes were not at war—
[173] some sections on both sides are said to have remained on friendly terms. Yet when
121 wars are discussed in a general fashion, the Bedouin insist that tribes confront each
619 other as such. If it is pointed out to them that men might be ranged against their
maternal relatives the Bedouin mumble apologetically that they would not kill their
726 maternal relatives—a lame argument since in the heat of battle men cannot make this
602 kind of discrimination. Details of other wars also illustrate the point that only parts
of tribes face each other in strife, for though the stories of past events may be inaccurate
there is genealogical evidence to substantiate their claims that certain groups
were linked in the past, and in any case their statements assert that where these links
exist they are not prepared to engage in hostilities. The several parts of each tribe,
121 like the parts of primary and secondary sections, have as many different sorts of
619 relationships as there are groups, and the general statement that tribes are warring
571 units merely obscures the interest there is in their relationships. Tribes, further, lack
the leadership to make war. I repeat that leadership does exist, but not even the
121 greatest leaders, past or present, can rightly be described as leaders of their tribes,
619 using the term in its structural connotation. Literature on the subject gives the
613 impression that there are tribal leaders, because successive administrations have used
• 554 the tribes and their divisions as a framework for attempting to rule the Bedouin, but
the details of the power domains of individual leaders make it clear that they have
little to do with the ordered divisions of tribes. A leader within part of one tribe may
carry with him tertiary sections of another tribe, and if major hostilities break out
between parts of these tribes, the sections of both which are joined as allies and
related as kinsfolk will not fight against each other, for sections so linked enjoy
stronger connexions than the structurally linked tertiary sections of a very large
[682] secondary section. Consequently the statement that homicide results in tribal war
[114] when the offender and his victim are members of two separate tribes is not merely
incomplete, not merely a simplification, it is wrong.

121 A point which has been implicit throughout the second part of this paper needs
now to be made quite explicit: groups do not come together in their respective
613 structural genealogical orders. During my entire residence in Cyrenaica I did not
571 see a group of agnates larger than a tertiary tribal section assemble for any purpose.
[114] It is true that the occasions when large groups are required to assemble are infrequent.
[648] It is also true that although the British Administration was serving a caretaker role
only, it may have had an affect on the nature of tribal gatherings. Despite this qualification,
there were several occasions when I expected tribal groups to assemble in
lineage order if the fusion of sections in relation to like sections has any meaning in
practice. Large groups of men did gather to dispute claims to wells, to argue about
rights to ploughland, and to make peace. In every case that I recorded the agnatically
closest groups of the main participants were absent, while members of genealogically
more remote groups were present in strength. This statement applies to gatherings
[628] in the camps and in the administrative centres. One of the biggest gatherings I
witnessed assembled in an administrative office in a village near the coast in the

571 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
231 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.

264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at mar-
585 riage nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
[556] tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain "as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
857 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
233 the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
776 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[771] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
• [554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
[613] lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly cap-
[602] tured by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations.* Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves de- 796
pend not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or elec- 852
tion to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying 889
with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an 554 •
individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes 602
the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are 613
thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, [557]
become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and 585
burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying cere- 764
monies may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise 796
rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neigh- 602
bours, and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the 182
significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes
brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be
considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman 585
over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Mar- 581
riage causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the poten- [613]
tial of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father [593]
that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of
wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be 682
observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[5] he may flee his 613
tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when 621
he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to
suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and 835
it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and 561
also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of [595]
spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three gen-
erations. Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his
father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were
first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a [582]
father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents
the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's
sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his [684]
father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be

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[5] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.

835 devoured by wild animals, the girl was "given"* to a close cousin who had
561 shot his sister. Both now reside with an enemy tribal section. The two acts
684 were equated. They were similar to the extent that both created a situation
which defied institutional resolution. The culprits were exorcised. The girl's lover remains with his group — the odium for the male is incomparably less than for the female, since, while maternity is easy to establish, paternity is frequently shrouded in doubt — and during the months I lived with this particular group, there was never a mention of the affair. It was as if "nothing had happened."

829 If asked why these two events cause such profound distress, the answers
578 the Bedouin give are twofold: they can do nothing about them, and they
cause split. By split in this context they mean split in the lineage; split in
613 the case of homicide because it may lead to a demand for blood-money which
[682] is payable only between corporations, and split in the case of incest because
[684] it causes chaos in relationships. Marriage, in one sense, their reasoning
581 runs, is similar, for it too causes split. Whatever may be the analytic strength
829 of the arguments that homicide and incest precipitate splitting, the argument that marriage does so is spurious. In what sense can marriage mean
613 split? Bedouin men marry "so that we may beget many sons, to make a
big lineage later on." The worst fate that can befall a man as a result of his son's marriage is that he, in later generations, will become the focal point in a series of branching descent lines. The alternative — that his sons remain unmarried — can only mean that his name would disappear through want of successors to carry it on, which is one of the greatest evils which can befall a man, according to Bedouin sentiment: better split than oblivion. If the key to the interpretation of the father's attitude to his son's marriage is not
581 that it causes split, it must lie elsewhere in their relationship. What mar-
585 riage does is alter the distribution of authority between father and son. In
593 order to pursue this, it is necessary first to clarify the types of authority involved, and then assess them in a post-marital situation.

554 The Division of Authority Between the Family and the Corporation

851 Politically, a person's status is determined for him at birth. At this time a man has the right to accept or deny paternity. Denial is tantamount to an accusation of adultery by his wife. In practice, once a wife has given birth to a male child, whatever doubts people may harbour regarding paternity, the husband accepts the child as his. "The boy for the bed," is a saying often heard among the Bedouin; but it remains the husband's prerogative to invest
[837] the child with legitimacy, hence, political status. Only if a husband becomes
aware that he is publicly considered a cuckold, or if he catches his wife and a lover *in flagrante delicto*, is he at all likely to take action. Otherwise he may

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[585] [581] * A marriage is illegal unless it is accompanied by an agreement to transfer wealth to the girl's father.

indeed welcome unfaithfulness on his wife's part. If a man is very old, and 554
his wife very young, it is likely that she will entertain lovers; if a man leaves 851
camp for a long absence his wife may not remain chaste. In both cases, if 837
the liaisons lead to the birth of a child, particularly a male, the husband
greets the news with unrestrained enthusiasm — "praise be to God," as their
saying goes. Incapacity[7] to produce offspring, if a husband is convinced of
it, may lead him to delegate a kinsman to serve his wife for procreative purposes:
he has the legal authority, as husband, to do so, and to require his
wife to submit, for the only alternative, if he is not to die without "issue,"
is to "take" a son from his brother and fulfill the obligations towards this
boy required of a pater, namely, attend to his circumcision, provide him with
teaching in the Koran (a duty neglected by most) and give him the wealth
with which to marry.

Granting the acceptance of paternity, whatever the circumstances of conception, 593
a male child, *ipso facto*, acceeds to membership of a corporation, and 554
is subject to the authority of that group in a number of matters. In many [851]
situations it would appear that a son is under the father's political control. [613]
At a moot, the son, if he speaks at all, will do so only to corroborate his
father. Discussions among men in a small camp evoke a similar pattern of
behaviour. Until the father becomes senile or dies, a son cannot publicly
pursue an independent course, but he desists by virtue of his relationships
with his father *qua* pater, not because of his father's political power to
coerce. All men of a corporation, in any event, "speak with one word" at [613]
a moot, and a son, by his assent to the common view, also supports his
father; in so doing he yields to the political authority of his corporation, and
not that of his father.

Membership in the corporation invests a man with other privileges and 593
duties. Protection against external enemies comes within the corporation's 613
jurisdiction, although in a particular situation, the father may well be the
person who dispenses it. Complimentarily, if a man commits an offense [681]
against a person not of his group, whatever private thoughts his father may
have about the act, the responsibility lies not on his shoulders but on the
group, and he is compelled to share this responsibility equally with all other
members. For example, if a son commits a homicide the father bears the [682]
same legal responsibility for the act, and is under obligation to contribute the
same share of blood-money as he would be if the act had been perpetrated
by any male of the group other than his son. Even in a narrower field of
relations between father and son the group exercises its authority. Acting
as pater, a man may punish his son, physically or otherwise; he may not
do so to the point of injury, for personal injury comes within the legitimate
sphere of the corporation. A man's "bone" belongs to his group; he is an in-

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[7] Impotency is a special case, because it is dishonourable for a woman to remain [833]
wife to an impotent man. She cannot divorce him, but her father can insist on a
witnessed test of impotency and, if it is proven, the husband is compelled to divorce [586]
her. Barrenness, obviously, is a different matter.

613

her father takes, but in certain critical situations he can be relieved of choice 593
if the interests of the group as a whole are at stake. [421]

Political authority is the preserve of a corporation, and its exercise leads [428]
to invasion of a man's authority in the field of domestic relations. This [584]
does not mean, however, that discrete areas of authority do not remain with
the father. In the tent his authority over his son is so overwhelming as to
keep the son in almost complete subordination. The son is referred to as a
slave, and in daily life he has to behave as one. He must obey every command,
for, were he to rebel, he would find little or no support among his
agnates, whatever the extent of the provocation. Retreat from his father is
hardly an alternative, since, while his father is alive, he has no animals of [422]
his own, and to leave camp would only mean that he would have to move
outside his group to seek employment elsewhere as a shepherd. If he did [558]
this he would forfeit status, and almost certainly cut himself off from property [428]
which would fall to him after his father's death. A man who "denies"
his father looses too many privileges for the practice to become widespread.

Caught in this dilemma, a son's predicament is worsened by the fact that 593
he cannot initiate marriage negotiations — to be able to do so requires some 584
animals to offer a girl's father. Through his mother's brother he has the [431]
means of bringing pressure to bear on his father, but the latter can resist for [604]
years. Finally, a marriage is arranged for him. It is difficult to convey the 581
yearning of young Bedouin for marriage. They discuss it among themselves 521
ad nauseam. For the most part their talk is about the sexual aspect of marriage. 831
Premarital sex relations are strictly controlled, and the movements
of each young girl are carefully guarded because, if on the day of her marriage 836
the test shows that she is not a virgin, she not only brings disgrace to [585]
her family, but the marriage may be revoked and her worth as a bride for
another man seriously diminished. Nevertheless premarital relations do [837]
occur, if not between youths and maidens to any extent, between young
men and married women.

The question still remains: why is marriage the occasion of such ebullient 581
celebration? The formal authority a father exercises over his son 593
changes little on marriage. Economically the son is still harnessed to the
father. The latter still shouts his orders at him, and obedience remains
unaltered. Any sign of an independent view on a matter is met with a gruff
rebuff. If the marriage turns out to be disagreeable to the father, he has
the authority — if not always the power — to break it. Marriage does not
mean a change in the general mode of behaviour between the two; the legal
relations remain unaltered, albeit modified in practice, as the married son
matures in age. But marriage does mean the acquisition of rights and status
previously denied a son. Henceforward, he has a domain of his own. This
is high drama, indeed, for although every effort is made to give substance to [554]
the expressed view that "nothing has happened," for the first time in his
life the son has seized publicly, amid the jubilations of his fellows, a status
which hitherto was the possession of the father.

daughters of agnates and, in view of the high agnatic concentration, the 582 daughters of agnates who are co-residents as well. Parallel-cousin marriage 602 therefore creates affinity between co-resident agnates.

The rate of parallel-cousin marriage is high, producing such a density of kinship relationships as to afford a reliable index for defining the agnatic corporation. As a form of marriage it persists; genealogical records clearly demonstrate this. Frequency of parallel-cousin marriage taken together with its persistency, means, above all else, that it makes an agnatic group a cognatic group as well. The matter is put in this way to suit the general development of the argument, but it would be a serious error to think that this means I am giving priority to agnation and that I am considering cognation as intrusive, or that, in this society, agnation can stand on its own because it has a kind of absolute significance other forms of relationship do not possess. Both forms exist in reality.

The great Bu Bakr of Cyrenaica's most celebrated lineage is alleged to have [613] exhorted his fellow tribesmen to "marry your father's brother's daughters and then your paternal relatives and your maternal relatives will become one." Whether he had given the advice or not, the Bedouin, as their society is constituted, would marry them anyway. The Bedouin form of agnation without its accompanying parallel-cousin marriage would impose impossible restrictions, if indeed there is any point in attempting to conceive of a situation so remote from reality. With parallel-cousin marriage present in the [613] corporate group, men referred to as agnates are not agnates only; each and every one of them is the centre of a bundle of roles, each role potentially [554] as important as the other. It would be false to argue, moreover, that complexities of relationships can be unravelled by analytically separating them, giving precedence to the agnatic role in an "agnatic" situation, the mother's brother's role in a domestic situation and so on. An agnate who is also a mother's brother is never the same, in any situation, as an agnate to whom one is not otherwise related. The prime significance of parallel-cousin marriage is that it creates a complexity of linkages which almost amount to confusion, [182] thereby maximising the choice available to individuals to meet whatever contingencies befall them.

The only area of relationships left relatively undisturbed by parallel-cousin marriage is the son, father and father's brother triangle. Freed of the complications stemming from parallel-cousin marriage, agnation can here approximate its true form. Other complications arise out of marriage. A 582 few are listed here: father and son marry a mother and her daughter; a 583 form of exchange marriage between first parallel-cousins occur; two brothers marry two sisters; the marriage of two brothers to two sisters is followed, in the succeeding generation, by the son of one union marrying the daughter of the other, making this latter a double first parallel-cousin marriage — both a father's brother's daughter's and a mother's sister's daughter's marriage. These forms can all occur within a corporate group. No citadel of agnation [613] can withstand this attack. All forms of marriage combine to break the grip [602]

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in position immediately anyone else appears at the entrance to the tent.[11] [834]
Women cook, but they do not serve the meal to males, nor are they responsible [342]
for the distribution of meat among them. Parts of an animal are [264]
carefully specified, and the various portions distributed at a meal carry 264
with them a great deal of significance. A host can honour, flatter, disappoint 574
or even insult his guest, depending on the precise distribution of meat 571
he adopts. Designated portions should go to certain kinsmen if they are [602]
present, but this still leaves a wide margin of choice, and a host can use
this choice as part of the many means at his disposal for directing his relationships
with other men. A political link can be forged or another
snapped by the distribution of portions of meat at the commensal meal.

The Bedouin Ideal Type of Family as a Unit of Production

This account of the division of labour is far from inclusive of all the tasks 594
carried out. The details given are only barely sufficient to provide some 183
indication of the necessary composition of a family. Referring again to the [462]
Bedouin sentiments about the matter, it is now possible to give it some
numerical precision. The number of females should be a minimum of
about three, including a mother, a teen-age daughter and a child of about
eight years. Males should number about six: a father, relieved of most [857]
chores to act as director; a son in his middle to late twenties, to plough; a [883]
second son, in his early to middle twenties, to herd the camels; a third, in [462]
his late teens to early twenties, to shepherd the sheep; a fourth, middle to [561]
late teens, to look after the goats; and a younger son to fetch, carry and
run errands about the camp. The family of the ordinary Bedouin, they say, [554] •
shows this sex and age distribution, although they recognise that a politically
ambitious man with the wealth to match his aspirations would require more [556]
of both sexes — particularly women, since the burden of entertainment increases
rapidly with a man's climb to power and fame.

Clearly, the basis of Bedouin sentiment concerning family structure is its 121
approximation to an ideal production unit. Some families display the features 183
of this ideal, but even they enjoy the productive benefits of this composition
for a very limited period only. The family, as described above, can only be an 594
ephemeral unit, since the age structure constantly changes, women are removed
by marriage, men move away and death affects it at any point at any
time. The Bedouin family is a fiction in the sense that it can be said to have a
characteristic composition. The mistake they make is to conceive of it as a
particular kinship structure related to production. The substance of what
has been referred to as a fiction is that, if viewed as a productive unit, it
bears close consistency with reality. Freed of the need to examine it in terms [621]
of specifically limited kinship relationships, and no longer anchored to the
inhabitants of a single tent, the distribution of people according to sex and

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[11] This is the general rule. In practice, the use of the divider can indicate an intimacy or distance in relationships, most subtly.

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the 621
universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links 613
are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group 582
claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, 182
is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other [423]
tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry [433]
into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent [619]
of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can
claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7
per cent of the total[13] are marriages with women of other tribes, which
again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal
area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly different
ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power
ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In
one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and
attention is now directed to the latter.

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically 621
on the page following. 592

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful *Shaikh*, [554]
the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a [619]
group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a [428]
few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable
property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the
tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time
he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger
brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long
because negotiations for his marriage had been started. His father (2) married [582]
a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) [587]
in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was
agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was [583]
"put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her
husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's
tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. It was widely [428]
known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second [562]
son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's
corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a 621
temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit 592
was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the 574
possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. [604]
His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after [431]
consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also
when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and, [231]

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[13] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

ameliorated in its protein content, particularly by the generosity of the occupants 621
of the nucleating Tent A. Not that they are the only ones who ever 574
slaughter their animals for food. Others do so, albeit much less frequently. 231
Whoever kills an animal, everyone present in the camp is given a share, and 262
the men always eat in the tent of the donor, sitting around one bowl. Thus, 431
the surplus that builds up at one point is redistributed among those suffering [556]
a shortage, and meat, in a society where the climate and way of life militate against its storage for more than a few days, is more efficiently used. Many other general economic points could be deduced. These general statements could, however, be made of practically any camp, whatever the specific differences.

Affinity and Matrilaterality in the Structure of the Camp

Economic considerations determine the general structure of these small 621
camps, but do not account for the particular people gathered in them. Per- 613
haps one of the most striking features of these camps, which comes out 602
clearly in the one discussed here, is the confined agnatic span which links the males. Lest it be underestimated, I wish to stress the profound significance of this fact. While granting its importance it is equally necessary to stress that the span, potentially, could be considerably reduced; in some camps it is. Many of the closer agnates of the men of this camp are not shown on the genealogy included with the diagram; (7), (15) and (16), for example, all have brothers, (12) has a large number of first paternal cousins and so on. Therefore, this particular cluster of agnates formed for reasons other than agnatic ties. The most direct single thread connecting Tents A, B and C is that which runs through women. Men of many other camps are all linked in this way, directly. Five tents of this camp are connected through a female link to a common ancestress, whose name still defines the group, two ascending generations for one adult male, three from others and four from others. If greater elaboration could have been shown on the genealogy without confusion, additional links through women could have been demonstrated. Affinity and matrilaterality are the prime movers in bringing agnates together as neighbours.

Other Factors Affecting the Structure of the Camp

Other considerations narrow the area in choice of residence. The quest 621
for power where every man entertains hope of achievement where ambitions 571
are not stifled by the rigour of rank and a small amount of wealth provides 554•
a basis for a beginning is also a significant factor in considering the composition of camps. The generosity of the people in Tent A was not entirely altruistic. Justly, it had won them repute, but the repute itself was an important aspect of the political power they enjoyed. They also acquired the services of several men to manage their animals, an impossible strain for them alone. And with their shepherds and herdsmen they secured devoted followers. It was hinted in discussing the structure of the camp that changes

62 were imminent, because the marriages of two of the men were anticipated,
57 two others harboured more distant hopes and boys in all the tents would soon
[554] be youths. The composition of this camp, caught at a moment in time, was
a function of the age and sex distribution of its inhabitants. All camps
show regularities in their structure, but their content is dynamic. Certain
general features persist, but the alignments of people undergo change with
[128] equal persistency. What priority is given to each of these considerations,
which component occupies the nucleating centre for others, will depend on
the problem under analysis, for while I have stressed that this or that is
important, I do not wish to suggest that any single factor has an absolute
importance compared with others, except in relation to a specific problem.

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619 The independent Sa'adi tribes fall into four groups :

1. The Jawazi, Fawayid, and Rammah, all of common origin with the 'Awaqir of Cyrenaica.
2. The Harabi and Bar'asa, both of common origin with the 'Ibeidat of Cyrenaica.
3. The Hanadi, and
4. The Awlad 'Ali

[173] The original ancestor whom these Sa'adi all claim is one Abu Dib, said to be of Suleim descent.

175 This sheikh was a real personage and a contemporary
554 of Ibn Khaldun (who died in A.D. 1406). He was sheikh
619 of the Beni Ja'afir, and a man of great importance in Barka,
the very place that the four tribes inhabited for centuries before
they came to Egypt. Also the period of fifteen or sixteen
generations, which the modern Bedouin assert to separate them
from Abu Dib, agrees with this chronology well enough.[1]

619 Some are found to assert that their title of Sa'adi "helping"
[173] is derived from an ancestress called Sa'ada, the wife of Abu
Dib, or, according to a hostile account, of a Jew called Yana.
But the real explanation of the term has already been given
above.

619 At the present day a sort of feudal system prevails both
651 in Egypt and Cyrenaica, by which families are *mrabit*,[2] or
vassal families, not tribes to tribes ; thus the Qat'an tribe of
Murabitin is divided, one part vassal to a family of Awlad
'Ali el-Ahmar, another to the Sinaqra, and a third to the
Sinana. For a tribute called "alms", which by hereditary
obligation each Mrabit family must pay, the Sa'adi family
to which it is attached is bound to afford the Mrabit family
protection in all minor difficulties of life, such as robbery
by another family of Sa'adi, etc.

Thus a "Mrabit" family by paying tribute can herd its flocks in peace, calling upon the Sa'adi to see that justice is done them, but they are bound to join the Sa'adi to fight with them in any serious conflict with other tribes.

Among the "Mrabit" tribes of the present day are the Jumei'at, Qat'an, and Awlad Suleiman, all claiming as common ancestor one Ka'b, and feudal relations are

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[1] The pedigrees of which these Western Bedouin are so proud can only be trusted so far back as the individual whose name a subdivision has adopted, such as Kharûf in the Awlad Kharûf pedigree. Taking them separately, the pedigrees will be found to dovetail into each other up to that point, but beyond it things become problematical.

[2] Sing. of "Murabitin".